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Abstract 
Post-legislative scrutiny in the UK Parliament became a formal part of committee 
activity in 2008 and to date there have been no systematic studies either in the UK 
or elsewhere. The limited literature that does exist on post-legislative scrutiny is 
restricted mainly to parliamentary reports. As such this research helps to fill an 
important gap in the academic literature. The thesis contributes to the conceptual 
understanding of scrutiny, accountability and responsibility as well as how these 
concepts interact with and impact upon post-legislative scrutiny. The research 
follows a mixed methods approach, focusing upon the content analysis of post-
legislative scrutiny reports with a particular focus upon the recommendations 
made and their acceptance by the government. These findings are supported by 
several case studies of post-legislative scrutiny inquiries. Drawing upon interviews 
with stakeholders, these case studies permit examination of the process of post-
legislative scrutiny in much greater detail. 
 
The research finds that while post-legislative scrutiny is more extensive than it first 
appears, the majority of committees do not engage with it formally. There is also a 
selection bias in terms of the post-legislative scrutiny undertaken thus far, which 
focuses upon the legislation of the 1997-2010 Labour Governments. There is a 
strong relationship between the strength of post-legislative recommendations and 
their acceptance. As a result it is argued that committees deploy a strategy of 
producing weaker recommendations order to get more of them accepted. Finally, 
the research finds that while there is evidence of post-legislative scrutiny having 
impact, there is also untapped potential for further impact should committees in 
both Houses start following up on their inquiries formally. While there is evidence 
of post-legislative scrutiny making a difference there is room for improvement in 
terms of its extent, selection and impact. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
One of the main roles of legislatures is to create laws. However it is only more 
recently that legislatures have begun to consider formally evaluating whether these 
laws subsequently meet the objectives set at the time of passage. In the UK 
Parliament, post-legislative scrutiny has been, in various forms, one of the core 
tasks of departmental select committees in the House of Commons (House of 
Commons Liaison Committee, 2012) since 2002.  
Post-legislative scrutiny is defined by the Law Commission of England and Wales 
as; 
“A broad form of review, the purpose of which is to address the 
effects of legislation in terms of whether intended policy objectives 
have been met by the legislation and, if so, how effectively. However 
this does not preclude consideration of narrow questions of a purely 
legal or technical nature”. (Law Commission, 2006: 7) 
 
This is an important definition. Both the UK Government and Parliament 
employed it when developing the current system of post-legislative review which 
underpins the post-2008 system of post-legislative scrutiny. As the Law 
Commission noted in their report on post-legislative scrutiny, the vast majority of 
respondents to their consultation stated that post-legislative scrutiny serves a 
much broader purpose than a narrow review of legal consequences (Law 
Commission, 2006).  
De Vrieze & Hasson (2017) state that post-legislative scrutiny holds two distinct 
functions. There is firstly a function relating to the monitoring of the 
implementation of legislation. Secondly, there is an evaluation function relating to 
whether or not the aims of an Act are reflected in the results and effects of 
legislation once implemented. 
These definitions provide us with a preliminary understanding of post-legislative 
scrutiny. However there is an absence of systematic study of post-legislative 
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scrutiny. We do not know how the process operates in practice.  Currently we do 
not know how many times post-legislative scrutiny has been undertaken and we 
do not have a full understanding of which committees have and have not been 
undertaking it, and their reasons why. In addition we do not know what the 
outcomes of this scrutiny is in terms of what recommendations committees have 
been producing and whether or not the government has been accepting those 
recommendations. Indeed, we also know very little about how committees are 
undertaking this function and what their views are of this scrutiny.  
The aim of this exploratory study is therefore to provide a detailed analysis of the 
extent and the outcomes of the post-legislative scrutiny undertaken by committees 
in the UK Parliament. In order to meet this aim, the thesis will answer the following 
research questions: 
1. How extensively has post-legislative scrutiny been undertaken by 
committees in the UK Parliament 
a. How frequently has post-legislative scrutiny been 
undertaken between the 2005-10 and 2015-2017 Parliaments 
and what factors have determined this?  
b. Are there patterns regarding which committees undertake 
such scrutiny? 
c. What are the characteristics of the legislation reviewed by 
post-legislative scrutiny?  
 
2. What recommendations have arisen from post-legislative scrutiny 
inquiries and how frequently have they been accepted by the UK 
Government?  
 
3. What has the experience been of committees undertaking post-
legislative scrutiny in the UK Parliament? 
While it has been possible for some time for committees to scrutinise the 
implementation of legislation, the current approach has now been running for a 
decade in the House of Commons and for five years in the House of Lords without 
20 
an understanding of how it is actually operating. This is therefore a timely study. 
This thesis fills an important gap in our knowledge of how this particular function 
of committees in the UK Parliament is undertaken. It allows us to identify whether 
any modifications to the processes of post-legislative scrutiny are necessary. This 
study is also timely in the sense that post-legislative scrutiny is becoming more 
formalised in legislatures across the world, for example in South-Eastern Asia (De 
Vrieze & Hasson, 2017). Yet, formalised post-legislative scrutiny in legislatures 
elsewhere in the world is also under-studied. The assessment of post-legislative 
scrutiny provided in the UK has the potential to inform decisions taken in other 
legislatures about whether to adopt the UK’s system of post-legislative scrutiny. 
The UK Parliament is being studied as a case study more generally in this research. 
This was important due to the lack of literature on post-legislative scrutiny 
comparatively. In order to begin to develop this literature there is a need to 
undertake in-depth analysis of a singular case in which the details of how post-
legislative scrutiny operates in practice can be assessed. Such a study could then 
be used as a foundation upon which other studies into post-legislative scrutiny can 
launch from (Gillham, 2000). Once an in-depth study is complete, there is research 
upon which future studies can compare their findings. While there are limitations 
with the perceived inability to generalise the findings of case study research 
(particularly in this case as parliamentary systems can differ quite broadly), being 
able to apply the findings of this research outside of the UK Parliament or other 
Westminster style legislatures is not the aim of this study.   
 
 Why is post-legislative scrutiny important and necessary? 
It is important to place post-legislative scrutiny into the context of the legislative 
process in the UK Parliament, not because post-legislative scrutiny can solve every 
problem (it cannot) but because it provides parliament with an opportunity to 
think again about the legislation it has passed. The need for post-legislative 
scrutiny, the Law Commission argues, arises within the context of an increasing 
volume of legislation being enacted in each session of parliament (Law 
Commission, 2006).  
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Fox & Korris, (2010) and Korris (2011) have argued that the sheer number of bills 
being produced and initiated, combined with their increasing complexity, places 
pressure on the legislative process as well as parliamentary time and resources. 
Their argument is that the volume of legislation is having a detrimental impact 
upon the amount of scrutiny such bills receive and subsequently, upon their 
operation.  
However research by Vollmer & Badger (2013) shows that there has in fact been a 
fall in the number of bills being introduced per session. Despite this fall in the 
number of bills, the length of legislation has increased (Greenberg, 2016). While 
the Law Commission argues that post-legislative scrutiny would not stem the flow 
of legislation from the government, it does necessitate a process of reflection (Law 
Commission, 2006). This reflection and the knowledge that Acts could be selected 
for review by a parliamentary committee, it is argued, would lead the government 
to take greater care when drafting legislation so as not to face criticism later in the 
Act’s life.  
The drafting of legislation has also been criticised for starting too late and being 
rushed (Rippon, 1993) in order to meet strict deadlines (Slapper & Kelly, 2015), 
which can lead to a lack of clarity within legislation. This leads to further criticism 
surrounding complex and difficult to follow legislation (Fox & Korris, 2010; Slapper 
& Kelly, 2015), in which lawyers struggle to comprehend laws. In essence the 
problem is with both demand and supply, an increasing level of complexity over 
the issues both government and parliament face, mixed with issues surrounding 
resources. 
Public bill committees in the House of Commons are frequently criticised as being 
ineffective in terms of scrutinising legislation (Thompson, 2015). Brazier (2004) 
argues that public bill committees deliver weak and incomplete scrutiny, as 
substantial changes are not usually made to bills at this stage, and bills often leave 
committee without full line by line scrutiny. Greenberg (2015) has argued that 
public bill committees in the UK barely undertake clause by clause scrutiny of bills, 
never mind line by line scrutiny due to a lack of appetite from committee members. 
Research by Thompson (2013) showed that on average committees make 53 
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amendments per bill but the vast majority of these amendments are government 
sponsored. Indeed bills are rarely amended against the wishes of the government, 
given the membership of public bill committees is decided by the party whips. This 
ensures that even the most controversial bills get a relatively smooth passage 
(Brazier, 2003; Brazier, Kalitowski, & Rosenblatt, 2007; Rippon, 1993).  
However, the government’s strength is overstated and the influence of opposition 
and government backbenchers is often masked in public bill committees (Russell, 
Gover, & Wollter, 2016; Thompson, 2013). Russell et al. (2016) noted that most of 
the substantive amendments moved by the government are a result of 
parliamentary pressure. Russell & Cowley, (2016) also noted that around 75% of all 
government amendments contained little policy substance and were rather 
technical or clarification amendments. The House of Lords is also able to limit the 
executive’s dominance over the process as it is not subject to programming, has no 
government majority and thus has greater flexibility over how it considers 
legislation and all amendments that are tabled are also debated and voted on 
(Norton, 2013).  
While the legislative process is perhaps more effective than many suggest, it is still 
a process that sees legislation enter into law without full scrutiny. As such post-
legislative scrutiny provides parliament with a mechanism to address legislation 
that for whatever reason, might not be operating as intended or achieving its 
objectives.  
If bills are poorly drafted and lack thorough scrutiny, they are more likely to 
contain mistakes or problems. Consequently, government may be unable to 
effectively implement the legislation and ensure intended policy objectives are 
met. This provides a reason as to why post-legislative scrutiny is an important and 
necessary function for parliament to be able to undertake. 
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 Post-legislative scrutiny in the UK Parliament 
Having outlined the context that post-legislative scrutiny operates in and the 
research questions, it is important to outline how the formal process operates in 
the UK Parliament in order to provide some background knowledge of how the 
system is expected to operate. The definition provided by the Law Commission 
relates to what are considered to be the purposes and benefits of post-legislative 
scrutiny. The main reasons and benefits cited by the Law Commission (2006) for 
the undertaking of post-legislative scrutiny were;  
 To assess whether legislation is working out in practice and, if not, to determine 
the reasons why and to offer solutions to rectify any problems.  
 
 To produce better regulations. The Law Commission suggests that post-
legislative scrutiny should lead to better regulation due to the increased focus 
upon how Acts and subsequent regulations operate. 
 
 To focus on implementation. With the knowledge that post-legislative scrutiny 
might one day be undertaken, it might concentrate the government’s mind on 
the task of implementing legislation and its likely effects. 
 
 To improve the delivery of policy aims, in the sense that it should provide a 
spur to those who work in the delivery of policy in ensuring that aims have been 
met. 
 
 To locate good practice and disseminate it in order to help both the executive 
and legislature learn how to avoid creating legislation with unintended 
consequences. 
 
 To improve the quality of legislation in the sense that with the knowledge that 
legislation could be formally reviewed, it might have the effect of improving the 
drafting and scrutiny of legislation (Law Commission, 2006) 
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Rogers & Walters (2015) argue that post-legislative scrutiny might be better served 
if it were undertaken outside parliament in a non-parliamentary context. However, 
parliament is best placed to determine whether or not intended policy objectives 
have been met as this is a political judgement and as such, should be made by a 
political and accountable body. Additionally, it is parliament which passed the 
legislation in the first place and parliament which will be required to make 
legislative changes should they be required. It therefore makes sense for a political 
body to undertake such scrutiny, although there are consequences of doing so. For 
example, parliament is inherently political and it can prove challenging to remove 
politics completely from the equation.  
The Law Commission has warned against issues that could limit the effectiveness 
of post-legislative scrutiny. The first is the risk that post-legislative scrutiny 
becomes a replay of the arguments that were put forward during the passage of the 
bill (Law Commission, 2006). If it becomes overly partisan, it is likely to divide 
scrutiny along party lines and render such scrutiny useless. Secondly, it is 
dependent upon political will and judgement, as without such will, parliament is 
not going to want to undertake such scrutiny. Finally, there is an issue with 
resources (Law Commission, 2006). The resources available to parliament are 
finite. This includes both time and money and consideration needs to be taken as 
to how much of a demand post-legislative scrutiny will place on resources. 
The Law Commission ultimately suggested that post-legislative scrutiny in the UK 
Parliament should be more systematic. However the government disagreed with 
their suggestion of introducing a dedicated post-legislative scrutiny committee. 
Instead, in 2008, the government agreed to introduce a systematic process of post-
legislative review by government departments. Legislation would receive a 
departmental review within three to five years of that Act entering the statute 
books. Once such a review was completed, a memorandum containing its findings 
would be sent to the relevant departmental select committee in the House of 
Commons for additional scrutiny, if it was deemed necessary (Office of the Leader 
of the House of Commons, 2008). This is the formalised system that the House of 
Commons has operated since 2008. Although it was rarely used to begin with, there 
has been an increase in the number of published memoranda by government 
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departments. Between 2008 and 2010 only seven memoranda were published. By 
January 2013, fifty-eight memoranda had been published (Kelly & Everett, 2013). In 
addition, since 2012 ad hoc committees in the House of Lords have undertaken 
post-legislative scrutiny, with a promise of at least one inquiry per session (House 
of Lords Liaison Committee, 2012).  Now, every autumn, in an open call to Peers, 
the Lords Liaison Committee invites ideas for post-legislative scrutiny. 
 
In relation to this systematic process of post-legislative scrutiny, the government 
stated that the system must concentrate on appropriate Acts and not focus upon 
reviewing every Act passed by parliament. It should also avoid re-running the same 
policy debates that were conducted during the passage of the bill through the 
legislative process. Thirdly, such scrutiny should reflect the specific circumstances 
of each Act including any relevant secondary legislation. Finally, it should 
complement existing scrutiny undertaken by Commons select committees (Office 
of the Leader of the House of Commons, 2008). It is under these conditions that 
post-legislative scrutiny in the UK Parliament operates. 
 
1.2.1 Post-legislative scrutiny and committees  
In the House of Commons, post-legislative scrutiny is undertaken by departmental 
select committees (sessional committees) which shadow government 
departments. In the House of Lords it is undertaken by ad hoc committees, created 
to undertake a specific function. There are important differences between these 
types of committees. Sessional committees are formed for a full parliament 
whereas ad hoc committees cease to function after they have published their 
reports. The time available to committees differs. Sessional committees (such as 
departmental select committees) have nine other tasks to complete whereas ad hoc 
committees are given one task. This means they can spend more time on work such 
as post-legislative scrutiny. There is also a key difference in that the Lords do not 
receive post-legislative review memoranda from the government, unless they 
specifically request one. The process in the Lords provides the opportunity for 
Members and clerks to bring forward ideas for post-legislative scrutiny, outside of 
the governments agreed memoranda process in the Commons. 
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Ad hoc committees in the House of Lords are popular, especially with Members, 
as they allow for specific and topical issues to be examined without creating a 
permanent vehicle for doing so (Rogers & Walters, 2015). One benefit of using such 
committees is that with nine months for one inquiry a more comprehensive, in-
depth report is possible. There is a downside however, as they dissolve after they 
have reported. 
 
 Methods 
This section will address the different methods previous studies on the impact and 
effectiveness of parliamentary committees have undertaken as well as the 
advantages and disadvantages of these methods. Following on from this it will 
outline how these studies will help to shape the methodology of this research.  
 
1.3.1 Researching parliamentary committees 
To date there have been no systematic studies of post-legislative scrutiny and how 
it operates as a tool of legislatures. The literature that does exist on post-legislative 
scrutiny is limited to grey literature from think tanks (De Vrieze & Hasson, 2017; 
Law Commission, 2006) and from parliament itself (House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Constitution, 2004). There is therefore no direct theoretical or 
empirical literature on which to base this study. However there is a literature on 
parliamentary committees and their outcomes. These studies have been selected 
on the basis that they focus upon how committees undertake scrutiny and what 
impact they have. These studies provide a useful foundation to support the analysis 
of how committees engage with post-legislative scrutiny. 
Academics have taken various approaches when studying and assessing the impact 
of scrutiny in the UK and also in other countries with a Westminster-style 
legislature (White, 2015b). Some have adopted a quantitative methodology and 
have measured the impact of committees using indicators, including; whether 
committee recommendations are being accepted by the government, whether 
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references are made to committee work during parliamentary proceedings, 
whether any amendments to bills stem from committee recommendations, as well 
as citations of committee work in judicial decisions and media coverage (White, 
2015b).  
For example, Tolley (2009) undertook a study assessing the work of the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (JCHR). His research assessed the extent to which 
the JCHR contributes to more informed debates and prevents governments from 
passing legislation it wants without agreeing to any changes the JCHR 
recommends. His quantitative analysis measured how many references there were 
to the Joint Committee during floor debates in both Houses of Parliament and also 
the extent to which the Joint Committee’s recommendations went on to influence 
legislative and judicial outcomes (Tolley, 2009). He concluded that the jury was 
still out on whether or not the Joint Committee was effective. In most cases, the 
committee was unable to get the government to consider its views during drafting 
and during the legislative process too (Tolley, 2009; White, 2015b). The problem 
with this approach is that referencing the report during a debate does not 
necessarily mean the debate is more informed, unless the key points the specific 
MP made in relation to the report are analysed. 
Monk (2010) followed a mixed methods approach. He collected similar data to 
Tolley (2009) but analysed them through a methodology he developed (Monk, 
2010). In this method, he identified six groups of actors whose subjective views 
should be heard. These are: government, bureaucracy, the legislature, external 
shareholders, the judiciary and the public (Monk, 2010; White, 2015b). He defined 
a basic level of influence a positive agreement on the impact and influence of a 
committee report from one of these actors (White, 2015b).  
Others have also favoured a mixed methods approach. Hindmoor, Larkin, & 
Kennon (2009) when assessing how influential the House of Commons Education 
Committee was, identified a number of measures to assess the impact and 
influence of the committee on four sets of actors; government, parliament, the 
media and political parties (Hindmoor et al., 2009). These findings were 
contextualised by interviewing both politicians and civil servants. They concluded 
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that while there were examples of the committee having an impact on, and 
influencing policy, systematic influence was harder to pinpoint (Hindmoor et al., 
2009; White, 2015b). 
Following this research Benton & Russell (2013) undertook a comprehensive study 
of the policy impact of select committees in the House of Commons, using a mixed 
methods approach. Their aim was to assess how influential House of Commons 
select committees were in the policy process. Their methods included the coding 
of media coverage of select committees and the coding of recommendations, 
acceptance and the implementation of recommendations from the reports of seven 
select committees between 1997 and 2010 (Benton & Russell, 2013; Russell & 
Benton, 2011). 56 semi-structured interviews with committee chairs and members 
as well as committee staff and civil servants were also undertaken in order to 
explore less quantifiable parts of select committee influence (Russell & Benton, 
2011). The study found that of the recommendations clearly aimed at central 
government, 40% were formally accepted. They also found that around 44% of 
measurable recommendations went on to be implemented (Benton & Russell, 
2013). It is this study from which this research draws many of its foundations.  
 
1.3.2 Methods used in this research  
The research starts quantitatively, with an audit of post-legislative scrutiny. This 
audit was designed to answer the first research question, ‘how extensively has post-
legislative scrutiny been undertaken by committees in the UK Parliament’, as well 
as its sub-research questions relating to the frequency of post-legislative scrutiny, 
which committees are undertaking it and the characteristics of the legislation 
reviewed. As there is limited data on post-legislative scrutiny, including on the 
total number of inquiries that have taken place, descriptive data was needed to lay 
a foundation for the rest of the study. This audit included the collation of data on 
the number of post-legislative scrutiny inquiries that have taken place, the session, 
the parliament and the legislation which has received post-legislative scrutiny. 
Data has also been collated on the number of Acts receiving post-legislative 
scrutiny in each inquiry and the time difference between the Act receiving Royal 
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Assent and receiving post-legislative scrutiny. This audit then moved on to address 
formal post-legislative scrutiny inquiries only (for definitions see page 80) and 
included data (data derived from sessional returns) on the time spent on the 
passage of legislation and the length of legislation (derived from the Acts 
themselves). Data was also collected on the sponsoring government department 
and on the primary legislative activity of government departments (derived from 
sessional returns), between 2005-2017. Data was also collated on the report output 
of committees in order to compare post-legislative scrutiny output and other 
committee output (data derived from the publication page of committee websites). 
Finally, data was collated for formal post-legislative scrutiny on whether legislation 
is contentious or uncontentious. The quantitative data collected has been stored 
and analysed on SPSS. This data is available from the UK Parliament website, as 
well as legislation.gov.uk. More detailed information regarding this audit can be 
found at the beginning of chapters 3 and 4. 
This study utilises some of the tried and tested methods of assessing committee 
scrutiny devised by Benton & Russell (2013). In particular this approach is used to 
assist in answering the second research question; what recommendations have 
arisen from post-legislative scrutiny inquiries and how frequently have they been 
accepted. Specifically this work builds upon Benton & Russell's (2013) study in 
terms of measuring the output of post-legislative scrutiny through the acceptance 
of recommendations using ordinal logistic regression analysis. The dependent 
variables in this study are the strength of recommendations made by committees 
and the government’s acceptance of recommendations. This involved the coding 
of committee reports and government responses from all the formal post-
legislative scrutiny inquiries in both the House of Commons and House of Lords 
between 2005 and 2017. Committee recommendations were coded for type and 
strength, and government responses were coded for the level of acceptance. 
Specific details about the coding schemes and independent variables used in the 
regression analysis can be found at the beginning of chapter 5. 
The research then moves on to findings drawn from qualitative study. This involves 
a case study analysis of five post-legislative scrutiny inquiries in order to analyse in 
greater depth the process of post-legislative scrutiny in a way in which quantitative 
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methods alone cannot. Multiple cases are therefore studied (Gillham, 2000). This 
final part of the research design aims to answer the final research question; what 
has the experience been of committees undertaking post-legislative scrutiny. This 
involved semi-structured interviews with a clerk, Member (typically the chair) and 
interest group which took part in each of the five post-legislative scrutiny inquiries 
(three interviews per inquiry). These interviews focused upon the selection of 
legislation, development of recommendations, the government responses as well 
as any follow up work the committees did.  
A case study approach was deemed appropriate for this research on the basis that 
there was a limited amount of literature (Simons, 2009) about how post-legislative 
scrutiny operates, therefore a method which allows for the investigation of 
situations where little is known and where you can get ‘under the skin’ of an 
organisation to find out what is happening was important (Gillham, 2000). Such 
an approach also allows for the evaluation of human action in institutions, the 
influences that determine such action and the interrelationship of acts and 
consequences (Simon, 2009). This is important when studying committees as they 
are complex and there are a number of influences upon them and 
interrelationships too. This is particularly important when studying a type of 
scrutiny that we did not know much about. This allowed for in depth research and 
the creation of an in-depth understanding (Simons, 2009) which is not possible 
using experimental design or other quantitative methods. Although there are 
benefits to such methods, there are limitations too. For example it will not be 
possible to generalise fully from the case study findings (Simons, 2009). However 
it was not the aim of the research to be able to generalise between committees or 
between different parliaments. The aim is to present a snapshot of how post-
legislative scrutiny is operating currently in the UK Parliament. That being said 
Flyvberg (2006) argues that being unable to generalise on the basis of a couple of 
cases is a misunderstanding of case study research. This is true of this research 
which finds common themes among the five case studies selected suggesting these 
themes might be common across these particular committees within the UK 
Parliament. There are also critiques about subjectivity, however Simons (2009) 
argues that the subjectivity of the researcher is part of the frame and rather than 
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being seen as a problem, it is monitored and disciplined as essential in 
understanding and interpreting the case. In relation to this research post-
legislative scrutiny is not an issue where subjectivity poses a great challenge 
however achieving triangulation through interviews for each case has helped to 
achieve a more rounded analysis of the cases from differing viewpoints. 
Additionally questions were posed in neutral terms to help overcome potential 
subjectivity issues.  
In addition to the interviews for the case study analysis, further semi-structured 
interviews were undertaken to support the research. The first was with the Head 
of the House of Commons Scrutiny Unit. This was important in assessing the focus 
of the unit on post-legislative scrutiny in the House of Commons and to assess 
what work is being done to promote and support committees undertaking post-
legislative scrutiny. The clerk of the House of Lords Liaison Committee was also 
interviewed to assess their views on the process in the House of Lords. Finally two 
interviews took place with clerks from departmental select committees which did 
not undertake formal post-legislative scrutiny between 2012 and 2017 in order to 
assess why. In total 19 interviews were undertaken for this study. Specific details 
relating to the case studies can be found in chapters 6 and 7. 
 
1.3.3 Data limitations 
As in any study, there may be some limitations with the data that has been 
collected. This is not expected to reduce the validity of the research findings but it 
does require acknowledgement. There may be limitations with the data collected 
through the interviews as it relies upon the recollection of House staff from 
between 2-5 years previously. There is always the chance that their recollection is 
not completely accurate. This has been mitigated by interviewing different people 
involved in inquiries to ensure triangulation.  
Formal post-legislative scrutiny (as defined on page 80) has also been fairly limited 
in terms of the number of cases. Further research will be necessary once post-
legislative scrutiny is a mature process. 
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Informal post-legislative scrutiny (as defined on page 80) is often not recognised 
as post-legislative scrutiny until committees are conducting end of session reviews. 
The focus of this research is on formal post-legislative scrutiny and as such the data 
collected on informal post-legislative scrutiny is not as detailed, however it is 
important to acknowledge its existence and its extensiveness. 
 
 Contribution  
In answering the research questions, this thesis makes a number of contributions. 
The thesis contributes to the conceptual understanding of scrutiny, accountability 
and responsibility and how these concepts interact with and impact upon post-
legislative scrutiny. In addition the thesis also contributes to the literature on the 
impact of parliamentary committees, in particular by extending the research of 
Hawes, (1992); Hindmoor, Larkin, & Kennon, (2009); Monk, (2012); Russell & 
Benton, (2011); Tolley, (2009) to a particular type of scrutiny rather than addressing 
impact overall or by specific committees. 
In addition, the thesis contributes to the limited literature on post-legislative 
scrutiny both in the UK in terms of how the UK Parliament undertakes such a 
function and more generally in terms of the comparative study of it. The thesis 
provides a detailed analysis of how this core task of parliamentary committees is 
undertaken and sheds light on how this process operates in practice and some of 
the challenges it faces. As well as contributing to the literature on post-legislative 
scrutiny, the thesis also contributes to the literature on the legislative process and 
the quality of that legislation. As post-legislative scrutiny assesses the overall 
quality of legislation, the findings of this research, based upon the outcomes of 
post-legislative scrutiny, sheds light on the legislative process and the quality of 
that legislation that has gone on to receive post-legislative scrutiny.   
This research also contributes to our knowledge of the behaviour of committees in 
the UK Parliament. This particularly is in relation to how committees select topics 
and lines of inquiry, how they determine to undertake an inquiry and also in terms 
of the choices they make when formulating their recommendations. There is also 
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a practical contribution to be made by this thesis. It provides a detailed assessment 
of the procedures utilised in the UK Parliament which could be beneficial to other 
legislatures which are in the process of formalising post-legislative scrutiny into 
their procedures. The conclusion of this thesis notes the challenges that the UK 
system faces and therefore challenges other legislatures should attempt to avoid. 
In addition the conclusion also offers recommendations in order to overcome 
those challenges.  
 
 Outline of the thesis 
Chapter two addresses the literature on the key concepts of this thesis; scrutiny, 
accountability and responsibility. These concepts are important as they provide a 
foundation for how parliament and its committees operate. With post-legislative 
scrutiny being a core task of committees (at least in the House of Commons) it is 
important to understand how they operate together and also how post-legislative 
scrutiny fits into such concepts. The chapter finds that scrutiny is the mechanism 
through which the executive can be held responsible and accountable for their 
actions. Accountability and responsibility are, therefore, essential components of 
scrutiny, in a parliamentary context, as without someone having to take 
responsibility for failure they cannot be held accountable for their actions. Also 
without responsibility, there would be no obligation to provide information, which 
underpins scrutiny. The chapter also develops a typology of scrutiny, based upon 
the conceptual analysis, which places post-legislative scrutiny firmly within it.  
Chapter three is the first empirical chapter of this thesis. This chapter begins to 
answer questions relating to the extent and frequency of post-legislative scrutiny 
in the UK Parliament. This is also an important chapter in terms of practical 
contributions, as the data presented there has not been assessed before. It begins 
by determining the types of post-legislative scrutiny undertaken by committees in 
the UK Parliament. While there is a systematic process in terms of the 
departmental review memoranda being sent to departmental select committees, 
post-legislative scrutiny is also inherent in the wider work of these departmental 
select committees. This chapter also assesses, albeit briefly, where this informal 
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post-legislative scrutiny might be taking place. The chapter then addresses the 
frequency of such scrutiny under both types outlined above. It particularly 
addresses the sub-research question of whether there is a pattern in the 
undertaking of post-legislative scrutiny, and again does so for both types of 
scrutiny, in terms of how many inquiries there have undertaken and what 
proportion of committee activity is formal post-legislative scrutiny.  
Chapter four concerns itself with the two final sub-research questions (from 
question one) relating to the selection of legislation. The chapter begins with a 
focus upon the process of post-legislative scrutiny, in particular the time elapsed 
between Royal Assent and Acts receiving post-legislative scrutiny. This is an 
important consideration as the government’s time frame is for post-legislative 
review to take place three to five years after an Act has received Royal Assent. 
However, the House of Lords Constitution Committee recommends three to six 
years. The chapter then moves on to assess the time spent on post-legislative 
scrutiny. This is examined through the time that elapsed between the launch of 
terms of reference and the publication of a report. In the second half of the chapter, 
the legislation receiving formal post-legislative review is assessed. This is done 
through assessing the party of government whose legislation is receiving the most 
post-legislative scrutiny. This highlights a key finding that there is a bias in the 
legislation selected for review with the vast majority coming from the 1997 – 2010 
Labour Governments, and with very little coming from the subsequent 
Conservative led Coalition Government between 2010 and 2015. This is despite 
more and more of that legislation falling into the recommended timeframes noted 
above.  
The chapter then moves on to assess the government departments that have seen 
their legislation receive post-legislative scrutiny. This includes the legislative 
output of that department. This chapter also addresses the depth of scrutiny that 
the legislation received as it went through the legislative process, including an 
assessment of the number of amendments and defeats in the House of Lords as 
well as the number of sittings bills had in public bill committees in the House of 
Commons. The chapter ends with a discussion of what will be termed the post-
legislative scrutiny gap. This thesis is focused upon the post-legislative scrutiny 
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that has taken place. However, it is also important to address whether there might 
be a gap in such scrutiny and in particular determine why departmental select 
committees might choose not to undertake formal post-legislative scrutiny.  
Chapter five forms the third empirical chapter and addresses the research 
question of the recommendations that have arisen from post-legislative scrutiny 
inquiries and how frequently they have been accepted by the UK Government. The 
chapter begins with an assessment of the recommendations produced following 
post-legislative scrutiny inquiries. In particular, it focuses upon where 
recommendations were directed (for example, central or local government) the 
type of recommendations produced and the strength of action that a 
recommendation called for. In particular it finds that committees tend to produce 
recommendations relating to policy and procedure and recommendations that call 
for weaker action. The chapter also addresses the acceptance of recommendations 
by the government, by strength of action called for, as well as type of 
recommendation. Secondly the chapter addresses the differences between the 
House of Commons and House of Lords. This is important as they have different 
approaches and practices. These different practices feed into the type of inquiry 
committees undertake as well as the types of recommendations that they will 
produce. Finally the chapter concludes with an assessment of the factors that 
impact on the strength and acceptance of recommendations. This uses two ordinal 
logistic regressions. The chapter finds that there is a strong relationship between 
the acceptance of recommendations and the strength of them, with stronger 
recommendations being more likely to be rejected by the government. As such 
committees could be altering their behaviour to produce weaker recommendations 
as a result of the government being more prone to reject recommendations that 
are calling for strong action (such as legislative change). This chapter contributes 
to the existing literature on the impact of parliamentary committees and in 
particular what impacts upon the acceptance of recommendations by the 
government.  
Chapters six and seven are the two final empirical chapters. These address five 
case studies of committees that have conducted post-legislative scrutiny in the UK 
Parliament. These two chapters deal with the research question relating to the 
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experience of committees that have undertaken post-legislative scrutiny. These 
chapters contribute to our understanding of the behaviour of committees when 
undertaking inquiries, from the perspective of post-legislative scrutiny. It is 
important in determining how committees view this type of scrutiny, and how it is 
undertaken, on top of highlighting any challenges they face under the current 
procedures. 
Chapter six focuses upon the experience of committees undertaking post-
legislative scrutiny in the House of Commons and assesses three case studies. This 
chapter assesses the Culture, Media and Sport Committee’s inquiry into the 
Gambling Act 2005, the Justice Committee’s inquiry into the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000 and the Health Committee’s inquiry into the Mental Health 
Act 2007. In so doing this chapter deals with why the legislation was selected, the 
utility of government memoranda, the selection of witnesses and the role of 
evidence, the development of recommendations and finally the way the 
committees dealt with the government response and follow-up to the inquiry.  
Chapter seven focuses upon the experience of committees undertaking post-
legislative scrutiny in the House of Lords and examines two case studies, the Select 
Committee on the Equality Act 2010 and the Select Committee on the Licensing 
Act 2003, plus the role of the House of Lords Liaison Committee in post-legislative 
scrutiny. It starts with an overview of the role of the House of Lords Liaison 
Committee in the initiation and follow up of post-legislative scrutiny. The chapter 
then goes on to cover the issues discussed in the previous paragraph in relation to 
the House of Lords.  
Chapter eight draws together the knowledge gained from the empirical research 
chapters and goes into further detail about the contribution and implications of 
this research both academically and practically for the UK Parliament. Given the 
limited knowledge on post-legislative scrutiny, the chapter ends by identifying 
what further research is necessary in this area and proposes recommendations to 
improve processes of post-legislative scrutiny in light of the findings of the 
previous chapters. 
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Chapter 2 Conceptual Framework 
 
Scrutiny is the central concept of this thesis. As such without being able to 
understand and define scrutiny, as a concept, it will not be possible to fully 
understand post-legislative scrutiny. The aim of this chapter is to begin to develop 
an understanding of scrutiny from academic definitions and from how the term is 
used in specific types of scrutiny. In order to operationalise the concept effectively 
for the purposes of this research, a broader understanding is required beyond a 
general definition. In British political discourse, our understanding of scrutiny has 
changed, having previously been framed around the language of accountability 
(McAllister & Stirbu, 2007) with the two used synonymously.  Therefore it is 
essential that the concept of accountability also be assessed, in order to enhance 
our understanding of scrutiny. Finally, due to the close links between 
accountability and responsibility (which are often conflated), responsibility will 
also be assessed. This will further enhance our understanding of scrutiny, as 
accountability and responsibility have an important relationship with scrutiny, 
particularly in a parliamentary context.  
This chapter will argue that scrutiny is the core concept and it is only through 
scrutiny that accountability and, as a result, responsibility are delivered in a 
parliamentary context. Finally, a new typology of parliamentary scrutiny will be 
developed from the arguments and debates regarding each of these concepts and 
how they enhance our understanding of scrutiny. 
 
 Scrutiny 
The term scrutiny is widely used by politicians and academics in discussions of the 
conduct of government and the practice of accountability. However, definitions of 
the concept are less readily available (Maer & Sandford, 2004). Indeed, our 
understanding of scrutiny has changed since the mid-1990s, with accountability 
and responsibility previously used between the 1970s and 1990s to describe the 
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relationship, for example, between ministers and parliament (Maer & Sandford, 
2004). The term, scrutiny, was popular with the 1997 Labour Government, partially 
as a result of its constitutional reform programme with its focus on creating a more 
modern and effective House of Commons, as well as creating an open and 
transparent government (e.g. through the introduction of Freedom of 
Information). The focus upon scrutiny occurred for a number of reasons; the 
scandals which took place under the previous government and the lack of 
sanctions against those who had been involved; the rise in unaccountable quangos 
in the 1980s and 1990s; and the desire for a more effective House of Commons with 
a more open government (Dale, 2000). This suggests that our understanding of 
scrutiny has changed over time from a period where the term was framed around 
accountability and responsibility to a period where it also became framed around 
open and transparent government.  
 
However, this is not just about open and transparent government. Previous 
government scandals led to a greater focus upon policy failures, with many noted 
by King & Crewe (2013), and a need for more accountability to hold those who 
made mistakes accountable but to also try to avoid mistakes in the first place. It 
could be argued here that there has been a shift in governance as a result of these 
events, with an initial focus less upon outcomes and more upon processes, audits 
and implementation. Conceptual change literature suggests that politics is a 
linguistically constituted activity and that political concepts go through changes 
related to political events (Farr, 1989). This would provide support to the 
arguments outlined above and that our understanding of scrutiny has changed 
over time, with scrutiny having previously been framed in the language of 
accountability. Our vocabulary around the concept has changed and this has led 
to an organisational change too. 
 
Maer & Sandford (2004: 5) define scrutiny as ‘the action of looking searchingly at 
something or as an investigation or critical inquiry’. There are similarities between 
this definition and the one which Centre for Public Scrutiny (2015) provides: ‘the 
activity by one elected or appointed organisation or office examining and 
monitoring all or part of the activity of an institution’. From these two definitions 
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it is possible to draw out that scrutiny involves the examination, investigation or 
inquiry into an activity or person. However, there is a difference in that Maer & 
Sandford (2004) define it as having a critical purpose. 
Thus, there is a general consensus from the definitions, that generally, scrutiny as 
an abstract concept involves an investigation, examination, review or inquiry of a 
body or an activity. While this definition does not encompass all scrutiny, it 
describes a broad process through which we can begin to categorise the 
phenomenon. There is, therefore, a need to operationalise this definition in order 
to better understand post-legislative scrutiny. Strictly speaking, it would be 
possible to operate with such an abstract definition of scrutiny for the purposes of 
this thesis. Post-legislative scrutiny is an examination of a body (government) in 
relation to the legislation that they have introduced and implemented. However, 
post-legislative scrutiny can be broader than this definition. For example, post-
legislative scrutiny can include an element of policy development. Indeed, as one 
of the Law Commission’s main reasons for undertaking post-legislative scrutiny (as 
noted in chapter one) states that if legislation is not working in practice, solutions 
should be offered to rectify such problems (Law Commission, 2006). Since this is 
the first systematic study of post-legislative scrutiny in the UK Parliament, it is 
important that we do not assume that the parameters of post-legislative scrutiny 
are rigidly or clearly set. It could mean ignoring aspects of post-legislative scrutiny 
which deserve attention. While post-legislative scrutiny would fall under the 
general definition, it does not encompass all the components of post-legislative 
scrutiny, such as monitoring the implementation of legislation or policy 
development.  As such it is important to expand our understanding of scrutiny. 
These abstract definitions, while failing to explain various aspects of scrutiny, also 
fail to recognise that when scrutiny takes place is important, as are the aims of that 
scrutiny.  Therefore, it is important to move on from the abstract idea of scrutiny 
and apply it to a political context. To be able to develop a better understanding of 
scrutiny we will assess how the term scrutiny is utilised within different contexts, 
such as in parliament and in local government. 
The work of the Joint Committee on Human Rights suggests that there is an 
important monitoring role for scrutiny, it is not always about critical examination 
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(Tolley, 2009). The role of the Joint Committee on Human Rights is to consider 
matters relating to human rights within the UK. Included here is the monitoring 
of legislation for compliance with the Human Rights Act 1998 (Tolley, 2009). 
Unlike the academic definitions, considered above, this suggests something less 
rigorous but just as important. Without monitoring and the resulting gathering of, 
or access to information, which monitoring allows, it is difficult to see how scrutiny 
can take place. This is less rigorous in the sense that it does not necessarily lead to 
an investigation or inquiry. A committee could monitor government and come to 
the conclusion no concrete action is necessary. The information gathered by the 
committee is then often used by other bodies such as government (in order to 
amend legislation) and the courts (to support legal cases relating to legislation), 
before further action is taken. Indeed the aim is for the committee to monitor 
compliance independently of the government and the judiciary. This allows action 
to be taken by other bodies which may then involve critical examination. The 
monitoring role of scrutiny would need to come first before we reach the 
examination or investigation, as without information there would be nothing to 
examine or investigate. Therefore we can begin to argue that monitoring and the 
access to and gathering of information is integral for scrutiny to take place. Indeed 
it could be argued that this monitoring is the foundation of scrutiny.  
The scrutiny of the European Union (EU) by national parliaments, sheds more light 
on the concept, and our understanding of it. Scrutiny of the EU by national 
parliaments suggests that there can be a monitoring and control aspect to scrutiny, 
in terms of attempting to influence the government’s negotiating position as 
negotiations take place (ex-ante accountability) and holding the government 
accountable for outcomes (ex-post accountability) (Auel, 2007; Holzhacker, 2002). 
Indeed Bovens (2007) argues that accountability is not just about ex-post scrutiny, 
as actors will anticipate negative criticism and adjust policies accordingly. The Law 
Commission also inferred that this is an important aim of post-legislative scrutiny, 
since they claim it should lead to better implementation and delivery of policy 
(Law Commission, 2006). With this particular aim, there is an accountability 
element to post-legislative scrutiny. The control in the context of scrutiny of the 
EU is to try to control and influence the government’s negotiating position and its 
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decision making (Holzhacker, 2002). This also suggests, that there is an 
accountability role for scrutiny here too, in terms of examining the government’s 
negotiating position and also examining its actions.  
In local government, scrutiny is often referred to in tandem with overview. 
Scrutiny is seen as the accountability side of its role with its other functions (e.g. 
policy development) being covered by overview (Ashworth & Snape, 2004). 
Scrutiny in local government is about both holding the executive to account but 
also supporting the executive in policy development (Ashworth & Snape, 2004) 
including the examination of policy and suggesting alternatives and changes. This 
has important implications for our understanding of this concept. It firstly links 
this concept back to accountability, (Ashworth & Snape, 2004; Martin, 2006). 
However it draws attention to an element of scrutiny that we have yet to consider, 
that of policy development. Scrutiny (in terms of local government) has developed 
from a narrow and inward looking process to a broad based policy focused process. 
Some such as Matthews & Flinders (2015) have touched upon the idea of ‘scrutiny 
creep’ in a parliamentary context, which has seen the role of scrutiny continue to 
broaden organisationally in recent years, and this would apply here. Matthews and 
Flinders (2015) refer to scrutiny creep as where committees have sought an 
expansion of their competencies, mainly in relation to public appointment 
hearings but this also has credence on scrutiny more broadly. It can be argued that 
scrutiny creep is in response to the change in vocabulary that we have seen in 
scrutiny since the mid-1990s. It is about both organisational change, in terms of 
parliament and its committees broadening their remits but it also has an element 
of conceptual change as well. This is on the basis that scrutiny creep is partly driven 
by a desire for parliament to find new ways of holding the government accountable 
and trying to rebalance the power relationship between the executive and 
legislature. This has implications for our understanding of the concept, but also for 
this research, as these scrutiny and overview committees in local government were 
developed to mirror parliamentary select committees in the UK (Coulson & 
Whiteman, 2012; Martin, 2006). As such the understanding of scrutiny provided by 
the literature on local government points to a broader concept than the abstract 
academic definitions of scrutiny. It also suggests that our understanding of 
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scrutiny has evolved, as it was previously framed around the language of 
accountability and responsibility.  
The literature relating to the examination of public appointments also adds further 
to the understanding of scrutiny in terms of promoting the idea that scrutiny also 
offers legitimacy to bodies, decisions and activities (Auel, 2007; Hazell, Chalmers, 
& Russell, 2012; Holzhacker, 2002). For example, Hazell et al. (2012) found that 
public hearings gave appointees a sense of greater legitimacy which comes through 
parliamentary endorsement. This is extended to other types of scrutiny, through 
parliament examining policy and legislation and eventually agreeing to it, thus 
potentially providing greater legitimacy to that policy/bill.  
The enhancement of accountability was the main aim for the creation of 
departmental select committees in 1979 (House of Commons Select Committee on 
Procedure, 1978). Indeed in the debate leading to the creation of committees, the 
Leader of the House of Commons, Norman St John Stevas, noted that one of 
parliament’s first roles is ‘to subject the executive to limitations and control’ and 
that in the 20th Century ‘parliament is not effectively supervising the executive’ (HC 
Deb 25 June 1979, cc.36-77). It also remains the overall aim of departmental select 
committees to this day (House of Commons Liaison Committee, 2012). This again 
supports the argument that there has been a linguistic change but also an 
organisational one too, illustrated by the alteration of the core tasks of 
departmental select committees (House of Commons Liaison Committee, 2012) 
(see pages 64-65), supporting the idea of scrutiny creep (Matthews & Flinders, 
2015). However it can be argued that these additional roles are supplementary to 
scrutiny rather than an integral part of it. Policy development is another role. This 
role has developed from the scrutiny of government policy and a desire to improve 
the policy making process. Again this extends our previous understanding of the 
concept. These committees have also expanded their remit to further enhance 
accountability through the scrutiny of government appointees, developed with the 
aim of enhancing accountability in the appointments process but also legitimacy 
(Hazell et al., 2012; Matthews & Flinders, 2015). 
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It is evident that accountability has an important relationship with scrutiny. This 
is down to the fact that scrutiny has previously been framed around the language 
of accountability (McAllister & Stirbu, 2007). While political events have led to 
linguistic change, practitioners, through organisational change have helped to 
develop our understanding of the concept over time and as such, scrutiny is no 
longer solely focused upon achieving accountability. Indeed White (2015b) notes 
that plenty of scrutiny does not involve accountability.  
Further links between these two concepts come from the use of the term oversight, 
frequently used interchangeably with scrutiny. The literature on oversight suggests 
it is about control (Lees, 1977; McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984; Rockman, 1984) while 
Yamamoto (2007) defines it as ‘the review, monitoring and supervision of 
government and public agencies, including the implementation of legislation and 
policy’. Such a definition has links to the academic definitions of scrutiny (such as 
White (2015b: 3) ‘an activity which involves the examining of government 
expenditure, administration and policies’). It also describes a particular type of 
scrutiny, as it does not encompass all the components of scrutiny discussed 
previously. This definition also suggests there are some links between 
accountability and the holding of institutions to account, supporting the idea that 
accountability has a relationship with scrutiny and oversight might be the specific 
name for that particular type of scrutiny. This also has implications for local 
government, as scrutiny is described as the accountability side of its role. Perhaps 
it would be better to use the terms overview and oversight. Having begun to discuss 
the links between scrutiny and accountability, it is an appropriate time to fully 
introduce the concept of accountability.  
 
 Accountability 
Accountability is a complex and contested concept. Definitions of accountability 
very much depend upon the context in which it is applied. (Cheung, 2005; Mulgan, 
2000; Sinclair, 1995). Accountability, like governance, has become one of the 
buzzwords of debates in politics, policy and administration (Bovens, 2005; Griffith, 
2005). As the concept of accountability has become more widely used it has been 
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taken for granted and it is assumed that everyone knows and understands what is 
meant by the concept (Dubnick, 1998).  
Accountability can be viewed firstly as a relationship and secondly as a relationship 
involving power and control. Indeed Mulgan (2000: 555) defines accountability as 
‘the process of being called to account, to an authority, for one’s actions’ while 
Barlow & Paun (2013: 8) defines it as ‘the requirement to give an account for 
individual or organisational performance, actions or decisions to another body 
which then has the power to act on that information’. This definition is supported 
by Beetham (2006), Brenton (2014) and Pelizzo & Stapenhurst (2014). 
In turn, this also implies that scrutiny involves a relationship too. If we consider 
that access to information is important then there must be some kind of 
relationship between the body undertaking scrutiny and the body from which 
information is being sought, otherwise there would be no access to information. 
With accountability including power and control, you can argue that this is what 
accountability adds to scrutiny. This relationship which comes from accountability 
will be engrained into scrutiny through mechanisms such as select committees, 
which aimed to rebalance the power relationship between the executive and 
legislature but which now do more than just hold the executive to account. Indeed, 
although accountability as a concept is not intrinsic to post-legislative scrutiny, it 
is prevalent within it through post-legislative scrutiny being undertaken by 
committees. 
The processes of what it means to hold someone to account further suggests links 
between accountability and scrutiny, which can enhance our understanding of 
scrutiny. Holding a person or body to account usually involves three stages, the 
obligation to inform, the right to interrogate/investigate and the right to pass 
judgement (Bovens, 2005; Brenton, 2014; Mulgan, 1997). The first stage is a duty 
held by those who are accountable while the final two stages are rights belonging 
to those who undertake the accounting (Mulgan, 1997). This links back to the idea 
that scrutiny has a monitoring role which is a foundation for all scrutiny (Maer & 
Sandford, 2004). This is important for scrutiny, as without monitoring and the 
ability to seek and access information, it is difficult to see how any investigation or 
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examination could take place (March and Olsen, 1995). A general definition of 
accountability can thus be provided: a relationship of power and control in which 
an agent is required to give an account for performance, actions and decisions to a 
principal, which then has the power to act on that information. 
To better understand this concept and its links with scrutiny it is necessary to move 
on from abstract conceptual definitions. Dubnick (1998) outlines four types of 
accountability; legal, organisational, professional and political. Sinclair (1995) 
outlines five; political, public, managerial, professional and personal. However 
Sinclair (1995) does acknowledge that public and political accountability are 
complementary parts of the same process. In terms of this thesis, political/public 
accountability is most relevant.  
Stewart (1984) notes that the concept of political accountability is a ladder which 
moves from ‘accountability by standards to accountability by judgement’ 
(Scarparo, 2008). However, while he notes five different types of accountability in 
this ladder, they could be better explained and presented in the context of this 
research, where accountability filters into the scrutiny undertaken by committees. 
For example, he notes accountability for probity and legality which aims to ensure 
that funds have been used according to previous plans, efficiency accountability 
through which value for money is determined and performance accountability 
which ensures that performance matches standards (Scarparo, 2008). These are all 
areas through which departmental select committees scrutinise the government 
and ultimately hold it to account. 
Principal-Agent theory provides important insights into accountability, as it 
suggests what the accountability relationship looks like, and indeed what the 
scrutiny relationship looks like, at least in a political context. It therefore adds to 
our understanding of the concept. In terms of political accountability, the public 
servant (minister and/or civil servant) exercises power and authority on behalf of 
the elected representatives, who are directly accountable to the people. In regards 
to this thesis, there is a principal-agent relationship between voters and 
parliament, between parliament and the Prime Minister, between the Prime 
Minister and government ministers and also between government ministers and 
civil servants (see figure 2.1). Ministers are accountable to parliament and are 
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accountable for the actions of the civil servants in their departments (Scarparo, 
2008). In this scenario the electorate would be the ultimate principal (Mulgan, 
1997; Strom, 2000). In this case it is thus not a single relationship but rather a series 
of relationships (Beetham, 2006). In relation to post-legislative scrutiny, 
parliament would be the ultimate principal and the agents are government 
ministers and subsequently civil servants as they are ultimately responsible for the 
implementation of legislation and related policy.  
 
Figure 2.1. Delegation and accountability under parliamentary government. 
 
Source: (Adapted from Strom, 2000) 
 
Beetham (2006) argues that the relationship between the voters and parliament is 
one of vertical accountability, while the relationship between parliament and the 
government is horizontal accountability. In terms of scrutiny, horizontal 
accountability is the most important. Brenton (2014) suggests that responsibility 
for actions is what links this chain (or series of chains depending upon how you 
view it) together. Principal-agent theory thus has implications for our 
understanding of scrutiny, if scrutiny is also a relationship then this would further 
suggest that accountability is the control within that relationship. Principal-agent 
relationships will be present, in all scrutiny, in some form considering that 
mechanisms such as select committees were created to address a power imbalance 
and a lack of control by parliament but now do more than just seek to control and 
limit the executive. For example, scrutiny involving policy development (which is 
a newer role) will involve such a relationship between bodies, despite the focus on 
cooperation because such relationships are engrained into the other roles which 
bodies, such as select committees, undertake.  
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This raises a number of issues, which will impact upon scrutiny. Principal-agent 
theory has implications for accountability and thus scrutiny, especially at the 
government department level with the delegation of tasks/responsibilities to civil 
servants. The lines of accountability begin to blur here because civil servants are 
not directly responsible to parliament and are restricted in what they can 
say/reveal during inquiries (Cabinet Office, 2014).  
The movement from a government to a governance paradigm has impacted upon 
accountability and how it is conceptualised (Frahm & Martin, 2009). In the 
government paradigm, the executive is the major or sole actor who is responsible 
for both the creation and implementation of public policy. However, when it 
comes to governance models, the executive is only one of many actors, although it 
does play an important steering role (Frahm & Martin, 2009). This has implications 
for political accountability through parliament as it blurs the lines of accountability 
and suggests a hollowing out or weakening of accountability. This in turn has an 
impact upon scrutiny as well, if the lines of accountability become blurred, and 
scrutiny is the mechanism through which accountability is conducted, then it 
makes sense for scrutiny creep to occur, to try and find other areas of control and 
influence. Linked in with the blurred lines of accountability and the hollowing out 
of it also, are the Next Step reforms (or New Public Management initiatives) to the 
civil service introduced by Margaret Thatcher which blurred the lines of ministerial 
accountability within government departments with the creation of quangos and 
arms-length bodies to implement policy (Scarparo, 2008). All this has meant the 
concept of scrutiny has developed and changed from a greater focus upon 
accountability to an additional focus upon openness and transparency.  
 
 Responsibility 
Links between accountability and responsibility were apparent in the previous 
discussion with Brenton (2014) suggesting that it is responsibility for actions that 
links the chain of accountability together. The aim of this section is to explore links 
between responsibility and scrutiny and, as a result identify how this enhances our 
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understanding of these concepts. As with accountability, responsibility is a 
contested concept however, not necessarily to the same extent.  
The definitions of responsibility begin to illustrate links between the concepts and 
start to enhance our understanding of scrutiny. Thomas (1998: 351-2) outlines three 
definitions of responsibility. In the first instance he states that responsibility can 
be defined as ‘an agency in which an actor is given a goal and the power to cause 
events to occur and is guided by a sense of obligation’. His second definition is ‘an 
authoritative relationship in which an agent is answerable to a principal for 
performance and is subject to sanctions for failure’. His final definition is, ‘an 
obligation that is moral and separate from the authoritative relationship’.  
The first and third definitions point to responsibility involving an obligation. This 
raises the question of whether responsibility is thus an obligation in the 
accountability relationship, as how can you be held accountable for the work you 
carry out, if you are not responsible for it? While the second definition does not 
explicitly mention an obligation, if you are answerable to a principal then surely 
you have an obligation to provide that answer. This is important for scrutiny if, as 
we have argued, the ability to gather and access information is a foundation of all 
scrutiny, then the obligation to answer questions and provide information is 
important in scrutiny succeeding.  
There are two further definitions which are worth addressing here, as they both 
reinforce points made previously in this section. Stabell (2014) supports the idea 
that responsibility is about an obligation, ‘the obligation to make up or to 
compensate for the harm one has caused through one’s own fault’. Finally the 
definition provided by Johansson (1994: 244) raises the point again regarding the 
obligation to provide an answer ‘being the person who should respond or provide 
an answer or guarantee something’. This helps to enhance our understanding of 
scrutiny as responsibility adds an obligation to the accountability relationship, 
which thus impacts upon scrutiny.  
In the UK, the concept of responsibility, especially in the context of politics, is 
understood through the prism of ministerial responsibility. It’s important, due to 
the political nature of this research, to assess ministerial responsibility more 
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specifically. Ministerial responsibility is a convention which underpins the UK 
Parliament’s ability to hold ministers and thus the executive to account. This 
supports the idea that responsibility (as an obligation) is a necessary component 
of accountability. This constitutional mechanism is split into two distinct areas, 
collective ministerial responsibility and individual ministerial responsibility. 
Collective ministerial responsibility is the constitutional convention by which 
cabinet and junior ministers must support government policy in public and in 
parliament. Should the convention be broken, it is expected that the offending 
minister will resign (Brenton, 2014). This could more accurately be called speaking 
with one voice, which in turn helps to keep the lines of accountability clear. 
Individual ministerial responsibility on the other hand is the mechanism by which 
ministers are responsible to parliament for everything that happens within their 
department. This does not necessarily mean that ministers must resign every time 
there is a problem but that they must be willing to inform or explain, apologise or 
take action (Gay, 2012). Resignation is the final option. This convention also applies 
to their own personal conduct as ministers (Brenton, 2014). While ministers can be 
held accountable for issues that they are not perhaps personally responsible for, 
the general principle sees them held accountable as the political head of the 
department. Without such a principle it is possible that the lines of accountability 
become blurred. There is a distinction to be made here between personal and 
political/constitutional responsibility.  
There is a difference in the understanding and interpretation of ministerial 
responsibility between parliament and government. Government focuses on its 
literal meaning, whereas parliament views it through the prism of parliamentary 
sovereignty (Woodhouse, 1994). In the case of select committees, the government 
believes that select committees can hold ministers responsible but only within the 
conventional framework of restrictions developed by modern government 
(Woodhouse, 1994). While on the other hand committees view ministerial 
responsibility through the prism of the sovereignty of parliament and its inherent 
right to scrutinise and control government (Flinders, 2001; Woodhouse, 1994). This 
difference in interpretation and understanding of the convention impacts upon the 
way both parliament and government approach responsibility and accountability 
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and thus it impacts on scrutiny. This difference in interpretation has an impact 
upon the aims and objectives which scrutiny has. Here government sees 
responsibility as providing answers but in no way constraining or sanctioning 
government, whereas parliament views responsibility through its connection to 
accountability, in the sense that a minister is responsible for the actions of his 
department and as a result is accountable for the actions of his department and 
can face sanctions. Indeed here it appears that parliament and government attach 
different aims, not just to responsibility but also to scrutiny.  
In a 2007 report, the House of Commons Public Administration Committee (2007: 
16) noted that “there is no consensus, either among politicians or officials, about 
the way in which ministerial and civil service responsibilities are divided. This 
means there can be no consensus about where accountability should lie”.  As such 
it is perhaps arguable that there has been a hollowing out or weakening of 
accountability with disagreements over where accountability should lie. This goes 
to show again that responsibility has an important relationship with accountability 
and the need to speak with one voice is vital to clearing the lines of accountability. 
It is perhaps this hollowing out of accountability, through the problems with 
responsibility that has helped to additionally advance the linguistic changes to the 
concept of scrutiny and also led to scrutiny creep and the need for committees, 
especially in the House of Commons, to expand the competences in order to find 
new routes to influence and scrutinise government. 
 
Figure 2.2 is designed to illustrate how the three concepts link. As abstract 
concepts, scrutiny, accountability and responsibility are separate but in a 
parliamentary context they are interlinked and often hard to distinguish. Therefore 
the institutional context is vital in the understanding and operationalisation of 
concepts. 
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Figure 2.2: Conceptual definitions and their links 
 
 
We noted earlier in this chapter that scrutiny involves an investigation, inquiry or 
examination. Through addressing the broader political/parliamentary literature on 
scrutiny we have also noted that it involves monitoring and access to information, 
as per the literature on the Joint Committee on Human Rights, control and 
oversight, as per the literature on local government, and scrutiny of the EU by 
national parliaments. It was through this discussion that the first links between 
scrutiny and accountability were made. We noted that accountability was about 
control and that it was a relationship. From the discussion about responsibility we 
noted that it was the obligation in that relationship (e.g. the obligation to provide 
information to select committees).   
 
There were obvious links here with scrutiny, in terms of oversight and control 
forming parts of scrutiny, but not all scrutiny. As White (2015b: 3) has noted ‘plenty 
of scrutiny does not involve accountability but some forms of scrutiny do take 
place in the context of formal accountability relationships’. We therefore 
concluded that there is a relationship between accountability and scrutiny, and 
that relationship helps to categorise a certain type of scrutiny. Indeed, 
accountability and scrutiny are different concepts in an abstract sense, but 
accountability is delivered through the undertaking of scrutiny and some of their 
core components can be seen to be similar, in a parliamentary context. However, 
the literature on accountability also touched upon responsibility, and that it is 
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responsibility that links the chains of accountability together. The literature on 
responsibility noted that it was an obligation and an authoritative relationship. An 
obligation that provides authority within the accountability relationship, as such 
responsibility is a core part of political accountability, as without responsibility the 
lines of accountability become blurred. Therefore, through accountability, 
responsibility is also delivered through scrutiny (i.e. the obligation within an 
accountability/scrutiny relationship).  
 
We will now address the aims and objectives of these concepts, considering these 
objectives in terms of how they help us to categorise the different types of scrutiny 
available, but also solidifying the links between the concepts of accountability, 
scrutiny and responsibility.  
 
 Aims and objectives 
2.4.1 Scrutiny 
While we have a deeper understanding of the broader concept of scrutiny, 
discussion has shown that it includes different emphases of scrutiny, whether that 
is monitoring, policy development or accountability. The aims and objectives 
associated with the concept are also important in developing an understanding of 
it and should aid in the categorisation of the concept. It is clear that the work of 
the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the work of scrutiny of the EU, by 
national parliaments have different aims and as such, had we taken each of these 
positions on their own we would have a different understanding of what scrutiny 
is. Therefore the aims and objectives attached to scrutiny are important in being 
able to understand the broader concept and to be able to operationalise it.  
Maer & Sandford (2004), White (2015b) and Yamamoto (2007) identify 
improvement in processes and outcomes as one of the aims of scrutiny, suggesting 
that scrutiny should be constructive. Unsurprisingly as a type of scrutiny, this 
reflects the aims of post-legislative scrutiny as set out by the Law Commission 
(2006), in that it should locate and disseminate good practice. This is supported 
further by Greer & Sandford (2003) and Maer & Sandford (2004) who suggest that 
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scrutiny should be constructive and should show value for money. At the same 
time Corrigan & Charteris (1999), Greer & Sandford (2003), Hull (2012), Pelizzo & 
Stapenhurst (2014) and White (2015b) identify holding bodies to account for their 
actions, as a further aim of scrutiny. This supports the discussion in previous 
paragraphs that accountability has a relationship with a distinct type of scrutiny 
(oversight).  
The following aims are those set out by MacMahon (1943) and Yamamoto (2007); 
scrutiny should ensure administrative compliance with statutory intent, should 
guard against harsh and callous administration, should check dishonesty and 
waste and should evaluate implementation in accordance with legislative 
objectives. These aims are all different types of scrutiny. The latter half of this aim 
links closely to post-legislative scrutiny and the aims and objectives of it as set out 
by the Law Commission (2006) and by De Vrieze & Hasson (2017). These aims do 
not explicitly suggest that scrutiny should be a constructive action. Rather they 
suggest that it should be about checking power and restraining it. These aims also 
suggest control through key words such as ensure, guard and check. These aims 
and objectives further support the argument that there is a relationship between 
scrutiny and accountability. However, while the aims and objectives just outlined 
may not imply something constructive, from meeting them, there should be a 
constructive outcome, thus supporting the idea that scrutiny (including when it 
involves accountability) is a constructive concept. For example, when guarding 
against harsh and callous administration and acting as a check on dishonesty and 
waste, good government should be being promoted at the same time.  
There is also some credibility to the idea that these aims and objectives are reliant, 
to some extent, upon each other being met. If you hope to hold bodies to account 
for their actions, you would also expect that if poor decisions had been made, that 
improved processes and outcomes would follow from that. Indeed Maer & 
Sandford (2004) suggest a further three aims which can be interlinked with the 
other aims and objectives outlined above. In their view, scrutiny should be 
independent, objective and inclusive. This is something scrutiny should be in order 
to produce its constructive outcomes. To be able to review and question decisions, 
it is necessary to first be able to seek information on key decisions which in turn is 
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important if you wish to check dishonesty and waste, improve processes and 
outcomes and hold bodies to account for their actions. As was argued earlier, the 
seeking of information is a necessary component of scrutiny. Indeed Geddes (2017) 
argues that oral evidence sessions held by committees serve as the foundation for 
conducting scrutiny. This supports the argument that the seeking of information 
and the monitoring involved here are common across all types of scrutiny. There 
is thus a core concept of scrutiny, which was defined earlier in this chapter, it is 
through this core concept that aims and objectives can be applied and types of 
scrutiny emerge.   
Figure 2.3: Concepts, aims and types 
 
 
We will apply these aims and objectives to categories once the aims and objectives 
of accountability and responsibility have been assessed.  
 
2.4.2 Accountability  
While the abstract concepts are separate, in a parliamentary context scrutiny and 
political accountability are clearly interlinked. The aims and objectives of political 
accountability provide further links between the two concepts in a parliamentary 
context. This connection matters as it is through these links that scrutiny becomes 
the vehicle by which accountability is delivered. The idea that accountability, 
should control abuse, corruption and misuse of public power (Bovens, 2007; 
Bovens, Schillemans, & Hart, 2008; Flinders, 2001; Uhr, 1993) refers to the aims of 
scrutiny as outlined by MacMahon (1943) and Yamamoto (2007), in particular that 
scrutiny should guard against harsh and callous administration. This also provides 
further support to the idea that accountability is a relationship about control. 
There is also further consensus that accountability should lead to an improvement 
in the efficiency and effectiveness of public policies and the enhancement of the 
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legitimacy of government (Bovens, 2007; Bovens et al., 2008; Flinders, 2001). This 
particular aim is linked the first objective of scrutiny, that it should improve 
processes and outcomes (Maer & Sandford, 2004; White, 2015a). The aim that 
accountability should provide assurance that public resources are being used in 
accordance with publicly stated aims and that public service values are being 
adhered to (Bovens et al., 2008; Flinders, 2001) supports the idea that scrutiny 
should check dishonesty and waste (MacMahon, 1943; Yamamoto, 2007). One final 
aim which refers to scrutiny is that accountability should be open and transparent 
(Brenton, 2014) which supports the idea that scrutiny should be independent, 
objective and inclusive. While they are not exactly the same, they are ideas which 
go hand in hand. The aims which match most closely are the ones which are also 
the aims of the type of scrutiny that we would term oversight, (e.g. should control 
of abuse, corruption and misuse of public power) which further supports the 
argument that oversight is a particular type of scrutiny which involves 
accountability. It also supports the argument that there are aims of scrutiny which 
operate together across the different types of scrutiny, such as the aim to improve 
processes and outcomes.  
 
Accountability through oversight can be seen as an essential part of scrutiny, as 
without an accountability relationship between a person being held accountable 
and a body doing the accounting, it would leave scrutiny relatively toothless and 
unable to meet a number of its aims and objectives. The link between the two is 
perhaps best expressed by Mulgan (2003) when he suggests that the accountability 
of government can be increased when the executive is more open to legislative 
investigation. To increase accountability you must increase scrutiny (or more 
specifically oversight), as without the power to investigate and acquire information 
how can a body be truly held accountable for their actions (Brazier, 2000; Mulgan, 
2003) unless information is freely available. Indeed Abels (2017) argues that there 
can be no control without information and informational asymmetries impact 
upon the scrutiny relationship, as such the information needs to be timely and 
sufficient. 
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This section has shown further links between scrutiny and accountability when it 
comes to their aims. As accountability operates outside of the political arena, 
scrutiny and accountability are not the same, however there are similarities 
between the two. As the third concept of this framework is responsibility, its aims 
will now be assessed before formally mapping the links between the concepts, via 
their aims. 
 
2.4.3 Responsibility  
The aims and objectives of responsibility shed more light on the links between 
these concepts and as a result further enhance our understanding of scrutiny. One 
objective which has been attached to the concept (collective ministerial 
responsibility) is to speak with one voice (Judge, 1984; Marshall, 1989). This 
objective supports the idea that responsibility helps to make the lines of 
accountability clearer, especially as speaking with one voice means that the 
government can be held collectively responsible. In this case responsibility 
enhances accountability. This has implications for scrutiny and the ability to 
effectively hold persons and bodies to account. Although it doesn’t always make 
the lines of accountability clear, for example speaking with one voice would make 
it harder to find people individually responsible. 
One further objective is to avoid misgovernment, misjudgement, and promote 
good decision making (Brazier, 1997; Uhr, 1993). This particular objective has 
connections with scrutiny through the aim to improve processes and outcomes 
(promote good decision making) and more specifically to guard against harsh and 
callous administration (avoid misgovernment and misjudgement). However, it is 
also connected to accountability through the control of abuse and corruption. This 
again points to the fact these concepts do operate together. Another objective 
which is connected to scrutiny, and enhances our understanding, is to provide 
information and answers about activities and actions (Judge, 1984; G Marshall, 
1971), the role of scrutiny is to seek information and the role of responsibility here 
is to provide it, again this suggests that responsibility is an obligation.  
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Figure 2.4. Conceptual aims and their links 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 shows the aims and objectives for each of the three concepts and is 
designed to highlight the connections between the three concepts. As noted above 
the aim of scrutiny to be independent, objective and inclusive are linked to open 
and transparent as the aim of accountability. Additionally, to improve outcomes 
and processes is linked to the aim of accountability to lead to improvements. 
Indeed, these links help to support the evidence presented previously that there is 
a relationship between these three concepts and that relationship involves 
accountability and responsibility operating within the broader concept of scrutiny, 
depending upon the type of scrutiny being deployed. While they are not the same 
concepts, and can operate outside of the political arena and outside of scrutiny, 
they do align when undertaking particular types of scrutiny. As White (2015b) has 
noted, plenty of scrutiny does not involve accountability, however some of it does. 
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While it would not be correct to suggest that accountability is a part of scrutiny, 
the concept does operate with it in certain instances. 
 
The literature presented in the previous sections suggests that there are different 
types of scrutiny, from the definitions and aims and objectives. The next section 
aims to support the continued development of our understanding of scrutiny 
through categorising scrutiny into its different types. 
 
 Typology of scrutiny: Oversight vs overview 
The aim of this section is to present a typology of scrutiny which builds upon the 
discussion in the previous sections. The literature on scrutiny in local government 
suggests that scrutiny is separated into two areas, that of scrutiny and that of 
overview, with the literature suggesting that holding the council executive to 
account is the main aim of scrutiny. Considering the links to oversight here, it is a 
better term to use, rather than scrutiny which represents a more abstract idea. 
Overview, on the other hand covers the aspect of support which non-executive 
councillors give to the executive and policy making process (Ashworth & Snape, 
2004; Martin, 2006). This then became the foundation for the creation of a new 
typology, as it provides scope for oversight to be that particular, distinct type of 
scrutiny that the literature describes but it also allows for the other types of 
scrutiny to be taken into account as well. 
The aims and objectives discussed in previous sections also lend themselves to the 
idea that there are two distinct types of scrutiny, oversight and overview. The local 
government literature provides a particularly apt foundation for developing a 
typology of committee scrutiny, at least in the UK Parliament, as local government 
committees are designed to mirror the committee system in the House of 
Commons. Table 2.1 shows how these aims and objectives of scrutiny (as well as 
accountability and responsibility) support these different types of scrutiny.  
 
 
 59 
Table 2.1. Aims and objectives of scrutiny via type of scrutiny.  
Oversight Overview 
Hold bodies to account Improve outcomes and purposes 
Evaluate implementation Constructive 
Ensure administrative compliance  Independent, objective and inclusive 
Guard against harsh and callous 
administration 
 
Check dishonesty and waste  
Speak with one voice  
Improvements in the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public bodies 
 
Open and transparent  
 
Table 2.1 shows that there a number of aims and objectives that fit into these two 
categories but that oversight has a broader range of aims and objectives. This 
supports further the idea that oversight is a particular type of scrutiny which has 
close links to accountability and responsibility. Indeed, when scrutiny is exercised 
with the aim of holding bodies or persons responsible and to account, that is 
oversight. When scrutiny is exercised without additional goals it is overview. 
However, the problem with only having two types of scrutiny is that when taking 
into account other areas of scrutiny (such as scrutiny of the EU by national 
parliaments), overview becomes a very big category, essentially a catch-all 
category, and there is thus a need to separate these into other types. Otherwise, all 
that would be left is oversight and all the other types within one category. Sandford 
(2005) argues that there are five types of scrutiny; policy, accountability, audit, 
budget scrutiny, and legislative scrutiny. He also suggests that policy scrutiny and 
accountability are the mainstay of the scrutiny process (Sandford, 2005). However, 
there is the question of whether the two areas overlap. For example, when 
examining policy it is perfectly plausible that the body undertaking the scrutiny 
will be looking to hold the executive to account but also seeking to influence policy 
making and development. There is also an issue here with audit being a separate 
type of scrutiny, especially when the National Audit Office (responsible for 
auditing government departments and executive agencies) describes its role as 
being one of supporting the holding of government to account (National Audit 
Office, 2018).  
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Another example revealing that there is potentially an overlap between overview 
and oversight is that of post-legislative scrutiny. Indeed post-legislative scrutiny, 
as defined in chapter one, would draw upon the aims and objectives of both 
overview and oversight. Post-legislative scrutiny, as noted in chapter one, does 
involve some level of accountability (and as such oversight) as it is designed to 
evaluate the implementation of legislation, ensure administrative compliance with 
that legislation. If there are problems with the legislation under review it is also 
expected to improve processes and outcomes as well as be constructive. In the 
typology below an additional category has been created to take into account this 
type of scrutiny.  
Table 2.2. Typology of scrutiny: Type and definition 
Type Definition When 
Type 
Occurs 
E.g. 
Oversight 
(type 1) 
The review, monitoring and 
supervision, of government and 
public agencies (usually including 
the implementation of legislation 
and policy) with the aim of 
holding them to account, post 
actions taking place1. 
Post 
(action) 
Examination of expenditure and 
performance/Public 
appointments/Departmental 
Strategy. 
Overview 
(type 2) 
The review and monitoring of the 
policy making process with the 
aim of supporting the executive 
and legislature in policy 
development and in their other 
operations, prior to actions being 
taken. 
Pre 
(action) 
Pre-Legislative Scrutiny 
Overview 
& 
Oversight 
(type 3) 
A hybrid (including elements of 
type 1 and type 2). This involves, 
the review, monitoring and 
supervision, of the executive in 
policy development with the aim 
of holding the executive to 
account for their policy actions 
and also supporting the executive 
in future policy development. 
Pre/Post 
(action) 
Post-Legislative 
Scrutiny/Scrutiny of the EU by 
National Parliaments/ 
Examination of policy. 
Legislative 
(type 4) 
The examination of government 
and private members bills 
(including primary and secondary 
legislation), with the aim of 
ensuring such bills are sufficiently 
prepared to enter the statue 
books. 
Current 
(action) 
Legislative Scrutiny 
                                                     
1 This includes both ex ante and ex post accountability. Ex-post meaning accountability after the 
outcome, ex-ante meaning accountability running simultaneously through a project (i.e. looking 
back at completed work but also questioning future plans). 
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This typology does two things; a) it creates categories of scrutiny which are more 
closely aligned to this research and b) it builds upon previous typologies, 
addressing their flaws. This new typology has four categories; oversight, overview, 
overview/oversight and legislative. 
The difference between these first two categories is the focus upon accountability 
and policy development, which comes from the foundations provided by Ashworth 
& Snape, (2004) and Sandford, (2005). However, there is room for overlap, as these 
two categories do not catch all types of scrutiny. Indeed, the two categories 
outlined thus far do not account for scrutiny such as the scrutiny of the European 
Union by national parliaments, which as discussed in the section of scrutiny, 
involves both a policy development and an accountability element. Nor do these 
two categories hold another important type of scrutiny; post-legislative scrutiny. 
Post-legislative scrutiny may not focus solely upon accountability and certainly not 
direct accountability to a minister, as the legislation under review might have been 
passed by a previous administration. However, there is still accountability present 
in terms of the department being responsible and held accountable for the 
implementation and the drafting of legislation, regardless of whether it was drawn 
up under a previous government. The government would also be responsible and 
accountable for making any necessary changes to legislation, again regardless of 
whether they had anything to do with it originally. However there is also the 
potential for a policy development role for post-legislative scrutiny as well. This is 
why a third type of scrutiny has been created to encompass these types of scrutiny 
which do not necessarily fit into type one or type two. 
The third type of scrutiny has been titled overview/oversight, as it combines 
elements of types one and two. Here examples include; post-legislative scrutiny 
and scrutiny of the EU by national parliaments. As this category combines 
elements from both type one and two, in terms of actions, it is concerned in some 
instances as pre and some as post decision making. 
However, one final category of scrutiny is necessary. That of legislative scrutiny, 
legislative scrutiny is distinct to the first three categories as they are focused upon 
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scrutiny of government departments whereas legislative scrutiny is focused upon 
the scrutiny of bills. Legislative scrutiny is defined as, the examination of 
government and private members bills (including primary and secondary 
legislation), with the aim of ensuring such bills are sufficiently prepared to enter 
the statue books. In this instance, in terms of discussing when this type of scrutiny 
takes place, it is current, on bills (both government and Members) prior to them 
becoming Acts of Parliament. The important distinction here is that it is the 
scrutiny of bills and not acts, the focus is upon suggesting potential amendments 
on managerial and political grounds (Sandford, 2005). It is not focused upon 
holding government departments to account but rather quality control. This type 
of scrutiny in the UK Parliament has its own system of scrutiny separate from 
departmental select committees. 
Table 2.2 also shows when the action occurs and examples of scrutiny taken from 
the core tasks of departmental select committees. Oversight occurs post action and 
other examples of this would be questions to ministers during departmental 
question time but also debates on government policy. Overview is pre-action 
taking place as scrutiny, such as pre-legislative scrutiny, is designed to help develop 
policy and legislation before it is formally introduced. Overview/Oversight can 
occur pre and post action, with all three examples there can be an element of 
holding the government to account for their actions but also a supporting role in 
policy development. It is a different pre and post action to oversight as the pre 
action does not necessarily relate just to ex ante accountability but also to policy 
development. Finally, legislative focuses on current action, i.e. on legislation that 
is making its way through the legislative process.  
 
Table 2.3. Typology and presence of accountability and responsibility 
Scrutiny 
Type 
Name Accountability Responsibility 
Type 1 Oversight High High 
Type 2 Overview Low Low 
Type 3 Overview/
Oversight 
Medium Medium 
Type 4 Legislative Low Low 
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Throughout the analysis of accountability and responsibility, discussion turned to 
what these two concepts add to scrutiny. Table 2.3 shows the strength of these 
concepts within scrutiny in each of the typologies outlined above. 
With regards to accountability and parliamentary scrutiny, oversight is a term 
which was used long before scrutiny became popular. Consequently, even though 
accountability is not the aim of type two and type four scrutiny, there is an 
underlying residue. For example with select committees, their main function, 
when set up, was to hold the government to account and to rebalance the power 
relationship between government and parliament. However their roles have 
developed over time but that original foundation of holding the government to 
account is present in virtually all of their activities, even if they do not hold that as 
the main aim of what they are trying to achieve. From this, oversight, because of 
its close links with accountability, has the strength of accountability at high, 
overview/oversight at medium because it contains an element of oversight, and 
overview and legislative have it at low rather than none. This is because 
accountability and the desire to hold government to account is engrained into the 
institution. 
Responsibility is present in all types of scrutiny, as has been assessed in the section 
on responsibility. Here the table has oversight as high, because responsibility is a 
necessary component of oversight in order to hold the government accountable, 
as in order to be held politically accountable you need to be responsible first. In 
type three it is argued to be at medium, because in terms of overview/oversight, 
the element of oversight is still present. It is low for overview (type 2) because of 
the need for access for information (a foundation of scrutiny). In legislative, it is 
argued to be low, as the focus of this scrutiny is not as closely directed at 
government and access to information may come from other outside bodies 
presenting evidence, without direct request, through calls for evidence during 
public bill committees. 
The overall aim of departmental select committees, as noted by the House of 
Commons Liaison Committee is to hold ministers and departments to account for 
their policy and decision making (House of Commons Liaison Committee, 2012). 
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However in 2002 a set of common objectives, core tasks, of select committees were 
created to ensure committees were aware of their broad range of responsibilities. 
The core tasks were reviewed in 2012 as some were deemed to be out of date and 
new responsibilities were absent. The core tasks pre-2012 are set out in table 2.4. 
Table 2.4: Core tasks of departmental select committees pre-2012 
 OBJECTIVE A: TO EXAMINE AND COMMENT ON THE POLICY OF THE 
DEPARTMENT 
Task 1 To examine policy proposals from the UK Government and the European 
Commission in Green Papers, White Papers, draft Guidance etc., and to inquire 
further where the committee considers it appropriate. 
Task 2 To identify and examine areas of emerging policy, or where existing policy is 
deficient, and make proposals. 
Task 3 To conduct scrutiny of any published draft bill within the committee’s 
responsibilities. 
Task 4 To examine specific output from the department expressed in documents or 
other decisions. 
 OBJECTIVE B: TO EXAMINE THE EXPENDITURE OF THE DEPARTMENT 
Task 5 To examine the expenditure plans and out-turn of the department, its agencies 
and principal NDPBs. 
 OBJECTIVE C: TO EXAMINE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
DEPARTMENT 
Task 6 To examine the department’s Public Service Agreements, the associated targets 
and the statistical measurements employed, and report if appropriate. 
Task 7 To monitor the work of the department’s Executive Agencies, NDPBs, regulators 
and other associated public bodies. 
Task 8 To scrutinise major appointments made by the department 
Task 9 To examine the implementation of legislation and major policy initiatives. 
 OBJECTIVE D: TO ASSIST THE HOUSE IN DEBATE AND DECISION 
Task 10 To produce reports which are suitable for debate in the House, including 
Westminster Hall, or debating committees. 
(Source: House of Commons Liaison Committee, 2012) 
The core tasks of departmental select committees are designed to be taken into 
account by committees when they are planning their work programmes. However, 
it is not expected that all committees will meet every single one, for example, 
committees with a large amount of legislation to deal with will simply not have the 
time to cover everything (House of Commons Liaison Committee, 2012). That 
being said, committees are expected to try and meet these core tasks and report 
back to the Liaison Committee at the end of each session in order to reveal which 
core tasks have been met and which have not.  
 
 
 65 
Table 2.5: Core tasks of departmental select committees post-2012 
Overall aim: To hold ministers and departments to account for their policy and decision-
making and to support the House in its control of the supply of public money and scrutiny 
of legislation 
Task 1:  
Strategy  
To examine the strategy of the department, how it has 
identified its key objectives and priorities and whether it has 
the means to achieve them, in terms of plans, resources, 
skills, capabilities and management information [Oversight] 
Task 2:  
Policy 
To examine policy proposals by the department, and areas of 
emerging policy, or where existing policy is deficient, and 
make proposals [Oversight & Overview] 
Task 3:  
Expenditure and 
Performance 
To examine the expenditure plans, outturn and performance 
of the department and its arm’s length bodies, and the 
relationships between spending and delivery of outcomes 
[Oversight] 
Task 4:  
Draft Bills 
To conduct scrutiny of draft bills within the committee’s 
responsibilities [Overview] 
Task 5:  
Bills and Delegated 
Legislation 
To assist the House in its consideration of bills and statutory 
instruments, including draft orders under the Public Bodies 
Act. [Legislative] 
Task 6:  
Post-Legislative Scrutiny 
To examine the implementation of legislation and scrutinise 
the department’s post- legislative assessments [Oversight & 
Overview] 
Task 7:  
European Scrutiny 
To scrutinise policy developments at the European level and 
EU legislative proposals. [Oversight & Overview] 
Task 8:  
Appointments 
To scrutinise major appointments made by the department 
and to hold pre-appointment hearings where appropriate. 
[Oversight] 
Task 9:  
Support for the House 
To produce timely reports to inform debate in the House, 
including Westminster Hall, or debating committees, and to 
examine petitions tabled. [Overview] 
Task 10:  
Public Engagement 
To assist the House of Commons in better engaging with the 
public by ensuring that the work of the committee is 
accessible to the public [Overview] 
(Source: House of Commons Liaison Committee, 2012) 
In order to operationalise the typology, these core tasks were placed into table 2.6 
in order to show where they fit within this typology. The pre-2012 and post-2012 
tasks (House of Commons Liaison Committee, 2012) were placed together and 
table 2.6 shows that all ten of the select committee tasks (which now cover a broad 
area) fit into the categories provided here in this typology. What is also worth 
noting is the shift in where the tasks are placed in pre and post-2012 lists. With the 
movement towards overview post-2012, it is worth questioning whether this is 
evidence of the scrutiny creep (i.e. where committees have sought an expansion of 
their competences) which was discussed in the section on scrutiny. Although it 
might be better argued that part of the reason for the renewed core tasks was that 
scrutiny creep had occurred and as such with an expansion of committee 
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competences over time the previous tasks were no longer up to date. It might 
rather be termed overview creep in which committees are moving beyond the 
traditional accountability role, which is their main aim. Such movement could be 
a response to committees trying to find new roles to influence government, as they 
do not have the power to force governments to do anything. The idea being that 
while oversight may have been the main focus of scrutiny prior to the end of the 
20th Century, this has now begun to change as the focus has shifted to other areas. 
Table 2.6. Typology and departmental select committee core tasks 
Scrutiny 
Type 
Name DSC Core 
Tasks (Pre 
2012) 
DSC Core 
Tasks 
(Post-2012) 
Type 1 Oversight 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 1, 3, 8 
Type 2 Overview 2, 3, 10 4, 9, 10 
Type 3 Overview/Oversight 1, 9 2, 6, 7, 
Type 4 Legislative N/A 5 
 
The aim of this section has been to create a typology of scrutiny which is better 
aligned to this thesis and which answers the questions raised in the analysis of 
scrutiny. A further aim has been to place post-legislative scrutiny within the 
broader system of scrutiny undertaken in parliament. In the process of putting 
together this typology, it has been able to show that there is evidence for the idea 
of scrutiny creep. It has also helped to answer questions which arose out of 
previous sections, that if oversight is a particular and distinct type of scrutiny, then 
what are the other types of scrutiny. This chapter has so far focused upon the 
conceptual and theoretical side of accountability, scrutiny and responsibility. 
However, there is a need to address the literature on scrutiny in practice, in 
relation to the UK Parliament and its committees.  
 
 Scrutiny in the UK Parliament 
As the focus of this thesis is on the post-legislative scrutiny undertaken by 
committees, it is important to address some of the literature on committees in the 
UK Parliament. The literature on committees can provide an insight into the 
challenges and practicalities of undertaking scrutiny in a parliamentary setting. 
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There are a number of mechanisms available to parliament to undertake scrutiny. 
Not all are suitable for undertaking post-legislative scrutiny. In terms of debates, 
the rapid response required from ministers and the level of concentration in having 
to listen to numerous lengthy speeches can mean that responses might not always 
take into account everything that has been said and all the issues raised. However, 
debates do not necessarily take place in isolation and government ministers and 
their civil servants will have some understanding of what the MPs of different 
parties might say and therefore will focus upon a party’s general thrust rather than 
all specific points raised by Members.  It is not the most appropriate way of 
undertaking post-legislative scrutiny, especially if the focus is on technical details 
which require deeper thought. However, debates can be used to place the 
particular issue such as legislation requiring review on to the political agenda, and 
as a forum for airing views. Parliamentary questions can be a useful mechanism for 
highlighting particular issues, such as the impact and implementation of 
legislation. They can also be useful in bringing issues to a minister’s attention and 
putting issues on to the agenda. However, as with debates, questions are not the 
most appropriate way of undertaking detailed scrutiny, especially in the House of 
Commons where backbench MPs are unable to ask follow up questions. Urgent 
questions in the House of Commons also allow for a series of questions on a 
particular topic, which again could be used to place issues on to the agenda. 
However, as with debates, parliamentary questions are not the most appropriate 
way of undertaking post-legislative scrutiny as the length of responses, either in 
writing or orally are restricted and as such so is detail.  
The ability of committees to hold inquiries and hold one off evidence sessions 
means they are better equipped to undertake detailed scrutiny. It means there can 
be a more sustained questioning of ministers and other interested parties, which 
the other mechanisms do not allow for. Committees are also suitable for 
undertaking post-legislative scrutiny, as a working relationship should already be 
developed between departments and committees in the House of Commons in 
their usual day to day work. White (2015c) argues that this relationship is key to 
committee influence. This would allow a committee to have more influence than 
an individual member asking a question in the chamber which can be easily 
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deflected. The ability of committees to produce reports which the government is 
then required to respond to in writing, within two months, is a further advantage 
of committees, as governments must respond to their findings and 
recommendations and thus must be seen to consider them. It is for these reasons 
why select committees are the focus of this research on post-legislative scrutiny. 
While the other mechanisms could be useful for getting post-legislative scrutiny 
or the issues around it on to the agenda, it is select committees who are most able 
to undertake comprehensive scrutiny and see results, mainly through their broadly 
consensual nature and working relationship with government departments.  
 
2.6.1 House of Commons – Departmental select committees 
The Hansard Society (2001), as with other academics such as Longley & Davidson, 
(1998), Shaw, (1998) and Strom, (1998) regard departmental select committees as 
the main vehicle for promoting a culture of scrutiny and accountability. Select 
committees in the UK undertake a range of functions (see table 2.5).  
Select committees perform an important scrutiny function but perhaps their 
success in holding the executive to account comes from the fact that from their 
creation through to 2011 these committees did not have power over things which 
greatly matter to government’s survival, such as the passage of legislation and the 
budget. As they are less of a threat to the passage of government bills and the 
government’s survival, they are treated in a different way to the chamber 
(Giddings, 1994; Hansard Society, 2001). This also suggests that they have soft 
power rather the hard power, in comparison to committees in the United States 
Congress. By hard power we mean the ability to coerce (e.g. power over the purse, 
the power to subpoena) and by soft power we mean the power to achieve goals 
through persuasion rather the coercion (e.g. power to embarrass) (Chafetz, 2017).  
However it could be argued that since 2011, and the passage of the Fixed Term 
Parliaments Act, little stands in the way of a government’s survival anymore, other 
than a vote of no confidence initiated under the requirements of that Act. While 
governments may not be impressed by critical committee reports, they very rarely 
threaten their existence, due to the bi-partisan nature of select committees but also 
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because, outside of parliament, these committee reports generally do not receive 
much attention. This all comes down to power, as noted above these committees, 
generally speaking, do not have coercive (hard) powers and instead must rely on 
the power to persuade (soft power) (Russell, 1986; Gordon & Street 2012; Heywood, 
2013). However despite this governments are required to respond within 60 days 
to a committee report. From this committees have been able to deepen the 
accountability and scrutiny of the executive by adding a new dimension to previous 
traditional measures of scrutiny. This gives credence to the argument as noted by 
Matthews & Flinders (2015), that scrutiny creep has occurred. The deepening of 
accountability and scrutiny of the executive, suggests that accountability has a 
relationship with that broader scrutiny relationship, in this case, between 
committees and government departments. This is an important distinction for 
committees as their function is to scrutinise the expenditure, policy and 
administration of government departments and their related quangos and 
executive agencies (Barlow & Paun 2013). The emphasis was to enhance the role of 
individual MPs (as opposed to parties) in influencing decision making (Giddings, 
1994). Select committees give backbenchers from both sides of the House the 
ability to contribute, in a less partisan manner, to the scrutiny of government. As 
such, committees have significantly improved the processes of scrutiny in ways in 
which the House of Commons chamber could not, e.g. the willingness of select 
committees to rigorously scrutinise government agencies, not just government 
departments, and request written and oral evidence from them (Hansard Society 
2001).  
Recent reforms have increased the importance and influence of select committees, 
these reforms included the election of committee chairs and members, removing 
the patronage powers of the whips and government in general (Russell 2011; Benton 
& Russell 2013). This has reduced criticisms laid at select committees’ doors such 
as those of Flinders (2001) that the government could steer committees away from 
controversial issues of scrutiny. However it is possible that governments can find 
other ways to steer committees away from controversial issues, such as publishing 
draft bills for departmental select committees to scrutinise. While criticisms may 
remain, improvements have been made since 2010, which may mean that some of 
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the issues raised in literature prior to these reforms require qualification. This is 
also a step forward in terms of the general literature on parliamentary committees, 
which suggests such active committees are inherently at tension with the classic 
model of parliamentary government (Longley & Davidson 1998), and yet they are 
developing to an extent. This is true even if the UK is developing a stronger 
committee system at a slower rate than other parliaments, as suggested in research 
by Herbert Döring in the mid-1990s (Longley & Davidson 1998). This is where 
departmental select committees in the UK depart, slightly, from the majoritarian 
tradition of weak committees (thanks to the recent reforms). However a study by 
Bates, Goodwin, & McKay (2017) noted that despite the high praise the reforms 
have received, there was no statistical evidence to suggest that MPs were more 
engaged with committee work despite the claims about committee’s higher status 
and significance. More research is, therefore, required in this area to better 
understand the full impact of the Wright Reforms. 
Benton & Russell (2013) undertook an extensive study of the impact of select 
committees in Westminster. Their research concluded that although select 
committees could be more influential, their findings did challenge those who 
suggest that committees are ignored by government. In fact, their research showed 
that committees have become an integral part of policy making, due to their 
detailed approach of scrutinising government policy and actions. Government 
departments are thus more willing to engage with committees in order not to fall 
foul of them later on in the policy process. This is one of the underlying aims of 
scrutiny, as noted earlier in the chapter, to constrain the power of government as 
they know eventually that they will have to account for their actions later on. This 
can also be a way of muting criticism of government later on. Additionally, this was 
seen as one of the aims of post-legislative scrutiny by the Law Commission (2006). 
 
2.6.2 House of Lords committees 
At this stage it is also worth noting the role of select committees in the House of 
Lords. House of Lords select committees tend to cover more crosscutting areas and 
do not shadow government departments (Norton 2013). As with parliamentary 
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questions, the focus is on depth rather than breadth. Select committees in the 
House of Lords are seen as prestigious, especially the Constitution, Science and 
Technology, and Economic Affairs Committees. These investigative committees 
also tend to tackle more strategic, technical and longer term issues due to their 
cross cutting nature (Russell, 2013). The same rules apply to Lords committees as 
they do to Commons committees regarding the government responding to reports 
and they also face similar challenges that Commons committees do (Rogers & 
Walters 2015). They tend to be consensual in nature due to the nature of the House 
of Lords and their membership is often based on merit due the expertise present 
in the House (Norton 2013). Lords Committees also tend to be less adversarial in 
their relationship with the government, and their reports have a more academic 
research feel to them (Russell, 2013). Ad hoc committees also form an important 
part of the committee structure in the House of Lords and their number set up 
each session was expanded in 2012 (House of Lords Liaison Committee 2012). They 
are set up temporarily and disband after the publication of their reports. They are 
popular among Peers as they allow topical issues to be examined without a 
permanent committee being appointed, as they are an established part of the 
committee structure in the House of Lords, there is competition in terms of Peers 
bidding for committees covering their preferred area being set up (Rogers & 
Walters 2015) 
As with House of Commons committees, House of Lords committees are regarded 
as an effective mechanism when it comes to scrutinising the government. It is 
therefore not surprising that the Hansard Society (2001), as with other academics 
such as Longley & Davidson, (1998), Shaw, (1998) and Strom, (1998) regard select 
committees as the main vehicle for promoting a culture of scrutiny and 
accountability. Although it should be noted that a combination of factors ensures 
that the House of Lords tends to tread with some caution, these factors being the 
lack of democratic election and the primacy of the House of Commons (Russell, 
2013). We will draw more on the challenges committees face and how their 
behaviour impacts upon outcomes later in the thesis when addressing the outputs 
of post-legislative scrutiny. 
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2.6.3 Parliament and committees at the apex of scrutiny 
Parliament and its committees especially do not undertake scrutiny of government 
in isolation (White, 2015b) and are in fact at the apex of a system of scrutiny 
(Hansard Society, 2001). As such it is important to situate committees in this 
literature on engagement with outside bodies, as it plays out most clearly in the 
process of committee inquiries and thus impacts upon scrutiny. It is also important 
to address as there are those who argue that post-legislative scrutiny, would be 
better undertaken outside of parliament (Rogers & Walters 2015). This section will 
address this web of scrutiny and argue why it is important that parliament 
maintains a leading role and why outside scrutiny is important in it maintaining 
that leading role.   
The study of scrutiny by the Hansard Society (2001) found the quality of 
information which is provided to parliament, by government, is variable and 
committees especially rely on information in order to be able to undertake effective 
scrutiny. This is important as we noted earlier in this chapter that access to 
information underpins all scrutiny. This also shows the reality verses the theory of 
gathering information. It also noted that: the system of accountability was 
inadequate and disconnected, the scrutiny of government lacked rigour and there 
were no means to make sure that the government follows recommendations 
(Scarparo, 2008). All of this has implications for the practicality of undertaking 
scrutiny in parliament. As a result the work of outside bodies should be a valuable 
addition to parliament in terms of undertaking scrutiny, especially in relation to 
post-legislative scrutiny, with committees relying on government reviews of 
legislation (sometimes its own) when considering undertaking additional scrutiny. 
Scrutiny of government can be undertaken by a number of non-statutory actors, 
and may not be the sole or even the main purpose of their work but nevertheless 
it forms part of their work. The issue with these bodies is that they have no formal 
power (other than through press releases) to bring the results of their scrutiny to 
the attention of policy makers but, instead are reliant on personal and institutional 
networks and media attention. However, some can be successful, if they are 
reputable, if there is a gap in civil service experience, and public opinion is on their 
side (White 2015b). 
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There are of course various forms of scrutiny which take place outside of 
parliament. Firstly, there is the media. The media plays a role in disseminating the 
results of democratic scrutiny as well as conducting its own investigations and 
publishing information which officials do not want released. However, some argue 
that scrutiny undertaken by the media is rarely constructive and rarely matches 
the detailed scrutiny which democratic institutions can offer (Maer & Sandford 
2004). Media exposure can also influence government because of its public reach, 
and it can also work with other forms of scrutiny such as parliament. For example, 
the Public Accounts Committee’s (PAC) work on tax avoidance following 
investigative journalism into corporations such as Google (White 2015b). However 
there has been a decline in investigative journalism in recent years (McNair 2009), 
which will impact upon the media’s ability to get access to information which 
government would rather not have in the public domain. 
There is also legal accountability and judicial review, which has increased in recent 
years following the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998 and through the UK’s 
membership of the European Union (EU) and as signatories to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. In England and Wales the High Courts can conduct 
judicial review examining whether a government has exercised its powers lawfully, 
and the European Court of Justice can also conduct scrutiny of UK primary 
legislation, in order to ensure it doesn’t conflict with EU legislation, which takes 
supremacy (White 2015b). However, the High Courts do not have the power to 
strike down legislation, although they can make a statement of incompatibility 
with regards the Human Rights Act 1998, which leaves the government to decide 
whether to amend the legislation (Maer & Sandford 2004; Hansard Society 2001). 
Between 2000 when the Human Rights Act came into force and the end of the 2010-
2015 Parliament there had only been 29 declarations of incompatibility of which 20 
were final (Joint Committee on Human Rights 2015). This is another example of 
soft power. Also the courts are limited in that they can only undertake concrete 
review rather than abstract review, meaning the courts can only rule on an issue 
once it has become law and once a case has been brought to their attention. The 
courts and judiciary also have an important input role in terms of post-legislative 
scrutiny due to the focus on the implementation and operation of legislation. The 
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courts and judiciary will often have first-hand information of where the legislation 
is difficult to enforce. 
Thirdly there is freedom of information (FOI). It provides a legal obligation for 
public bodies to release information, with an appeals procedure in place so 
challenges can be made if there is a refusal. However the Freedom of Information 
Act has been criticised for its limited nature and the number of exemptions 
available to the government (Maer & Sandford, 2004).  Exempt material includes; 
the economy, commercial interests and the formation of government policy (Maer 
& Sandford, 2004). There are also fears that the Act is resulting in officials in 
Whitehall not recording meetings properly for fear that minutes could be released 
under FOI (Taylor, 2015; Hope, 2015). This also has implications for parliamentary 
scrutiny, as committees require access to documents during inquiries, if those 
documents are not available then it could impact on a committee’s (and thus 
parliament’s) ability to hold the government to account. 
Finally, there is financial scrutiny and audit, designed to ensure that public funds 
are being used in line with policy, efficiently and effectively. The NAO is in charge 
of auditing the accounts of all central government departments and half of the 
executive agencies and all of its work is presented to parliament. Most of the other 
audit work is undertaken in the private sector. All of the parliaments and 
assemblies of the United Kingdom receive reports from audit bodies and have audit 
committees which can investigate the public accounts (Hansard Society 2001; Maer 
& Sandford 2004). Further financial scrutiny is undertaken by the Office of Budget 
Responsibility which provides independent analysis of public sector finances 
(Office for Budget Responsibility, 2015) and previously by the Audit Commission, 
however its roles have now been subsumed by the Cabinet Office, NAO and 
Financial Reporting Council (HM Government, 2015). 
So alongside the growth of government has been a growth in these other forms of 
scrutiny, which are often better equipped than parliament in terms of resources 
and expertise to monitor government. The expansion in the number of these 
bodies’ means there is more information available and accessible on the 
performance of government. However, the previous paragraphs also acknowledge 
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some of the limitations which the other bodies face and while parliament has 
certainly faced an array of challenges it does have the added benefit of having 
democratic legitimacy when undertaking scrutiny of government. Each of the 
forms of extra-parliamentary scrutiny outlined above adds value in one way or 
another, however none of them on their own would be sufficient in order to hold 
the government to account due to differences in focus, motivation and access to 
influence. With parliament being a democratically elected body, and with more 
scope to influence and question ministers, parliament is in a prime location to be 
at the apex of scrutiny in which these different bodies can feed into.  However there 
is a need to ensure that better co-ordination takes place of the different scrutiny 
activities taking place (Scarparo, 2008). 
While there is little direct literature on the relationships which parliament and in 
particular committees have with outside organisations, such as interest groups or 
regulators and how these organisations feed in to the scrutiny process, there is 
literature on relationships between committees and interest groups. Since their 
inception, committees have developed close working relationships with interest 
groups in terms of submitting written and oral evidence to inquiries (Hindmoor et 
al. 2009). Indeed a survey in 1986 found that 49% of interest groups had submitted 
oral evidence while 66% had submitted written evidence to committees (Norton 
1999). Committees also hold lists of organisations and specialists in their area of 
interest who they can call upon during inquiries. There are thus close links 
between committees and interest groups.  
However, there is no direct literature on how committees and parliament more 
generally deal with the information they are given, and little on how interest 
groups can influence and support committees in scrutiny outside of an inquiry 
setting. If these organisations are carrying out extra-parliamentary scrutiny, then 
surely they have to be able to influence scrutiny from its inception, through helping 
to set the agenda, rather than solely contributing to a pre-arranged inquiry. If these 
organisation’s reports and studies were only accessible during pre-arranged 
inquiries then that could diminish the impact of their research, as once a 
committee has called for evidence, the evidence must be tailored to that specific 
inquiry. In research on post-legislative scrutiny in the Scottish Parliament, a survey 
76 
of Members of the Scottish Parliament showed that pressure from an interest 
group was the second most popular answer for which factors have influenced a 
committee’s decision to undertake post-legislative scrutiny (Caygill 2014). The 
question is, does this relationship occur in Westminster too? Research by White 
(2015c) found that the Home Affairs Committee, while undertaking inquiries did 
at the end of each evidence session allow for a topical section, where organisations 
could provide evidence not related to the inquiry. So while there is evidence of 
these extra parliamentary bodies operating with the committee system in terms of 
shaping and taking part in scrutiny, it does not appear to be systematic. That being 
said the influence of interest groups is not necessarily always transparent. With the 
Home Affairs Committee, it appears to be an innovation undertaken by that 
committee. Further research will be required to see if other committees pick such 
innovation out as best practice (White 2015c).  
As part of this apex of scrutiny, it is not only how parliament can access 
information but how parliament deals with this information that is important. The 
NAO and PAC produce reports which departmental select committees can use to 
guide their own scrutiny, however committee members are often not interested in 
scrutinising the finance of departments and therefore a low priority is given to 
finance (Hansard Society 2001).  
 
 Conceptual conclusion 
As abstract concepts, scrutiny, accountability and responsibility are separate 
concepts, but in a parliamentary context they are intertwined and hard to 
distinguish. Scrutiny is the mechanism through which people can be held 
responsible and accountable for their actions. As such accountability and 
responsibility are important for certain elements of scrutiny, as without someone 
having to take responsibility for failure they cannot be held accountable for their 
actions. Without responsibility, there would be no obligation to provide 
information, which underpins scrutiny. This would obviously diminish the 
outcome of holding people accountable for their actions (Corrigan & Charteris, 
1999; Greer & Sandford, 2003; Hull, 2012; Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2014; White, 
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2015b). Indeed, while scrutiny is an active process and relationship, accountability 
describes the authority, power and control within that relationship (White, 2015b) 
and responsibility provides the obligation. It was also noted how these concepts 
interact in terms of post-legislative scrutiny, in relation to scrutiny the aims 
outlined in this chapter match or mirror some of the aims of post-legislative 
scrutiny. The monitoring of implementation which forms part of the role of post-
legislative scrutiny relates to oversight and accountability. So how these three 
concepts interact, does have an impact upon post-legislative scrutiny. 
The aim of this conceptual analysis has been to assess the concepts and begin to 
develop an understanding of how accountability and responsibility enhance our 
understanding of scrutiny. From the academic definitions there was consensus that 
scrutiny involves an investigation, examination or inquiry. However, our 
assessment of how the term scrutiny is used in specific cases shows scrutiny to be 
much broader than the abstract academic definitions initially suggested, and that 
it is a concept that can be categorised. Accountability was about an authoritative 
relationship between a principal and an agent, with responsibility being the 
obligation within that relationship. As such if accountability is about a relationship 
then there must be a relationship in scrutiny, between the person being scrutinised 
and the body undertaking the scrutiny. The review discovered that some of the 
aims of accountability and scrutiny link together and that when they do it forms a 
particular type of scrutiny (oversight). The conceptual analysis has also shown the 
aims and objectives which participants in these concepts have attached to them, 
and includes a number of agreed aims within the concepts. However these aims 
and objectives are dependent upon context and help in the categorisation of 
scrutiny.  The review also found links between the aims and objectives of each of 
the concepts, this points back to the argument that these concepts have an 
important working relationship within a parliamentary context through the 
different types of scrutiny identified in this chapter. Again, this feeds into the 
argument that responsibility and accountability enhance the scrutiny relationship. 
This conceptual framework has therefore contributed to the conceptual 
understanding of scrutiny, accountability and responsibility and how these 
concepts interact with each other. 
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Finally, the chapter addressed the literature on scrutiny in parliament, and in 
particular parliamentary committees. The section showed that challenges different 
scrutiny mechanisms face, as well as justified why committees are the most 
appropriate vehicle for post-legislative scrutiny. The section also showed the 
challenges that committees face when undertaking the scrutiny. 
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Chapter 3 Committees and post-legislative 
scrutiny 
Having constructed a conceptual framework in the previous chapter, this chapter 
aims to provide a foundation for the study of post-legislative scrutiny.  
The finer details of how post-legislative scrutiny is conducted, such as the 
legislation that has been reviewed, remain unknown. For example, to date there is 
no comprehensive list of post-legislative scrutiny inquiries and no consolidated list 
of legislation that has been reviewed through post-legislative scrutiny. The aim of 
this chapter is to begin to fill the gaps in our knowledge about post-legislative 
scrutiny starting with how many post-legislative scrutiny inquiries there have 
been. In particular, this chapter assesses how the formal processes of post-
legislative scrutiny have been carried out. It begins by assessing how frequently 
post-legislative scrutiny has been undertaken between the 2005-2010 and 2015-2017 
Parliaments and what factors have determined this, before moving on to assess 
whether there are patterns regarding which committees undertake such scrutiny. 
This analysis has taken place through an audit of post-legislative scrutiny. This 
involved the collation of data on the number of post-legislative scrutiny inquiries 
that have taken place; the session; the parliament; and the legislation which has 
received post-legislative scrutiny. This allows for the assessment of post-legislative 
scrutiny, session by session, in order to analyse the progress post-legislative 
scrutiny has made. This data has been collated from committee reports.  
This chapter therefore seeks to answer research questions one (a) and one (b) 
relating to the frequency of post-legislative scrutiny and patterns of committees 
undertaking it. The practical contribution in this chapter relates to the production 
of a comprehensive list of post-legislative scrutiny, the Acts reviewed, as well as 
the committees undertaking it. Without such a list it is not possible to keep track 
of when and where post-legislative scrutiny is taking place but also which 
legislation has been reviewed and which has not. This is important for future 
decisions made by committees in both Houses of Parliament. 
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The chapter finds that whilst post-legislative scrutiny is perhaps more extensive 
than previously thought, it cannot be described as frequent. It is also clear from 
this chapter that post-legislative scrutiny has still not become a regular part of 
committee work. In comparison to the amount of legislation that is passed by the 
UK Parliament, post-legislative scrutiny is still rather infrequent.  
 
 Frequency of post-legislative scrutiny  
As there is no consolidated list of post-legislative scrutiny inquires thus far, this 
section will begin by addressing this. This list was drawn together by checking all 
of the committee inquiries on the UK Parliament website between the 2005/06 
session of the 2005-2010 Parliament and the end of the 2015-2017 Parliament. The 
titles of the inquiries were checked along with the summary page of the inquiry 
report, for signs that the inquiry was post-legislative scrutiny. The key indicators 
were that post-legislative scrutiny was in the title or terms of reference of the 
inquiry or that the inquiry was dedicated to reviewing an Act of Parliament. The 
data collected is separated into the two types of post-legislative scrutiny 
undertaken by parliamentary committees, that have been identified so far, these 
are; 
 Formal – a dedicated post-legislative scrutiny inquiry reviewing an Act or a 
number of Acts relating to a particular policy area. 
 Informal – an issue based inquiry which includes an element of reviewing an 
Act or a number of Acts relating to a particular policy area. 
 
The informal category was created, as a number of committee clerks noted that 
post-legislative scrutiny is inherent in some of the work that they undertake. 
Without this category, the study would miss a number of inquiries that involved 
an element of post-legislative scrutiny but where post-legislative scrutiny was not 
the main focus. Whilst the focus of this study is on formal post-legislative scrutiny, 
acknowledging the presence of another type of post-legislative scrutiny was 
important as this is an under researched area where additional research is required.  
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3.1.1 Frequency of post-legislative scrutiny in total 
In total there have been 57 instances of post-legislative scrutiny since the start of 
the 2005 Parliament and end of the 2015 Parliament. There were twenty formal 
inquiries and thirty-seven informal instances of post-legislative scrutiny.  
Table 3.1. Committees which have undertaken post-legislative scrutiny2 
Committee House Formal Informal3 Totals 
Ad Hoc4 L 6 0 6 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy C 0 5 5 
Housing, Communities and Local Government C 1 2 3 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport C 2 6 8 
Defence C 0 2 2 
Environmental Audit C 0 1 1 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs C 3 3 6 
Foreign Affairs C 0 1 1 
Home Affairs C 1 6 7 
Health and Social Care C 1 1 2 
International Development C 0 2 2 
Justice C 3 0 3 
Joint Committee on Human Rights C/L 1 5 6 
Northern Ireland Affairs C 0 1 1 
Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs C 2 1 3 
Petitions C 0 1 1 
Women and Equalities C 0 4 4 
Totals N/A 20 41 61 
 
Source5: (BEIS (2017a); BIS (2008, 2012a, 2013); CLG (2013, 2014a, 2017); CMS (2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a); D (2016a); D, FA, ID and TI (2007); EFRA (2008a, 2013a, 2014a, 
2016a, 2016b, 2017c); EA (2014a); H (2010, 2013); HA (2008a, 2008b, 2012, 2014a, 2014b, 2016a, 
2016b); ID (2016a); JCHR (2007a, 2008a, 2009, 2011, 2014a, 2014b); J (2012, 2013a, 2015); NIA 
(2013a); PE & WE (2017a); PA (2009, 2013a, 2013c); SCAL (2013); SCEL (2015); SCEAD (2016); SCIA 
(2014); SCLA (2017); SCMCA (2014); WE (2016, 2017a, 2017b). 
 
                                                     
2 The House of Lords Delegated Powers Committee’s report on the Legislative and Regulatory 
Reform Act 2006 is not contained in this study on the basis that the report did not conduct post-
legislative scrutiny but rather the correspondence between the committee and the department 
regarding the departments memorandum on the Act. The report did go on to recommend that a 
future committee undertake post-legislative scrutiny on the Act – so far no committee has.  
3 Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry Committees (2007) 
and the Women and Equalities & Petitions Committees (2017) were each one inquiry, however 
each committee has received acknowledgement in the table as having undertaken some post-
legislative scrutiny. Hence why the total figure is 61. 
4 Committee names in the table relate to the name of the committee at the time of writing. 
5 The full name of sources abbreviated here and in other tables and charts as well can be found in 
appendix 6 and 7 on pages 321-322.  
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Table 3.1 shows the committees which have undertaken post-legislative scrutiny by 
type. It shows the most active committees in undertaking post-legislative scrutiny 
as a whole are the: Culture, Media and Sport Committee; followed by the House of 
Commons Home Affairs Committee; and the ad hoc committees of the House of 
Lords. Had this study solely focused upon formal post-legislative scrutiny, then the 
three top active committees would have been the ad hoc committees of the House 
of Lords and the House of Commons Justice Committee joint with the House of 
Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee. Indeed if informal 
post-legislative scrutiny had been excluded from this study, incorrect conclusions 
may have been drawn regarding which committees are more or less active when it 
comes to post-legislative scrutiny. Looking at post-legislative scrutiny as a whole 
it is perhaps more extensive than it first appears with more committees engaging 
with it.  
The following departmental select committees have not undertaken any post-
legislative scrutiny in the 2005, 2010, or 2015 Parliaments; Education, Scottish 
Affairs, Transport, Treasury, Welsh Affairs, and Work and Pensions. However, 
these are a minority of committees. The Treasury Committee has not undertaken 
post-legislative scrutiny, this can be in part explained by the fact that financial 
legislation is not subject to post-legislative scrutiny. Whilst the Treasury does pass 
legislation related to finance not all legislation is budgetary in nature and as such, 
the Treasury does produce post-legislative memoranda suggesting that some 
Treasury legislation is eligible for post-legislative scrutiny.  There are other non-
departmental committees in the House of Commons that have not undertaken 
post-legislative scrutiny. However, post-legislative scrutiny is not one of their core 
tasks, although there is nothing to stop them undertaking it. For example, the 
Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee is not a departmental 
select committee per say and is not expected to adhere to the core tasks set out by 
the Liaison Committee but has undertaken post-legislative scrutiny twice. 
However, for the other committees, post-legislative scrutiny is one of their core 
tasks and they shadow departments which do initiate legislation and which should 
be eligible for post-legislative scrutiny. For example, the Wales Office and Scotland 
Office initiate legislation relating to devolution (although infrequent) and the 
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Department for Education legislates on education reform. There may be a number 
of reasons why they have decided not to undertake post-legislative scrutiny, such 
as legislation not requiring review or the committee not having the appetite to 
undertake post-legislative scrutiny. These issues will be explored in more detail in 
chapter four. 
There are also a number of House of Lords committees which have not undertaken 
post-legislative scrutiny. Although they could undertake post-legislative scrutiny 
they are not expected to unlike Commons departmental select committees are. 
Furthermore, with ad hoc committees being set up to undertake post-legislative 
scrutiny in the House of Lords, and with their ability to draw upon a range of 
expertise, there is less pressure on the standing committees to undertake separate 
review. 
Figure 3.1 shows the total amount of post-legislative scrutiny completed in each 
session, across all types. The figure shows that the most active parliamentary 
session for post-legislative scrutiny was the 2013-2014 session with 16 instances of 
post-legislative scrutiny taking place, seven of which were formal and nine of 
which were informal. This was also the peak during the 2010 Parliament. The peak 
during the 2005 Parliament was the 2007-2008 session with six instances of post-
legislative scrutiny taking place. The peak in the 2015 Parliament, which was cut 
short, was the 2016-2017 session with 13 inquiries taking place, involving at least an 
element of post-legislative scrutiny. There appears to be a trend developing here 
in terms of post-legislative scrutiny activity increasing during the middle and later 
sessions of a parliament. However data will be needed for the current 2017 
Parliament before such a trend could be confirmed. The figure shows the start of 
such a trend too, and suggests that there are peaks and troughs which follow a 
parliament, peaking at some point during the middle of the parliament. Such peaks 
and troughs can be explained by greater pressures on committee time at the start 
of a parliament, especially following the election of a new government which 
means post-legislative scrutiny is less of a priority at that particular time. Perhaps 
it is not until the pace of government begins to slow after the initial post-election 
rush that committees feel they have the opportunity to undertake such scrutiny. 
The trend line on figure 3.1 also suggests there is a modest increase in post-
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legislative activity, but again more data will be needed from the remainder of the 
2017 Parliament before any trend can be confirmed. 
Figure 3.1. Post-legislative scrutiny by type and total 
 
Source: (BEIS (2017a); BIS (2008, 2012a, 2013); CLG (2013, 2014a, 2017); CMS (2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a); D (2016a); D, FA, ID and TI (2007); EFRA (2008a, 2013a, 2014a, 
2016a, 2016b, 2017c); EA (2014a); H (2010, 2013); HA (2008a, 2008b, 2012, 2014a, 2014b, 2016a, 
2016b); ID (2016a); JCHR (2007a, 2008a, 2009, 2011, 2014a, 2014b); J (2012, 2013a, 2015); NIA 
(2013a); PE & WE (2017a); PA (2009, 2013a, 2013c); SCAL (2013); SCEL (2015); SCEAD (2016); SCIA 
(2014); SCLA (2017); SCMCA (2014); WE (2016, 2017a, 2017b). 
 
Finally, in this section assessing the total post-legislative activity between the start 
of the 2005 Parliament and the end of the 2015 Parliament, it is important to 
compare review by post-legislative scrutiny to the amount of legislation being 
passed in each session. Whilst a direct comparison cannot be made because some 
of the Acts receiving post-legislative scrutiny pre-date the 2005 Parliament, it does 
allow for a basic comparison between the legislative output and post-legislative 
output.  
Figure 3.2 shows the total number of government bills which have gone on to 
receive Royal Assent and become Acts of Parliament. It shows that there is a peak 
immediately after an election and a decline until the final session before an election 
where there is a rise. This could be down to governments rushing final pieces of 
legislation through before the election is called. This is in comparison to post-
legislative scrutiny which peaks just after the half way point of a parliament, as 
noted above. It is not possible to say if the two are linked, due to the lack of data 
over a longer period of time. However in the 2010 Parliament only two pieces of 
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legislation from the coalition government were assessed. Looking at that session 
in isolation, there would not appear to be a link between the two in terms of post-
legislative scrutiny peaking two-three years after an election in order to scrutinise 
the legislation from earlier sessions. 
Figure 3.2. Bills which have received Royal Assent by session 
 
Source: (House of Commons, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017) 
 
In total table 3.2 shows that 393 pieces of legislation were passed into law during 
the time period this study is focusing upon in comparison to 57 instances of post-
legislative scrutiny. Of the 393 pieces of legislation introduced in this period, 26 of 
those have gone on to receive post-legislative scrutiny of some kind (6.6%), 11 of 
those (3%) were from formal post-legislative scrutiny. It is clear that whilst looking 
at post-legislative scrutiny as a whole there is more of it than perhaps first meets 
the eye. However, it is not frequent when compared to parliament’s legislative 
output. Whilst it would not be possible, or even necessary, to conduct post-
legislative scrutiny on every Act, this suggests that the current system of post-
legislative scrutiny is not systematic. Post-legislative scrutiny is therefore still 
limited in its activity. The introduction of a dedicated post-legislative scrutiny 
committee has been noted before, particularly by the House of Lords Constitution 
Committee, and could help in terms of increasing the amount of post-legislative 
scrutiny that is undertaken in the UK Parliament.  
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However there are a number of reasons for this such as, a large number of Acts not 
requiring post-legislative scrutiny and some Acts not being eligible for post-
legislative scrutiny on the basis of being financial in nature. Table 3.2 shows that 
out of 393 pieces of legislation, 49 were considered to be financial in nature 
(finance, consolidation of funds, appropriation and supply and appropriations 
acts), leaving 344 pieces of legislation eligible for post-legislative scrutiny. Out of 
the eligible Acts 7.6% of them have received either formal or informal post-
legislative scrutiny and only 3.2% have received formal post-legislative scrutiny.  
Table 3.2. Legislation passed between 2005 - 2017 
Session 
Total 
Bills 
Private 
Members Bills 
Government 
Bills 
Finance 
related 
Eligible for post-
legislative scrutiny 
2005/06 56 3 53 6 50 
2006/07 33 2 31 4 29 
2007/08 33 3 30 5 28 
2008/09 27 5 22 4 23 
2009/10 30 7 23 4 26 
2010/12 49 7 42 8 41 
2012/13 38 10 28 4 34 
2013/14 30 5 25 3 27 
2014/15 36 10 26 4 32 
2015/16 29 6 23 3 26 
2016/17 32 8 24 4 28 
Total 393 66 327 49 344 
Source: (House of Commons, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017) 
However, there are other reasons as to why not all of these remaining Acts will be 
considered suitable by committees. For example, if post-legislative scrutiny is not 
a priority for committees or there is not enough time to undertake multiple formal 
post-legislative scrutiny inquiries in the House of Commons. One additional factor 
could be the passage of a number of Acts in a particular policy area (e.g. education), 
this could discourage post-legislative scrutiny as little time may have passed 
between successive Acts for the legislation to be fully implemented and its impact 
to become known. Taking into account Acts which are financial in nature still 
leaves a large number of Acts which have not received post-legislative scrutiny. It 
may also be limited because some of the Acts are relatively new, however, despite 
the government’s proposed timeframe for departmental review, Acts are eligible 
for post-legislative scrutiny regardless of time on the statute books.  
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3.1.2 Frequency by type: Formal post-legislative scrutiny 
Table 3.3 shows that twenty formal post-legislative scrutiny inquiries have taken 
place since the 2005-2006 session of the 2005 Parliament and the end of the 2015 
Parliament. 
 
Table 3.3. Formal post-legislative scrutiny 
Committee 
No of 
Acts  Act(s) Scrutinised Session 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 1 Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966 2007/2008 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 1 Licensing Act 2003 2008/2009 
Select Committee on Adoption 
Legislation (Lords) 2 
Adoption and Children Act 
2002 2012/2013 
 N/A 
Children and Adoption Act 
2006 N/A 
Justice 1 
Freedom of Information Act 
2000 2012/2013 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 1 Gambling Act 2005 2012/2013 
Public Administration and 
Constitutional Reform 
1 
Statistics and Registration 
Service Act 2007 2012/2013 
Public Administration and 
Constitutional Reform 1 Charities Act 2006 2013/2014 
Housing, Communities and Local 
Government 1 
Greater London Authority 
Act 2007 2013/2014 
Select Committee on the Inquiries Act 
(Lords) 1 Inquiries Act 2005 2013/2014 
Select Committee on the Mental 
Capacity Act (Lords) 1 Mental Capacity Act 2005 2013/2014 
Health 1 Mental Health Act 2007 2013/2014 
Justice 1 Serious Crime Act 2007 2013/2014 
Joint Committee on Human Rights 1 
Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures Act 
2011 2013/2014 
Select Committee on Extradition 
Legislation (Lords) 1 Extradition Act 2003 2014/2015 
Justice 1 
Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment Act 2012 2014/2015 
Home Affairs 1 
Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 2014/2015 
Select Committee on the Equality Act 
and Disability (Lords) 1 Equality Act 2010 2015/2016 
Select Committee on the Licensing Act 
(Lords) 1 Licensing Act 2003 2016/2017 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 1 
Flood and Water 
Management Act 2010 2016/2017 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 1 Animal Welfare Act 2016 2016/2017 
Source: (CLG (2013); CMS (2009, 2012); EFRA (2008a, 2016b, 2017c); H (2013); HA (2014b); JCHR 
(2014a); J (2012, 2013a, 2015); PACA (2013a, 2013c); SCAL (2013); SCEL (2015); SCEAD (2016); SCIA 
(2014); SCLA (2017); SCMCA (2014)) 
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Table 3.3 also shows that all but one of the post-legislative scrutiny inquiries 
involved the review of one Act. However the one inquiry which did review two 
pieces of legislation looked at two similar Acts; in this case the Adoption and 
Children Act 2002 and the Children and Adoption Act 2006. Indeed, this provides 
some confirmation that post-legislative scrutiny is more likely to take place where 
legislation is free standing, and not linked to other Acts passed successively in a 
single policy area. As noted in the previous section, education would be a good 
example of this.  
Table 3.3 also shows that, of the formal post-legislative scrutiny inquires, only one 
Act has been scrutinised more than once, suggesting that inquiries are not 
overlapping or repeating scrutiny already undertaken by another committee. This 
is important, especially in the House of Commons as departmental select 
committees have ten core tasks (House of Commons Liaison Committee 2012) 
which compete for prioritisation. While post-legislative scrutiny might not be at 
the top of their ‘to do lists’, it is important that the post-legislative scrutiny they 
undertake does not repeat the work of their predecessor committees or another 
committee. 
The one exception to this is the review of the Licensing Act 2003 which was 
reviewed by the Culture, Media and Sport Committee in the 2008-2009 session of 
the 2005 Parliament and which was also reviewed in the 2016-2017 session of the 
2015 Parliament, by an ad hoc committee in the Lords. There is a gap of seven 
parliamentary sessions between the first post-legislative scrutiny inquiry and the 
second. There is a chance for some overlap here, however, the difference in dates 
might make some difference in terms of the Act’s assessment. For example, the 
consequences of some parts of the Act might not have become known until much 
later, after the Act has been enacted. The Act has also been amended by the 
Policing Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 and by various pieces of 
secondary legislation, since the first inquiry. This would leave scope for a further 
review of the Licensing Act 2003 assessing its performance since these 
amendments. The first inquiry also concluded that it was too early to determine 
the full impact of the Act and whether it was meeting its objectives (Select 
Committee on the Licensing Act, 2017). The House of Lords Select Committee on 
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the Licensing Act noted that the Commons inquiry had made judgments on the 
Act when it had only been in force for three years which was not long enough to 
consider the full implications of the legislation. Subsequently, they determined an 
additional review would be beneficial as over ten years had now passed (Select 
Committee on the Licensing act, 2017). 
The other difference is that the reviews are undertaken in different Houses which 
have different time pressures and expertise. One of the House of Lords’ aims is to 
add value  (Norton, 2007) and due to the nature of ad hoc committees and the fact 
they are set up for an entire parliamentary session to conduct (usually) a single 
inquiry means they can spend far more time on post-legislative scrutiny than 
departmental select committees. This is because they do not face the same time 
and workload pressures. The fact ad hoc committees can take up to a year to report 
back to the House of Lords means they can take and receive evidence from more 
witnesses and go into more detail than House of Commons committees. Hence, it 
could be a benefit to look at the Licensing Act 2003 again, in more detail. Table 3.2 
also identifies the committees which have been undertaking post-legislative 
scrutiny and the amount of post-legislative scrutiny per session between the 2005-
2006 session of the 2005 Parliament and the 2016/2017 session of the 2015 
Parliament. However, to analyse this data more specifically it is broken down into 
the following two figures. 
Figure 3.3 shows that ad hoc committees (in the House of Lords) have undertaken 
the most post-legislative scrutiny since the start of the 2005 Parliament. This is due 
to the fact that since 2012, the House of Lords determined that it would create a 
number of ad hoc committees each session to scrutinise specific issues and that at 
least one of those committees would be a post-legislative scrutiny committee 
(House of Lords Liaison Committee, 2012). There was one committee in each 
session, except in the 2013-14 session which had two. It is therefore excepted that, 
if the Liaison Committee keeps their pledge, at least one ad hoc committee to be 
appointed each session to undertake post-legislative scrutiny. In terms of the 
House of Commons, the Justice Committee and the Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs Committee have been the most active, with the Culture, Media and Sport 
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Committee and the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee 
coming joint third with two inquiries each. 
 
Figure 3.3. Formal post-legislative scrutiny inquiries by committee 
 
Source: (CLG (2013); CMS (2009, 2012); EFRA (2008a, 2016b, 2017c); H (2013); HA (2014b); JCHR 
(2014a); J (2012, 2013a, 2015); PACA (2013a, 2013c); SCAL (2013); SCEL (2015); SCEAD (2016); SCIA 
(2014); SCLA (2017); SCMCA (2014)) 
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Figure 3.4. Formal post-legislative scrutiny inquiries by parliamentary session 
 
Source: (CLG (2013); CMS (2009, 2012); EFRA (2008a, 2016b, 2017c); H (2013); HA (2014b); JCHR 
(2014a); J (2012, 2013a, 2015); PACA (2013a, 2013c); SCAL (2013); SCEL (2015); SCEAD (2016); SCIA 
(2014); SCLA (2017); SCMCA (2014)) 
 
The other committees in figure 3.3 have undertaken post-legislative scrutiny once 
in that time period and not every parliamentary committee is part of figure 3.3; 
indicating they have not undertaken formal post-legislative scrutiny at all during 
this time period. 
Figure 3.4 shows the number of formal post-legislative scrutiny inquiries which 
have been undertaken per session since the 2005-2006 session of the 2005 
Parliament. There was no formal post-legislative scrutiny undertaken in the 2005-
2006 and the 2006-2007 sessions of parliament. However, the then Labour 
Government did not respond to the Law Commission's (2006) report on post-
legislative scrutiny (published in October 2006) until March 2008. No explanation 
was given by the government for why it took seventeen months to respond to the 
Commission’s report. However it could be argued from a parliamentary reform 
perspective, as there is a tendency to do nothing unless the conditions are right, 
that the government will be reluctant to cede any power to parliament unless it 
has to, especially around issues that may hold ministers more responsible (Kelso, 
2009). This response set out the current, more systematic system of government 
departments undertaking post-legislative review and publishing memoranda 
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determining amongst other things whether an Act has met its key policy objectives 
(Office of the Leader of the House of Commons, 2008). It is these memoranda 
which potentially act as a trigger (depending upon the quality of the memoranda) 
for committees to undertake post-legislative scrutiny. The 2007-2008 and the 
2008-2009 sessions show one formal inquiry per session as the new systematic 
approach gets underway and committees adapt to it. 
The drop to zero formal post-legislative scrutiny inquiries in the 2009-2010 session 
can be explained by the 2010 General Election. However, it is somewhat surprising 
to see no formal post-legislative scrutiny being undertaken in the double 2010-2012 
session especially as it is the first session of a new parliament with a change in the 
parties of government. It might be expected that more post-legislative scrutiny 
would take place following a change in government as such scrutiny would more 
likely focus upon the previous government’s legislation. However, this lack of 
formal post-legislative scrutiny could be down to the fact committees were newly 
re-formed with new memberships and chairs who are ‘finding their feet’. They also 
face a new government with completely different policies to the last, which may 
require their attention in terms of scrutiny time.  
The pace does begin to increase in the 2012-2013 session and peaks in the 2013-14 
session. There may be a trend in post-legislative scrutiny being more of a focus 
towards the middle of a parliament. This could be down to the fact that in early 
sessions the new policy of a government may require scrutiny by departmental 
select committees, especially as flagship policy is likely to be announced rapidly 
following an election. However it will not be possible before 2022 to determine 
whether such a trend continues as the 2015 Parliament was cut short by the 2017 
General Election. That being said, there was an increase in post-legislative scrutiny 
in the second (and final) session of that Parliament. The trend line on figure 3.4 
does show an upward trajectory, however, it remains to be seen what will happen 
in subsequent sessions and the impact that might have on the overall trend.  
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Table 3.4. Formal post-Legislative Scrutiny as a percentage of committee work 
between 2005 and 2015 
Committee Percent 
CMS 3 
J 3 
EFRA 3 
PA 1 
H 1 
HA 1 
CLG 1 
Total 2 
Source: (UK Parliament, 2016b) 
 
Finally, table 3.4 shows formal post-legislative scrutiny as a percentage of 
published committee reports between 2005 and 2017. Departmental Select 
Committees are only presented in the table as post-legislative scrutiny is one of 
their ten core tasks. Table 3.4 shows that post-legislative scrutiny forms a small 
part of a committee’s output. Post-legislative scrutiny forms a greater proportion 
of committee work (although still small) for the Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee, Justice Committee and the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Committee. The Justice Committee and Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Committee have undertaken three formal inquiries and the Culture, Media and 
Sport Committee has undertaken two inquiries, the figures therefore suggest a 
difference in their workload, with a greater number of reports being published by 
the Justice and Environment Committee than the Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee. This could point to the Culture, Media and Sport Committee having 
more time to undertake such scrutiny and the Justice Committee having a desire 
to undertake it when they can, and when they think it is valuable. 
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Figure 3.5. Formal post-legislative scrutiny inquiries by parliamentary session 
 
Source: (CLG (2013); CMS (2009, 2012); EFRA (2008a, 2016b, 2017c); H (2013); HA (2014b); JCHR 
(2014a); J (2012, 2013a, 2015); PACA (2013a, 2013c); SCAL (2013); SCEL (2015); SCEAD (2016); SCIA 
(2014); SCLA (2017); SCMCA (2014)) 
 
It is also possible in this section dealing with formal post-legislative scrutiny to 
include an assessment of the frequency of formal post-legislative scrutiny inquiries 
by House. Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of formal post-legislative scrutiny 
inquiries by House. It shows that the House of Commons has undertaken just over 
twice as many inquiries as the House of Lords. This can be explained by post-
legislative scrutiny being a core task of departmental select committees and has 
been formalised since 2008, whereas post-legislative scrutiny in the House of Lords 
has only been formalised since 2012 with the introduction of specific ad hoc 
committees to deal with individual inquiries. There might also be an expectation 
that the House of Lords might begin to narrow the gap regarding the number of 
inquiries on the basis that it has determined that at least one ad hoc committee 
will be created per session to undertake post-legislative scrutiny. Even in years 
when the House of Commons does not undertake any post-legislative scrutiny 
inquiries, there is a strong likelihood of at least one from the House of Lords. 
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3.1.3 Frequency by type: Informal post-legislative scrutiny 
The next section will assess informal post-legislative scrutiny.  
Table 3.5. Informal post-legislative scrutiny 
Committee 
No of Acts 
scrutinised Act(s) involved 
Year 
inquiry 
complete 
CMS 1 Data Protection Act 1998 2013 
CMS 13 Protection of Children Act 1978 2014 
 N/A Criminal Justice Act 1988 2014 
 N/A Criminal Justice and Order Act 1994 2014 
 N/A Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 2014 
 N/A Coroners and Justice Act 2009 2014 
 N/A Communications Act 2003 2014 
 N/A Obscene Publications Act 1959 2014 
 N/A Human Rights Act 1998 2014 
 N/A Malicious Communications Act 1988 2014 
 N/A Offences Against the Person Act 1861 2014 
 N/A Computer Misuse 1990 2014 
 N/A Protection from Harassment Act 1997 2014 
 N/A Sexual Offences Act 2003 2014 
CMS 1 Digital Economy Act 2010 2013 
CMS 1 Human Rights Act 1998 2010 
CMS 2 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 2007 
 N/A 
London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act 
2006 2007 
CMS 2 Lotteries and Amusements Act 1967 2007 
 N/A Gambling Act 2005 2007 
BIS 2 Equal Pay Act 1970 2013 
 N/A Equality Act 2010 2013 
BIS 1 Digital Economy Act 2010 2012 
BIS 1 
Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration 
Act 1996 2008 
BIS, D, FA, 
ID 2 Export Control Act 2002 2007 
BEIS 1 Companies Act 2006 2017 
CLG 1 Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012 2014 
CLG 1 Care Act 2014 2017 
D 2 Health and Safety at Work Act etc. 1974 2016 
 N/A Corporate Manslaughter and Homicide Act 2007 2016 
EFRA 3 Animal Welfare Act 2006 2014 
 N/A Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1974 2014 
 N/A Pet Animals Act 1951 2014 
EFRA 1 Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 2013 
EFRA 1 Flood and Water Management Act 2010 2016 
EA 1 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 2014 
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Committee 
No of Acts 
scrutinised Act(s) involved 
Year 
inquiry 
complete 
H 2 Licensing Act 2003 2009 
 N/A Policing and Crime Act 2009 2009 
HA 2 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 2014 
 N/A Telecommunications Act 1984 2014 
HA 1 Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 2012 
HA 1 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 2008 
HA 2 Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 2008 
 N/A Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 2008 
HA 2 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 2016 
HA 1 Modern Slavery Act 2015 2016 
ID 4 International Development Act 2002 2016 
 N/A 
International Development (Reporting and 
Transparency) Act 2006 2016 
 N/A 
International Development (Gender Equality) Act 
2014 2016 
 N/A 
International Development (Official Development 
Assistance Target) Act 2015 2016 
NIA 1 Northern Ireland Act 1998 2013 
PA 3 Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 2009 
 N/A Freedom of Information Act 2000 2009 
 N/A Official Secrets Act 1989 2009 
JCHR 1 Children Act 1989 2014 
JCHR 2 Extradition Act 2003 2011 
  Police and Justice Act 2006 2011 
JCHR 1 Public Order Act 1986 2009 
JCHR 2 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 2007 
 N/A 
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants 
etc.) Act 2004 2007 
JCHR 1 Data Protection Act 1998 2008 
WE 2 Equality Act 2010 2017 
 N/A Sex Discrimination (Election Candidates) Act 2002 2017 
WE 2 Gender Recognition Act 2004 2015 
 N/A Equality Act 2010 2015 
WE/PE 1 Equality Act 2010 2017 
WE 2 Equality Act 2010 2017 
 N/A Licencing Act 2003 2017 
Source: (BEIS (2017a); BIS (2008, 2012a, 2013); CLG (2014a, 2017); CMS (2007, 2008, 2010, 2013a, 
2013b, 2014a); D (2016a); D, FA, ID and TI (2007); EFRA (2013a, 2014a, 2016a); EA (2014a); H 
(2010); HA (2008a, 2008b, 2012, 2014a, 2016a, 2016b); ID (2016a); JCHR (2007a, 2008a, 2009, 
2011, 2014b); NIA (2013a); PE & WE (2017a); PACA (2009); WE (2016, 2017a, 2017b)). 
 
The idea of informal post-legislative scrutiny has also been acknowledged by the 
Standards Procedure and Public Appointments Committee (2013) of the Scottish 
Parliament. Its report on post-legislative scrutiny stated; 
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“It is also important to note that much of the routine work 
undertaken by committees contains elements of post-legislative 
scrutiny, even if it is not formally labelled as such. Most notably, 
many committee inquiries involve an element of post-legislative 
scrutiny, since they often focus on improvements which could be 
made to the legislative framework in a particular policy area” 
(Standards Procedure and Public Appointments Committee, 2013). 
 
This is a key factor in why it is defined as having a less substantial element of post-
legislative scrutiny. Committees often do not acknowledge they are undertaking 
post-legislative scrutiny as part of their inquiry until they are reporting back to the 
House of Commons Liaison Committee at the end of each parliamentary session, 
on the core tasks they have fulfilled during it.  
Table 3.5 shows that there are thirty seven of these inquires between the 2005-2006 
session of the 2005 Parliament and the end of the 2015 Parliament. Hence it is more 
frequent than the formal post-legislative scrutiny that has been assessed so far. 
This will be because post-legislative scrutiny has been inherent in the other work 
that parliamentary committees have been undertaking. What is also different from 
formal post-legislative scrutiny, is that it is more likely that several Acts are 
assessed in these inquiries.  
The scrutiny of the Acts involved will be determined by the nature of the issue 
which the committee chose to inquire into and therefore might (depending upon 
the topic), skip over parts of the Act which are not relevant to the issue they are 
analysing. That is not to say that formal post-legislative scrutiny undertakes a 
detailed examination of an entire Act but rather they take a different approach in 
terms of looking for key problems within an Act rather than looking at wider policy 
issues and assessing Acts through that prism. Take the example of the Women and 
Equality Committee’s inquiry into transgender equality. It looked at both the 
Gender Recognition Act 2004 and the Equality Act 2010 through the prism of 
transgender equality, meaning the Equality Act 2010 was only reviewed through 
that prism rather than in its entirety, as the Act also covers equality for women and 
those with a disability.  
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Another example here is the Culture, Media and Sports inquiry into nuisance calls. 
While this was not a post-legislative scrutiny inquiry, part of looking at the issue 
of nuisance calls included assessing what the legislation surrounding this (in this 
case the Data Protection Act 1998) involved and what is and is not covered in the 
Act. It is also notable that there is more of an overlap here with some legislation 
being reviewed more than once. This is to some extent to be expected as 
committees undertaking informal post-legislative scrutiny are not reviewing an 
entire Act, only the parts of it relevant to the issue under scrutiny. Whilst there is 
overlap in terms of Acts listed as being covered, it is likely that there is actually 
only a limited overlap in terms of the parts of the Act being reviewed, whether that 
is by different committees or by the same committee under a different inquiry. 
This does raise questions about where informal post-legislative scrutiny might be 
placed in the typology of scrutiny in the previous chapter. As informal post-
legislative scrutiny is inherent, and is defined as an issue based inquiry then it 
would be taking place in a broader inquiry that is classified as overview (type 2), 
which sees low accountability and low responsibility (in comparison to medium 
levels in the overview/oversight classification which a formal post-legislative 
scrutiny inquiry would fall under). This is on the basis that post-legislative scrutiny 
in this context is unlikely to be focused upon holding the government accountable 
and responsible but rather locating a problem and offering solutions. As it is 
possible committees will not be conscious to the fact that they are undertaking a 
type of post-legislative scrutiny, there will be less impetus to focus upon 
accountability and responsibility. 
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Figure 3.6. Number of informal post-legislative scrutiny undertaken by 
committees6 
Source: (BEIS (2017a); BIS (2008, 2012a, 2013); CLG (2014a, 2017); CMS (2007, 2008, 2010, 
2013a, 2013b, 2014a); D (2016a); D, FA, ID and TI (2007); EFRA (2013a, 2014a, 2016a); EA 
(2014a); H (2010); HA (2008a, 2008b, 2012, 2014a, 2016a, 2016b); ID (2016a); JCHR (2007a, 
2008a, 2009, 2011, 2014b); NIA (2013a); PE & WE (2017a); PACA (2009); WE (2016, 2017a, 
2017b)). 
Figure 3.6 shows the amount of informal post-legislative scrutiny undertaken by 
committees. Figure 3.6 shows that the Culture, Media and Sport Committee and 
the Home Affairs Committee have been the most active in undertaking this 
particular type of scrutiny, followed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and 
the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee (formerly Business, 
Innovation and Skills Committees). Figure 3.6 thus shows a number of committees 
undertaking this type of post-legislative scrutiny which have not undertaken it 
through formal post-legislative scrutiny. This includes the Business, Innovation 
and Skills Committee (as it then was) and Defence Committee which have also 
undertaken a joint inquiry on export controls. This type of scrutiny may provide 
an avenue for parliamentary committees to undertake post-legislative scrutiny as 
                                                     
6 D, FA, ID and TI (2007) and WE & PE (2017) were each one inquiry, however each committee 
has received acknowledgement in the chart as having undertaken some post-legislative scrutiny. 
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part of their routine inquiries without them having to forego another inquiry in 
order to undertake formal post-legislative scrutiny. This is then perhaps an 
advantage for committees. However, there is a challenge here too, as committees 
often do not realise they are undertaking informal post-legislative scrutiny until 
they are reflecting back upon the work they have undertaken over the past session. 
Therefore, there is the risk that this type of post-legislative scrutiny becomes a box 
ticking exercise without engaging fully with the aims and focus of post-legislative 
scrutiny. That being said, if committees are conscious of the fact that post-
legislative scrutiny is inherent in some of the routine work they undertake it might 
produce more meaningful scrutiny. 
This type of post-legislative scrutiny is less likely to be undertaken with a 
government memoranda. As a result it may be necessary for committees to receive 
additional guidance about how post-legislative scrutiny could be part of routine 
inquiries to ensure they are conscious of this fact and therefore engage properly 
with post-legislative scrutiny, where it does become part of a more routine inquiry. 
 
3.1.4 Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter has found that in total there were 20 formal based post-
legislative scrutiny inquiries of which, all but one involved the review of one Act. 
This was to be expected to some extent as these inquiries are often triggered by a 
government memoranda and as such focus upon the problems and issues in one 
Act of Parliament. The chapter also found that only one of the Acts scrutinised 
through formal post-legislative scrutiny has been scrutinised more than once, 
suggesting that generally speaking inquiries do not overlap or repeat by another 
committee. This is important as post-legislative scrutiny is usually not a priority as 
time is limited, therefore it is encouraging that committees are not overlapping on 
this type of post-legislative scrutiny. 
In terms of informal post-legislative scrutiny, the chapter discovered that so far it 
had been undertaken 37 times. As a result, it is more frequent than formal post-
legislative scrutiny. What is also different from formal post-legislative scrutiny, is 
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that it is more likely that more than one single piece of legislation is being assessed 
in these inquiries. This can be explained by the fact that these inquiries contain a 
less substantial element of post-legislative scrutiny and often skim over legislation 
leading (sometimes) to a number of Acts being covered by these inquiries.  
The chapter also found that through informal post-legislative scrutiny, a number 
of committees can be seen to be undertaking this type of post-legislative scrutiny 
which have not undertaken it through formal post-legislative scrutiny. As a result 
informal post-legislative scrutiny gives committees an avenue to undertake post-
legislative scrutiny in this manner as opposed to a formal post-legislative scrutiny 
inquiry which a committee may not have time for or the resources to undertake.  
However, there is the risk that this type of post-legislative scrutiny becomes a box 
ticking exercise without engaging fully with the aims and focus of post-legislative 
scrutiny. This is because informal post-legislative scrutiny is often not apparent 
until a committee is reporting back to the House of Commons Liaison Committee 
on which core tasks it has met. As a result it may be necessary for committees to 
receive additional guidance about how post-legislative scrutiny could be part of 
routine inquiries to ensure they are conscious to this fact and therefore engage 
properly with post-legislative scrutiny, where it does become part of a more routine 
inquiry. 
If this study had stuck to formal post-legislative scrutiny and not explored 
informal, it would have overlooked 37 instances of post-legislative scrutiny. Having 
assessed the two types of post-legislative scrutiny undertaken by committees it 
appears that as a whole, there is more of it taking place, however it cannot be 
described as extensive nor systematic. As further research is necessary into 
informal post-legislative scrutiny, this should not be seen as an excuse not to 
increase the amount of formal post-legislative scrutiny taking place. 
This chapter has answered research questions one (a) and one (b) and has provided 
a practical contribution in terms of producing a consolidated list of post-legislative 
scrutiny. However what remains unclear is the types of legislation selected for 
review (other than the names of the Acts) and the characteristics of such 
legislation. The next chapter addresses such issues.  
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Chapter 4 The process of post-legislative 
scrutiny and legislation selected for 
review 
In terms of assessing the descriptive data relating to the undertaking of post-
legislative scrutiny, this chapter will address research questions one (c); how can 
we explain the types of legislation being selected for post-legislative scrutiny? This 
sub research question is important in terms of assessing the extensiveness of post-
legislative scrutiny. Without understanding the legislation under review it is not 
possible to address whether any patterns have developed here.  
This chapter will begin with an assessment of the process of post-legislative 
scrutiny including the time difference between royal assent and post-legislative 
scrutiny and the time committees have spent on post-legislative scrutiny; the 
legislation selected for review and the depth of scrutiny that legislation has faced. 
This is important, firstly, because this data has not been collected and analysed 
before. Secondly, it will provide an overview of the legislation that has been 
reviewed and will allow for reflection upon whether the legislation selected and 
the type of post-legislative scrutiny selected are appropriate. Finally, this data is 
important to analyse because much of the descriptive data which will be assessed 
in this chapter will go on to be employed as independent variables for use in 
regression analysis in chapter five. 
This chapter will add to the practical contribution from the previous chapter in 
terms of finalising the audit of post-legislative scrutiny undertaken in the UK 
Parliament. It also contributes to our knowledge of committee behaviour in terms 
of the legislation they select and when they choose to undertake post-legislative 
scrutiny.  
For this chapter, data has been collated for both formal and informal post-
legislative scrutiny on the time difference between the Act receiving Royal Assent 
and receiving post-legislative scrutiny. This is to analyse the average timeframe 
from Royal Assent to post-legislative scrutiny in order to check whether parliament 
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is meeting guidelines, recommended by the House of Lords Select Committee on 
the Constitution (2004). This data has been collated from committee reports. 
The rest of the data collection for this chapter applies to formal post-legislative 
scrutiny inquiries only, on the basis that informal post-legislative scrutiny is not 
usually identified as post-legislative scrutiny until after the inquiry has taken place. 
Indeed, informal post-legislative scrutiny was identified through scoping 
interviews and it was acknowledged that it is usually only certified as post-
legislative scrutiny once committees complete their end of session report to state 
that they have met the core tasks set out by the House of Commons Liaison 
Committee. It is therefore not completely comparable with formal post-legislative 
scrutiny which is the focus of this study. While it does beg the question as to 
whether this is a tick box exercise as far as committees are concerned, the reports 
contained in this research do contain an element of post-legislative scrutiny 
through the scrutiny of Acts related to the policy area under discussion.  
This audit (for formal post-legislative scrutiny only) also included data on the time 
spent on the passage of legislation (data derived from sessional returns), the length 
of legislation (derived from the Acts themselves) and the amount of time that 
legislation spent in committee and whether the legislation was passed in the wash-
up. This allows for the analysis of how much scrutiny Acts received. Data was also 
collected on the sponsoring government department. This will be determined by 
which departments produced the explanatory notes for the legislation. The 
department is listed as both where the responsibility for that policy area currently 
lies and the department who introduced it, even if that department no longer 
exists. This is to see which of the former departments were most likely to see their 
legislation receive post-legislative scrutiny. Data was collected on the primary 
legislative activity of government departments (derived from sessional returns) 
between 2005-2017. This will allow for the analysis of which departments are most 
likely to see legislation receive post-legislative scrutiny and to delve deeper into 
the reasons why. Furthermore, data was also collected on the party of government 
which passed the legislation. Data was also collated on the report output of 
committees in order to compare post-legislative scrutiny output and other 
committee output (data derived from the publication page of committee websites). 
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However, it should be noted this was only possible for departmental select 
committees in the House of Commons, as House of Lords ad hoc committees are 
only established to inquire into one issue and expire once their report has been 
published.  
Finally, data was also collated for formal post-legislative scrutiny on whether 
legislation is contentious or uncontentious. There are a number of ways in which 
legislation is defined as being contentious, including whether the official 
opposition calls for a formal division at Second and Third Reading, if a smaller 
party does the same and if there is a government/opposition rebellion. 
Contentiousness was then coded as (1) Division forced at Second Reading, (2) 
Division forced at Third Reading, (3) Division forced at both Second and Third 
Reading and (4) Rebellion by 5% of government or opposition MPs against their 
party’s whip. The five percent threshold was selected to discount the times when 
only a couple of MPs (e.g. out of over 100) would vote against their party. A 
rebellion of five percent or more would signify that there was a problem within 
that party’s parliamentary group and was not just the ‘usual suspects’. Second and 
third readings were chosen as they are the opportunities MPs have to vote on Acts 
as a whole package. Rebellions on specific amendments/clauses were not included 
here as they signify disagreement a specific part of a bill rather than all of it. Russell 
& Cowley (2016) noted that amendments to bills were subject to very few rebellions 
in the Commons. In addition, if a specific part of a bill does force certain Members 
to rebel at report stage or committee stage, and are defeated they will likely rebel 
at third reading and their rebellion captured in that data. 
 
 Process of post-legislative scrutiny 
First, we assess the time difference between an Act receiving royal assent and 
receiving post-legislative scrutiny, to determine whether it is meeting the 
recommendations set out by the House of Lords Constitution Committee and by 
the Leader of the House of Commons. This section will also assess the amount of 
time committees have spent on the inquiry. This will help to expand knowledge on 
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how post-legislative scrutiny is undertaken in terms of meeting recommendations 
for its undertaking and the time committees devote to it. 
 
4.1.1 Time difference between Royal Assent and post-legislative 
scrutiny 
In its report on ‘Parliament and the Legislative Process’, the House of Lords 
Constitution Committee recommended that; 
“…most Acts, other than Finance Acts, should normally be subject to 
review within three years of their commencement, or six years 
following their enactment, whichever is the sooner.” (House of Lords 
Select Committee on the Constitution, 2004: 44). 
The House of Lords believed that there should be a set period following the passage 
of an Act in which it should be reviewed again by parliament. While this is the set 
period they chose they did acknowledge that it is a maximum period and that 
parliament should be free to review legislation before the maximum period has 
been reached, should they believe it necessary. Their reasoning for this timeframe 
is as follows; 
“..we believe that there should be a review within a set number of 
years—we suggest three years— after the provisions of the Act have 
been brought into effect. We also believe that there should be a set 
period following the passage of the Act when it should be reviewed. 
We think six years would be appropriate. This is in order to cover 
cases where a minister may not have brought the provisions into 
force. A review would then force a minister to explain why it had not 
been brought into effect” (House of Lords Select Committee on the 
Constitution, 2004: 44). 
However, if judging post-legislative scrutiny by this standard, then it is clearly 
failing as most legislation does not receive a review within three years of their 
commencement and six years of enactment. In the UK Government’s response to 
the Law Commission’s report on post-legislative scrutiny in 2008, it set out the 
106 
precise details of how this new systematic approach to post-legislative scrutiny 
should operate. Its response stated that; 
“The new requirement for an automatic departmental Memorandum 
to be published and submitted to the relevant departmental 
committee, generally between 3 and 5 years after Royal Assent” 
(Office of the Leader of the House of Commons, 2008: 18). 
While this statement is directed at government departments it also means that 
departmental select committees will be receiving these memoranda within the 
same time frame and then determining whether they should be undertaking post-
legislative scrutiny on that particular piece of legislation. Nevertheless, it should 
be noted that not all post-legislative scrutiny is triggered by a memorandum. In 
the case of the House of Lords, memoranda are often published and sent to the 
relevant departmental select committee often sometime before the House of Lords 
decides to hold an inquiry. They may request a memorandum from the 
government (if the Act was enacted before 2005, as they do not fall within the remit 
of the new system) or an updated one if the previous one is dated.  
4.1.2 Time difference: Formal post-legislative scrutiny 
Table 4.1 shows that the average time frame for all formal post-legislative scrutiny 
between royal assent and the publication of a post-legislative scrutiny report is 
eight years and ten months. If you exclude the post-legislative scrutiny inquiry into 
the Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966, which is an outlier, then the average comes 
down to seven years, three months. 
Both of these figures are therefore outside of the maximum limit recommended by 
the House of Lords Constitution Committee. It is also out of the time frame 
suggested by the UK Government however these inquiries include those that have 
not been initiated following the production of a memorandum and as such are 
therefore unlikely to follow the government led time frame. The fact that on 
average they do not meet the House of Lords maximum limit is interesting, 
especially as the creation of the new post-legislative scrutiny process might lead to 
the expectation that formal post-legislative scrutiny inquiries follow this guidance.
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Table 4.1. The time difference between Royal Assent and the publication of a post-legislative scrutiny report. 
Committee Acts  Act(s) involved 
Royal 
Assent 
Inquiry 
Launch Variation7 
Variation 
with 
Memo8 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 1 Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966 
November 
1966 July 2007 
40 years, 7 
months  
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 1 Licensing Act 2003 July 2003 July 2008 5 years  
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 1 Gambling Act 2005 April 2005 May 2011 
6 years,  
1 month  
Justice 1 Freedom of Information Act 2000 
November 
2000 
December 
2011 11 years 11 years 
Public Administration and Constitutional 
affairs 1 Charities Act 2006 
November 
2007 July 2012 
5 years,  
8 months  
Health 1 Mental Health Act 2007 July 2007 
February 
20139 
5 years,  
7 months 
5 years,  
7 months 
Ad hoc (Lords) 2 Adoption and Children Act 2002 
November 
2002 June 2012 
9 years,  
7 months  
 N/A Children and Adoption Act 2006 June 2006 June 2012 6 years  
Justice 1 Serious Crime Act 2007 
October 
2007 
January 
2013 
5 years,  
2 months 
5 years,  
2 months 
Public Administration and Constitutional 
affairs 
1 Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007 
July 2007 June 2012 
4 years,  
11 months 
4 years,  
11 months 
Housing, Communities and Local Government 1 Greater London Authority Act 2007 
October 
2007 
December 
2012 
5 years,  
2 months 
5 years,  
2months 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Inquiries Act 2005 April 2005 June 2013 
8 years,  
2 months  
                                                     
7 Rounded to the nearest month. 
8 Where a memo has been cited as one of the reasons for an inquiry. There are memos for the Inquiries Act, for example, but it was requested by the ad hoc committee 
rather than it being published under the government’s approach. 
9 First evidence session – no inquiry launch date could be located. 
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Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Mental Capacity Act 2005 April 2005 May 2013 
8 years, 
1 month  
Home Affairs 1 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 July 2000 
October 
2014 
14 years,  
3 months  
Joint Committee on Human Rights 1 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 
December 
2011 
December 
2014 3 years  
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Extradition Act 2003 
November 
2003 June 2014 
10 years,  
7 months  
Justice 1 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment Act 2012 May 2012 
December 
2013 
1 year,  
8 months  
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Equality Act 2010 April 2010 June 2015 
5 year,  
3 months  
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 1 Animal Welfare Act 200610 
November 
2006 
February 
2016 
9 years, 
3 months  
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Licensing Act 2003 July 2003 June 2016 13 years  
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 1 Flood Water Management Act 2010 April 2010 
January 
2017 
6 years, 10 
months  
6 years, 10 
months 
    Average 
8 years, 10 
months 
6 years, 5 
months 
Source: (CLG (2013); CMS (2009, 2012); EFRA (2008a, 2016b, 2017c); H (2013); HA (2014b); JCHR (2014a); J (2012, 2013a, 2015); PACA (2013a, 2013c); SCAL (2013); 
SCEL (2015); SCEAD (2016); SCIA (2014); SCLA (2017); SCMCA (2014)) 
                                                     
10 A memoranda was published in 2010, 6 years prior to the committee deciding to conduct post-legislative scrutiny, hence it was not a trigger for this particular inquiry. 
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The table also shows the difference for those Acts which received a post-legislative 
memorandum. While the data shows that the difference is closer if a memorandum 
is present, such scrutiny is still taking place outside of the House of Lords’ time 
frame (although only just). Out of twenty-one pieces of legislation to receive post-
legislative scrutiny here, nine were conducted within the House of Lords 
Constitution Committees recommended time frame of 6 years after passage (48%). 
The data also shows that post-legislative scrutiny is taking place outside of the time 
frame which leads on from the government’s memoranda. Although if the 
government produces a memorandum in the fifth year (assuming they produce 
them on time), it might take time for an opening to come up in a committee’s work 
plan.  
This is especially true for departmental select committees, which have a variety of 
tasks to fulfil. There is on average a one year difference between those which have 
received a memorandum from the government through the new approach and 
those which did not11. It would suggest that the memoranda process does bring 
down the average time, albeit by a year. Although there could be other factors at 
work here. For example, the UK Government’s approach to post-legislative 
scrutiny was announced in 2008. However, this did apply to all those Acts which 
had been passed since the start of the 2005 Parliament. Therefore, for those Acts 
passed prior to 2008, when the memoranda were produced is important and will 
depend upon how long it took departments to go back through the previous three 
years’ worth of legislation. The lack of inquiries hitting the recommended 
timeframe can be explained by the fact that clerks believe it is too short a time 
period. The former clerk of the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee noted that it needs to be five years at the very least, possibly seven or 
eight depending upon the policy area in question (Flood, 2017). The clerk of the 
Select Committee on the Equality Act 2010 and Disability noted that both 
recommended timeframes are too short and in fact, seven to eight years is more 
appropriate (Collon, 2017a). If committee clerks believe additional time is needed, 
                                                     
11Excluding the Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966 as it is an outlier.  
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and as there are no sanctions for not meeting the timeframes, then this explains 
why only 48% of formal inquiries to date have met the timeframe.  
This does raise broader questions about the use of these time frames. Both the 
government’s and the House of Lords’ timeframe were developed prior to the 
introduction and subsequent operation of this system and have not been reviewed. 
As committees are not hitting these timeframes it suggests there might be a more 
appropriate one to deploy. For example, a number of clerks noted that a more 
realistic timeframe would be somewhere between five and ten years (Collon, 2017a; 
Flood, 2016). It also raises the broader issue of whether targets are useful at all. 
Proponents of targets (or formal timeframes) would argue that they provide 
direction and motivation but opponents would argue they suggest a specific 
mission and meeting them could come at the cost of other areas (Boyne & Chen, 
2007). In the case of post-legislative scrutiny, they may have been important in 
motivating committees to take the new system more seriously, but ten years later, 
with the hindsight of the practicalities of undertaking this scrutiny, a review of 
them would be appropriate.  
The table shows that legislation passed since 2007, which has gone on to receive 
post-legislative scrutiny, has all managed to hit the maximum limit as set out by 
the House of Lords Constitution Committee. There may, therefore, be a trend 
following the introduction of the new systematic approach by the UK Government. 
Such a trend could be confirmed following the undertaking of additional post-
legislative scrutiny inquiries in the coming 2017 Parliament, and beyond. The table 
also shows two formal post-legislative scrutiny inquiries which were quite rapidly 
reviewed after enactment. The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment Act 2012 and 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 were both reviewed 
three years after they had received royal assent. This shows that committees can 
act rapidly if they believe the legislation warrants a review as both of these Acts 
had not received post-legislative review by the relevant government departments 
by the time the inquiry was started. The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures Act 2011 was reviewed at this time because the previous control order 
system received a yearly review but that was not a requirement for Terrorism 
Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs). With the Home Office only 
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producing quarterly statistics the committee felt it was necessary to address the 
overall operation of the Act (Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2015). With 
regards to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment Act 2012, the Justice 
Committee noted that it was an early review but determined that because legal aid 
and access to justice are so important, the changes deserved to be closely 
monitored (House of Commons Justice Committee, 2015) 
The data also reveals that committees are willing to take a longer-term view in 
terms of reviewing legislation. For example, the Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966 
waited 42 years for a formal post-legislative scrutiny inquiry. It should be noted 
however that this Act was reviewed before the 2008 timeframes were implemented 
by the government and as it was passed in 1966 it would not fall under the 2005 
cut off period for departmental review. In total six pieces of legislation were 
reviewed after ten years on the statue books. It is important to note that there will 
be advantages and disadvantages to reviewing legislation earlier and later 
following enactment. For example, if reviewed too early a committee may miss 
problems which are yet to develop as the legislation has not been on the statute 
books long enough. There is also the chance that early review might deter another 
committee or a successor committee from reviewing it again, so as not to cause an 
overlap. However, there are disadvantages of reviewing legislation after it has been 
on the statue books for a longer length of time. For example, the longer a piece of 
legislation has been on the statue books the greater the prospect is that the Act 
will be either repealed, substantively changed or superseded by new legislation. 
This means that some Acts which may warrant review during their lifetime in 
operation will not receive review. This may be seen as a positive but if an Act has 
been underperforming its aims for 7 years before it is repealed, that is 7 years when 
a review could have taken place and a solution sought. Furthermore, while a 
committee may come across a problem with the legislation, it raises the question 
of whether an earlier review would have also discovered it and dealt with the issue 
sooner. This is why there must be flexibility within the system in order to deal with 
such challenges and why committees should be able to undertake post-legislative 
scrutiny without a memorandum from the government. It means they can listen 
to issues that are being raised in order to better guide them, whether that be 
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through stakeholders or the media. Further details regarding why committees 
decide to initiate post-legislative scrutiny will be assessed in the coming chapters 
when analysing interview data on the individual experiences of committees 
undertaking post-legislative scrutiny.  
The mode for the differences (all) is six. The mode is at the maximum limit of the 
House of Lords’ recommendation. The mode for differences where a memorandum 
has been present is six and therefore within the limit of the House of Lords’ 
recommendation. Overall when taking the average and mode into account the 
undertaking of post-legislative scrutiny is not terribly far away from the 
recommended time frame set out by the House of Lords. As discussed already most 
inquires take place within six years. 
 
4.1.3 Time difference: Informal post-legislative scrutiny 
Next, this section will discuss the mean and mode difference between royal assent 
and post-legislative scrutiny for informal post-legislative scrutiny. This is 
important in order to compare both types of post-legislative scrutiny and note how 
they are different. For this type of post-legislative scrutiny, only one set of data is 
needed as memoranda are a trigger for formal as opposed to informal post-
legislative scrutiny. 
The average time difference in table 4.2 is 15 years, 10 months. This could be due to 
inquiries being based around an issue and while reviewing legislation may fall into 
that inquiry, it is regardless of when it was passed by parliament. For example, the 
joint inquiry into export controls by the Business Innovation and Skills, Defence, 
International Development and Foreign Affairs Committees assessed legislation 
from both 2003 and 1979, which skews the data in terms of the average. This would 
suggest that the introduction of government memoranda was an appropriate step 
to take, to ensure that post-legislative scrutiny is not only more systematic but also 
more timely. Removing the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 brings the average 
time difference down to 13 years, 10 months.
 113 
Table 4.2. The time difference between Royal Assent and the publication of a post-legislative scrutiny report (informal) 
Committee 
No of 
Acts  Act(s)  Royal Assent Inquiry Launch Variation 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 1 Data Protection Act 1998 July 1998 July 2013 15 years 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 13 Protection of Children Act 1978 July 1978 August 2013 35 years, 1 month 
 N/A Criminal Justice Act 1988 July 1988 
August 2013 25 years, 1 month 
 N/A Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 November 1994 
August 2013 18 years, 9 months 
 N/A Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 May 2008 
August 2013 5 years, 3 months 
 N/A Coroners and Justice Act 2009 November 2009 
August 2013 3 years, 9 months 
 N/A Communications Act 2003 July 2003 
August 2013 10 years, 1 month 
 N/A Obscene Publications Act 1959 July 1959 
August 2013 54 years, 1 month 
 N/A Human Rights Act 1998 November 1998 
August 2013 14 years, 9 months 
 N/A Malicious Communications Act 1988 July 1988 
August 2013 25 years, 1 month 
 N/A Offences Against the Person Act 1861 August 1861 
August 2013 152 years 
 N/A Computer Misuse 1990 June 1990 
August 2013 23 years, 2 months 
 N/A Protection from Harassment Act 1997 March 1997 
August 2013 16 years, 5 months 
 N/A Sexual Offences Act 2003 November 2003 
August 2013 9 years, 9 months 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 1 Digital Economy Act 2010 April 2010 October 2012 2 years, 6 months 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 1 Human Rights Act 1998 November 1998 November 2008 10 years 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 2 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 November 1994 May 2007 12 years, 6 months 
 N/A 
London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games 
Act 2006 March 2006 May 2007 1 year, 1 month 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 2 Lotteries and Amusements Act 1967 July 1976 October 2006 30 years, 3 months 
 N/A Gambling Act 2005 April 2005 October 2006 1 year, 7 months 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 2 Equal Pay Act 1970 May 1970 September 2012 42 years, 3 months 
 N/A Equality Act 2010 April 2010 September 2012 2 years, 5 months 
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Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 1 Digital Economy Act 2010 April 2010 August 2011 1 year, 4 months 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 1 
Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration 
Act 1996 July 1996 October 2007 11 years, 3 months 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy; 
Defence; Foreign Affairs; International 
Development 2 Export Control Act 2002 July 2002 December 2006 4 years, 4 months 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 1 Companies Act 2006 November 2006 September 2016 9 years, 10 months 
Housing, Communities and Local Government 1 Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012 March 2012 July 2013 1 year, 4 months 
Housing, Communities and Local Government 1 Care Act 2014 May 2014 June 2016 2 years, 1 month 
Defence 2 Health and Safety at Work Act etc. 1974 July 1974 October 2015 41 years, 3 months 
 N/A Corporate Manslaughter and Homicide Act 2007 July 2007 October 2015 8 years, 3 months 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 3 Animal Welfare Act 2006 November 2006 December 2013 7 years, 1 month 
 N/A Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1974 July 1976 
December 2013 37 years, 5 months 
 N/A Pet Animals Act 1951 June 1951 
December 2013 62 years, 6 months 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 1 Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 July 1991 May 2012 20 years, 10 months 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 1 Flood and Water Management Act 2010 April 2010 January 2016 5 years, 10 months 
Environmental Audit 1 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 October 1981 December 2013 32 years, 1 month 
Health 1 Licensing Act 2003 July 2003 April 2009 5 years, 9 months 
Home Affairs 2 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 July 2000 July 2013 13 years 
 N/A Telecommunications Act 1984 April 1984 July 2013 29 years, 3 months 
Home Affairs 1 Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 May 1971 January 2012 40 years, 8 months 
Home Affairs 1 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 July 2000 March 2007 6 years, 8 months 
Home Affairs 2 Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 November 2004 July 2007 2 years, 8 months 
 N/A Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 July 2007 July 2007 0 years 
Home Affairs 1 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 July 2002 January 2016 13 years, 6 months 
Home Affairs 1 Modern Slavery Act 2015 March 2015 January 2016 10 months 
International Development 4 International Development Act 2002 February 2002 July 2015 13 years, 5 months 
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 N/A 
International Development (Reporting and 
Transparency) Act 2006 July 2006 
July 2015 
8 years, 12 months 
 N/A 
International Development (Gender Equality) Act 
2014 March 2014 
July 2015 
1 year, 4 months 
 N/A 
International Development (Official Development 
Assistance Target) Act 2015 March 2015 
July 2015 
4 months 
Northern Ireland Affairs 1 Northern Ireland Act 1998 November 1998 December 2012 14 years, 1 month 
Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs 3 Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 July 1998 December 2008 10 years, 5 months 
 N/A Freedom of Information Act 2000 November 2000 
December 2008 8 years 
 N/A Official Secrets Act 1989 May 1989 
December 2008 19 years, 7 months 
Joint Committee on Human Rights 1 Children Act 1989 November 1989 June 2014 24 years, 7 months 
Joint Committee on Human Rights 2 Extradition Act 2003 November 2003 December 2010 7 years, 1 month 
  Police and Justice Act 2006 November 2006 December 2010 4 years, 1 month 
Joint Committee on Human Rights 1 Public Order Act 1986 November 1986 April 2008 21 years, 6 months 
Joint Committee on Human Rights 2 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 November 2002 November 2006 4 years 
 N/A 
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants 
etc.) Act 2004 July 2004 November 2006 2 years, 4 months 
Joint Committee on Human Rights 1 Data Protection Act 1998 July 1998 November 2007 9 years, 4 months 
Women and Equalities  2 Equality Act 2010 April 2010 August 2016 6 years, 4 months 
 N/A 
Sex Discrimination (Election Candidates) Act 
2002 February 2002 August 2016 14 years, 6 months 
Women and Equalities 2 Gender Recognition Act 2004 July 2004 July 2015 11 years, 1 month  
 N/A Equality Act 2010 April 2010 July 2015 5 years, 4 months 
Women and Equalities; Petitions 1 Equality Act 2010 April 2010 June 2016 6 years, 3 months 
Women and Equalities 2 Equality Act 2010 April 2010 August 2016 6 years, 4 months 
 N/A Licencing Act 2003 July 2003 August 2016 13 years, 1 month 
    AVG 15 years, 10 months 
Source: (BEIS (2017); BIS (2008, 2012a, 2013); CLG (2014a, 2017); CMS (2007, 2008, 2010, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a); D, FA, ID and TI (2007); D (2016a); EFRA (2013a, 
2014a, 2016a, 2016b); EA (2014a); H (2010); HA (2008a, 2008b, 2012, 2014a); ID (2016); JCHR (2007a, 2008a, 2009, 2011, 2014b); NIA (2013a); PACA (2009); PE 
(2017); WE (2016, 2017a, 2017b)). 
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Timeliness appears important in a number of these informal post-legislative 
scrutiny inquiries and as such that arguably is the best time to undertake those 
inquiries rather than through an arbitrary timeframe. For example, in late 
2015/early 2016 there were a series of floods caused by Storms Desmond and Eva 
(BBC News, 2016) and following this, the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Committee held an inquiry on flood water management. In 2012 the same 
committee held an inquiry into dog control, after the government launched a 
consultation into this policy, following a spate of dangerous dog attacks (Bowcott, 
2012).  
 
Table 4.3. Memoranda and informal post-legislative scrutiny  
Legislation Published Notes 
Equality Act 
2010 
July 2015 Published at the request of an ad hoc committee for a formal 
post-legislative scrutiny inquiry and copied to the House of 
Commons Women and Equalities Committee 
Animal 
Welfare Act 
2006 
December 
2010 
Published three years prior to the informal inquiry. 
Companies 
Act 2006 
January 
2012 
Published four years prior to the informal inquiry. 
Flood Water 
Management 
Act 2010 
January 
2017 
Published after the informal inquiry but triggered a formal 
inquiry. 
Licensing 
Act 2003 
June 2016 Published after the informal inquiry and at the request of an 
ad hoc committee for a formal post-legislative scrutiny 
inquiry. 
London 
Olympic 
Games and 
Paralympic 
Games Act 
2006 
June 2011 Published five years after the informal inquiry. 
Police and 
Justice Act 
2006 
October 
2011 
Published just after the informal inquiry. 
 
Timeliness is, therefore, an important factor and points to the need to retain a 
flexible system of post-legislative scrutiny. The timeframes that are currently 
constituted do have their place in encouraging more formal post-legislative 
scrutiny but they are not concrete. Post-legislative memoranda are designed to 
ensure a process of departmental review but their publication sometimes Acts as a 
trigger for formal post-legislative scrutiny. None of the inquiries categorised under 
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informal post-legislative scrutiny have been triggered by memoranda, mainly 
because they contain elements of post-legislative scrutiny as part of a broader issue 
based inquiry. Data on memoranda are not contained within table 4.2. However, 
post-legislative memoranda do exist for seven of the Acts listed in table 4.3. The 
table contains the Act, when it was published and notes on its publication. 
 
4.1.4 Time spent on post-legislative scrutiny 
For the rest of this chapter, the data focuses on formal post-legislative scrutiny 
only, as it focuses on the characteristics of the legislation selected for full review. 
Table 4.4 shows the time spent on formal post-legislative scrutiny by the number 
of oral evidence sessions, witnesses and days between the inquiry launch and 
report publication.  
The table shows that there is a clear difference between the time spent by 
Commons and Lords committees on post-legislative scrutiny. On average, House 
of Lords committees hold thirteen oral evidence sessions and take evidence from 
47 witnesses per inquiry in comparison to House of Commons committees who on 
average hold five oral evidence sessions with 17 witnesses per inquiry. This will be 
down to the amount of time that ad hoc committees in the House of Lords have to 
undertake a post-legislative scrutiny inquires, in contrast to the numerous time 
and resource pressures that House of Commons committees face. However, the 
time difference between the inquiry launch and report publication can be 
deceptive. The three longest running post-legislative scrutiny inquiries were not in 
the Lords but in the Commons. However, it is important to note here that the top 
three committees have multiple tasks to complete and are likely juggling more 
than one at a time, in comparison to ad hoc committees in the Lords. 
There is variation in the amount of time that committees spend on post-legislative 
scrutiny which can in part be explained by the number of tasks and other inquiries 
that they are potentially undertaking. 
It could be argued that the more oral evidence sessions that are held, the more 
likely it is that the inquiry is a substantial one. This could show inquiries that are 
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planned well in advance or just planned well, in comparison to those who hold 
fewer oral evidence sessions which might suggest the inquiry has been squeezed 
into a tight agenda. However, not all inquiries include oral evidence, indeed the 
inquiries into the Flood Water Management Act 2010 and the Serious Crime Act 
2007 took no oral evidence and lasted 90 and 241 days respectively.  
In terms of which committees are more likely to undertake longer inquiries, the 
Justice Committee held seven and six oral evidence sessions, suggesting it 
undertakes more substantial inquiries. The other committees show a mixed picture 
which might suggest that post-legislative scrutiny is slotted into the agenda where 
and when committees deem it necessary rather than carving out specific time. The 
time allocated for those inquiries will depend upon a number of factors such as 
workload, resources and the scope of inquiry that they wish to undertake. 
However, the scope of the inquiry could also be limited by the previous two factors. 
This chapter will now move on to assess the legislation which is selected to receive 
post-legislative scrutiny. 
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Table 4.4. Time spent on formal post-legislative scrutiny by number of oral evidence sessions and panels 
 
Source: (CLG (2013); CMS (2009, 2012); EFRA (2008a, 2016b, 2017c); H (2013); HA (2014b); JCHR (2014a); J (2012, 2013a, 2015); PACA (2013a, 2013c); SCAL (2013); 
SCEL (2015); SCEAD (2016); SCIA (2014); SCLA (2017); SCMCA (2014
Committee Acts 
No of 
Witnesses 
Oral evidence 
sessions 
Inquiry length (Days) 
Ad hoc (Lords) 
Adoption and Children Act 2002, Children and 
Adoption Act 2006 
33 
25 
260 
Ad hoc (Lords) Mental Capacity Act 2005 54 22 301 
Ad hoc (Lords) Equality Act 2010 53 20 274 
Ad hoc (Lords) Licensing Act 2003 65 20 278 
Ad hoc (Lords) Extradition Act 2003 43 16 271 
Ad hoc (Lords) Inquiries Act 2005 31 15 271 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Gambling Act 2005 50 14 440 
Justice Freedom of Information Act 2000 34 13 219 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Licensing Act 2003 35 12 300 
Justice Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment Act 2012 33 11 454 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Animal Welfare Act 2006 33 10 286 
Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs   Charities Act 2006 20 9 322 
Housing, Communities and Local Government Greater London Authority Act 2007 8 5 300 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966 13 5 309 
Home Affairs Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 6 4 32 
Health Mental Health Act 2007 7 2 175 
Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs   Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007 5 2 255 
Joint Committee on Human Rights 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures 
Act 2011 
NA 
1 
399 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Flood and Water Management Act 2010 0 0 90 
Justice Serious Crime Act 2007 0 0 241 
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 Selection of legislation 
This section will assess the party of government under which the legislation that 
has received formal post-legislative scrutiny was initiated. This section will also 
assess the departments that have introduced legislation which have gone on to 
receive formal post-legislative scrutiny. As informal post-legislative scrutiny often 
occurs within a broader inquiry without direct acknowledgement, they will not be 
assessed in this manner. The purpose of assessing the party of government and 
government departments is to see whether there are any trends in legislation 
receiving dedicated review. This is less likely to happen with informal post-
legislative scrutiny as it is not necessarily driven by problems in legislation being 
raised. Rather it is part of a routine inquiry assessing a policy area in which it then 
becomes apparent that some of the problems lie with legislation. Finally, it will 
assess the contentiousness of the legislation in terms of whether there was a 
division at second and/or third reading, and in terms of whether or not there was 
a rebellion during those votes 
 
4.2.1 Party of government 
Table 4.5 shows the party of government which introduced the legislation receiving 
formal post-legislative scrutiny. It shows that 18 out of the 20 Acts which have been 
subject to formal post-legislative scrutiny were introduced under previous Labour 
Governments (1964-1970, 1997-2001, 2001-2005 and 2005-2010), with only two 
pieces of legislation being introduced by the 2010-2015 Coalition Government. This 
can potentially be explained by the fact that the 2008 system encouraged the 
production of a memorandum and thus encouraged post-legislative scrutiny of 
Acts passed since 2005. During the first half of the 2010 Parliament, it would be 
Labour-introduced legislation which was receiving post-legislative review by the 
relevant government department. However, we are now well beyond the first half 
of the 2010 Parliament. The legislation of the 2010-2015 Coalition Government 
should now be receiving departmental post-legislative review. There is a challenge 
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here with accountability as the government which introduced the legislation is no 
longer in office, as such any accountability is directed at the current 
administration, as a result of ‘government’ (regardless of who introduced it) being 
responsible for the implementation of legislation. As noted in the typology in 
chapter two, accountability is not ranked as being high in relation to post-
legislative scrutiny (or type three scrutiny more broadly) because post-legislative 
scrutiny is about more than just accountability and this finding further supports 
the argument that accountability is not high in terms of presence.  
It should also be noted that not all post-legislative scrutiny is driven by memoranda 
published by government departments under the systematic process, as 
committees can and do select legislation to receive post-legislative scrutiny 
without receiving a post-legislative memorandum first. There is no procedural 
obstacle that could stop committees addressing the legislation of the 2010-2015 
Coalition Government. Recent reforms were supposed to have emboldened 
committees. However, this does not appear to be the case in relation to the 
selection of legislation to receive post-legislative scrutiny. Indeed Barlow (2013) 
suggested that committees needed to behave themselves and be less hostile with 
government departments. Even so, a potential effect of this (if committees have 
heeded such a warning) is that committees become reluctant to undertake scrutiny 
that the government frowns upon. This behaviour is in stark contrast to the 
literature on scrutiny in the conceptual framework which suggested that these 
committees were created to subject the executive to limitations and control (HC 
Deb 25 June 1979, cc.36-77). In reality, this experience shows the difference 
between scrutiny in theory (as a concept) and how scrutiny is delivered in practice, 
taking into account the power relations between the executive and legislature.  
The above point again raises the issue of the powers of committees. The fact they 
are being told to ‘behave themselves’ shows how little hard power they have. As 
they rely on the power of persuasion (Gordon & Street, 2012), they obviously need 
to avoid irritating the body they are trying to influence. 
This suggests that there might be some bias in the selection of legislation that 
receives post-legislative scrutiny on the basis that some of the legislation of 2010-
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2015 Coalition Government now falls into the three-five year timeframe for post-
legislative review by a government department. However, the subsequent 
memoranda from these reviews do not appear to be getting picked up by 
committees (the section later in the chapter on the post-legislative gap will explore 
this issue in more detail). This raises the question of whether this is a result of the 
party in government at the time. There may be an unwillingness among MPs from 
the governing party to subject their own government’s legislation to post-
legislative scrutiny. The bias here is not completely unexpected as parliament is a 
partisan body and as such is going to act in a partisan way. It is key however for 
parliament and especially committees to be aware of these inherent biases over 
selection and work to address them.
 123 
Table 4.5. Legislation receiving formal post-legislative scrutiny by party of government 
Committee 
No of  
Acts scrutinised Act(s) involved Party of Government 
Justice 1 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment Act 2012 Conservative/Liberal Democrat 
Joint Committee on Human Rights 1 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 Conservative/Liberal Democrat 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 1 Gambling Act 2005 Labour 
Justice 1 Freedom of Information Act 2000 Labour 
Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs 1 Charities Act 2006 Labour 
Health 1 Mental Health Act 2007 Labour 
Ad hoc (Lords) 2 Adoption and Children Act 2002 Labour 
  N/A Children and Adoption Act 2006 Labour 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Equality Act 2010 Labour 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Extradition Act 2003 Labour 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Inquiries Act 2005 Labour 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Mental Capacity Act 2005 Labour 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Licensing Act 2003 Labour 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 1 Licensing Act 2003 Labour 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 1 Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966 Labour 
Home Affairs 1 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 Labour 
Justice 1 Serious Crime Act 2007 Labour 
Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs 1 Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007 Labour 
Housing, Communities and Local Government 1 Greater London Authority Act 2007 Labour 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 1 Animal Welfare Act 2006 Labour 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 1 Flood and Water Management Act 2010 Labour 
Source: (HM Government, 1966, 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 
2012)
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4.2.2 Government departments and post-legislative scrutiny 
Next, this section moves on to assess the frequency in which government 
departments have seen their legislation subject to formal post-legislative inquiry. 
Table 4.6 shows the Acts in question, as well as the department which currently 
holds responsibility for the legislation, so a comparison can be made. However, the 
department which it was introduced under is also included (even if this 
department has been abolished or merged). This is to assess whether certain 
departments which no longer exist in their original form at the time the legislation 
was introduced were likely to see their legislation reviewed.  
Table 4.6 shows that the two departments which had their legislation reviewed by 
post-legislative scrutiny most often were the Ministry of Justice and the Home 
Office with five and four pieces of legislation reviewed respectively (when placing 
the legislation under the department which would be responsible for it today).  
However, taking into account the original departments, the department most 
likely to see post-legislative scrutiny undertaken on its legislation is the Home 
Office with five pieces of legislation receiving scrutiny. The Home Office may be 
one of the most legislatively intensive departments here because of the political 
need to show the government is being tough on law and order. Indeed, research 
shows that between 2010 and 2017, the Home Office was the second most 
legislatively intensive department, after the Treasury (Institute for Government, 
2018).  This links back to the idea that successive governments have used the 
legislative process as a form of press release to show they are doing something (Fox 
& Korris, 2010). The difference can be explained by the fact that the Ministry of 
Justice was created in 2007 and took some of the Home Office’s responsibilities on 
law and human rights and took all the responsibilities of the Department for 
Constitutional Affairs (responsibility for constitutional affairs now rests with the 
Cabinet Office since the Coalition Government). If the Ministry of Justice is most 
likely to see its legislation reviewed, then it would be expected that the Justice 
Committee is the departmental select committee which has undertaken the most 
formal post-legislative scrutiny. 
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Table 4.6. Legislation receiving post-legislative scrutiny by initiating government department 
Committee 
No of Acts 
scrutinised Act(s) involved 
Government Department 
(now) 
Government 
Department (original) 
Ad hoc (Lords) 2 Adoption and Children Act 2002 Department for Education Department of Health 
 N/A Children and Adoption Act 2006 Department for Education 
Department for 
Education and Skills 
Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs 1 Charities Act 2006 Cabinet Office Cabinet Office 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Equality Act 2010 
Government Equalities 
Office 
Government Equalities 
Office; Department for 
Work and Pensions; 
Department for Children, 
Schools and Families; 
Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills; 
Department for Transport 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Extradition Act 2003 Home Office Home Office 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 1 Flood and Water Management Act 2010 
Department for the 
Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs 
Department for the 
Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs 
Justice 1 Freedom of Information Act 2000 Ministry of Justice Home Office 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 1 Gambling Act 2005 
Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport 
Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport 
Housing, Communities and Local Government 1 Greater London Authority Act 2007 
Ministry of Housing, 
Communities and Local 
Government 
Department for 
Communities and Local 
Government 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Inquiries Act 2005 Ministry of Justice 
Department for 
Constitutional Affairs 
Justice 1 
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment Act 
2012 Ministry of Justice Ministry of Justice 
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Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Licensing Act 2003 
Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport 
Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 1 Licensing Act 2003 
Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport 
Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Mental Capacity Act 2005 
Ministry of Justice / 
Department of Health and 
Social Care 
Department for 
Constitutional Affairs / 
Department of Health 
Health 1 Mental Health Act 2007 
Ministry of Justice / 
Department of Health and 
Social Care 
Ministry of Justice / 
Department of Health 
Home Affairs 1 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 Home Office Home Office 
Justice 1 Serious Crime Act 2007 Home Office Home Office 
Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs 1 Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007 Her Majesty’s Treasury Her Majesty’s Treasury 
Joint Committee on Human Rights 1 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures Act 2011 Home Office Home Office 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 1 Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966 
Department for the 
Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs 
Department for the 
Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 1 Animal Welfare Act 2006 
Department for the 
Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs 
Department for the 
Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs 
Source: (CO (2006); DCSF (2006); DCLG (2007); DFCA, DH (2005); DFCA (2005); DCMS (2003, 2005); DEFRA (1966; 2006; 2010); DH, MJ (2007); DH (2002); HMT 
(2007); HO (2000a, 2000b, 2003, 2007, 2011); MJ (2012); WEO (2010)
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Table 4.7. Legislative output of departments whose select committees have undertaken formal post-legislative scrutiny. 
 
 2005-2010 Parliament 2010-2015 Parliament 
2015-2017 
Parliament  
 
2005-
2006 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
2008-
2009 
2009-
2010 
2010-
2012 
2012-
2013 
2013-
2014 
2014-
2015 
2015-
2016 
2016-
2017 Total 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 2 0 0 3 11 
Ministry of Justice 3 5 2 2 2 2 4 3 1 0 0 24 
Cabinet Office 3 0 1 2 0 5 2 2 3 1 0 19 
Department of Health and Social Care 5 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 14 
Home Office 8 3 1 2 1 5 2 2 4 2 2 32 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 3 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 7 
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government 1 3 2 2 0 3 2 1 0 2 1 17 
Total 25 13 8 10 6 18 12 12 8 5 7 124 
 
Source:  (The National Archives (2016); UK Parliament, (2016a)) 
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Table 4.6 established that the Ministry of Justice and Home Office were the 
departments which had the most legislation receive formal post-legislative 
scrutiny. This can be explained by the committees which have undertaken post-
legislative scrutiny on their acts (not necessarily the correlated departmental select 
committee) might be more in favour and have more of an interest in post-
legislative scrutiny. This is true of the Justice Committee under the chairmanship 
of Alan Beith (2007-2015). However, it can also be explained by the fact they are 
two departments which are legislatively intensive. With the Home Office being 
prominent in terms of the amount of legislation receiving post-legislative scrutiny 
it is then somewhat surprising to see the Home Affairs Committee having only 
undertaken one piece of formal post-legislative scrutiny. The reasons for and for 
not undertaking post-legislative scrutiny will be explored in more detail in 
chapters six and seven which deal with the experiences committees have had while 
undertaking post-legislative scrutiny. 
Table 4.7 shows the legislative output of departments whose shadowing select 
committees have undertaken formal post-legislative scrutiny. This allows us to 
compare the legislative intensity of government departments in comparison to the 
most active departmental select committees. The Home Office and Ministry of 
Justice have the top two highest legislative outputs. If these departments have a 
high legislative output, then to some degree there is a greater chance that their 
legislation will receive post-legislative scrutiny because there are more of them in 
force. However, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport only introduced 
eight pieces of legislation between the start of the 2005 Parliament and end of the 
2010 Parliament, yet there have been two formal post-legislative scrutiny inquiries. 
If the pattern occurs in previous parliaments, in terms of legislative output, it 
reflects the willingness of the committee to undertake post-legislative scrutiny, 
and a lighter workload of that committee in comparison to other committees. Take 
the example of the Home Affairs Committee, it shadows one of the most 
legislatively intensive departments yet it has only undertaken one piece of formal 
post-legislative scrutiny. While it is true some of the Home Office’s responsibilities 
have been transferred to the Ministry of Justice, it also indicates an unwillingness 
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of the Home Affairs Committee to undertake formal post-legislative scrutiny, 
which will depend upon the preferences of committee members.  
 
4.2.3 Contentiousness  
There are a number of ways in which legislation can be defined as contentious, 
including whether the official opposition calls for a formal division at Second and 
Third Reading, if a smaller party does the same and if there is a 
government/opposition rebellion in one of those divisions. Table 4.8 shows 
whether or not the legislation which has received formal post-legislative scrutiny 
so far, was divided on at second and/or third reading in the House of Commons 
and also whether or not there was a rebellion by MPs during these divisions. 
However, there are differing degrees of contentiousness and just because a piece 
of legislation passes second reading without a division does not mean it will not be 
seen as contentious further through the legislative process. To this end, table 4.7 
also addresses whether there was a division at third reading. The table shows that 
there was a division forced at third reading for eleven out of twenty pieces of 
legislation (55%). Five of those bills (25%) saw a division at both second and third 
reading which would suggest a level of contentiousness not only on the general 
principles of the bill but also on the final Act itself. If a party or group of MPs are 
dissatisfied with the principles of a bill and vote against it at second reading, then 
they are unlikely to vote for it at third reading. 
Finally, the table shows that only the Gambling Act 2005 saw a rebellion at these 
stages during its passage. This also points to a different type of contentiousness on 
the basis that MPs are rebelling against their party’s position whether they are in 
government or opposition. Indeed, 28 Labour (government) MPs voted against the 
whip during the division on second reading and 24 Labour MPs voted against the 
whip during the division at third reading. The fact there was a rebellion on this 
legislation might mean efforts were made to revise the bill in order to 
accommodate the legislation’s critics, more so than legislation which is challenged 
along party lines. There were no rebellions among opposition parties. 
130 
Table 4.8. Contentiousness of legislation by divisions and rebellions 
                                                     
12 N/A – not applicable 
13 NA – not available 
Committee 
No of Acts 
scrutinised Act(s) involved 
2R - 
D 
3R - 
D Rebellion 
Ad hoc (Lords) 2 Adoption and Children Act 2002 N N N/A12 
Public 
Administration 
and 
Constitutional 
Affairs 1 Charities Act 2006 N N N/A 
 N/A 
Children and Adoption Act 
2006 N Y N 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Equality Act 2010 N Y N 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Extradition Act 2003 Y Y N 
Environment, 
Food and Rural 
Affairs 1 
Flood and Water Management 
Act 2010 N N N/A 
Justice 1 
Freedom of Information Act 
2000 N N N/A 
Digital, 
Culture, Media 
and Sport 1 Gambling Act 2005 Y Y Y 
Housing, 
Communities 
and Local 
Government 1 
Greater London Authority Act 
2007 Y Y N 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Inquiries Act 2005 N N N/A 
Justice 1 
Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment Act 2012 Y Y N 
Ad hoc  (Lords) 1 Licensing Act 2003 N Y N 
Digital, 
Culture, Media 
and Sport 1 Licensing Act 2003 N Y N 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Mental Capacity Act 2005 Y Y N 
Health 1 Mental Health Act 2007 N Y N 
Home Affairs 1 
Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 N N N/A 
Justice 1 Serious Crime Act 2007 N N N/A 
Public 
Administration 
and 
Constitutional 
Affairs 
1 
Statistics and Registration 
Service Act 2007 
N N N/A 
Joint 
Committee on 
Human Rights 1 
Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures Act 2011 N Y N 
Environment, 
Food and Rural 
Affairs 1 Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966 NA13 NA NA 
Environment, 
Food and Rural 
Affairs 1 Animal Welfare Act 2006 N N N/A 
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Source: (HC Deb 7 Dec 1999, c.714; HC Deb 6 Mar 2000, c.767; HC Deb 8 Mar 2000, c.610; HC 
Deb 5 Apr 2000, c.1119; HC Deb 29 Oct 2001, c.649; HC Deb 20 May 2002, c.97; HC Deb 24 Mar 
2003, c.51; HC Deb 25 Mar 2003, c.243; HC Deb 16 Jun 2003, c.168; HC Deb 11 Oct 2004, c.22; HC 
Deb 1 Nov 2004, c.25; HC Deb 14 Dec 2004, c.1627; HC Deb 24 Jan 2005, c.126; HC Deb 15 Mar 
2005, c.149; HC Deb 6 Apr 2005, c.1492; HC Deb 10 Jan 2006, c.248; HC Deb 9 Feb 2006, c.1048; 
HC Deb 2 Mar 2006, c.417; HC Deb 14 Mar 2006, c.1427; HC Deb 16 May 2006, c.960; HC Deb 
20 Jun 2006, c.1280; HC Deb 26 Jun 2006, c.21; HC Deb 25 Oct 2006, c.1616; HC Deb 12 Dec 2006, 
c.751; HC Deb 8 Jan 2007, c.23; HC Deb 27 Feb 2007 c.880; HC Deb 13 Mar 2007, c.244; HC Deb 
16 Apr 2007, c.52; HC Deb 12 Jun 2007, c.661; HC Deb 19 Jun 2007, c.1333; HC Deb 22 Oct 2007, 
c.117; HC Deb 11 May 2009, c.553; HC Deb 02 Dec 2009, c.1226; HC Deb 9 Dec 2009, c.39; HC 
Deb 15 Dec 2009, c.835; HC Deb 2 Feb 2010, c.174HC Deb 7 Jun 2011, c.69; HC Deb 29 Jun 2011, 
c.984; HC Deb 5 Sept 2011, c.132; HC Deb 2 Nov 2011, c.1042) 
 
The table thus shows that there are Acts receiving post-legislative scrutiny which 
have a degree of contentiousness attached to them. This could be important as the 
more contentious a piece of legislation is, the more likely a government may be to 
protect that legislation as much as they can from amendment and too detailed 
scrutiny. It could be a type of legislation which is likely to require post-legislative 
scrutiny. So it is encouraging to see that 55% of the legislation which received 
formal post-legislative scrutiny had some degree of contentiousness, whether that 
is because it saw a division at second and/or third reading or because it saw a 
rebellion. In terms of understanding committee behaviour in this area, the 
willingness of committees to undertake review of contentious legislation when 
assessed in terms of divisions might be explained by most of the legislation having 
been introduced by a previous administration. As such it is not deemed to be as 
contentious now. This might explain the lack of legislation from the Coalition 
Government receiving review. There is contentious legislation, as defined by this 
thesis, which has not yet received review but were passed under the Coalition 
Government. These include the Health and Social Care Act 2012 which saw a 
division at both second and third reading, as well as with a rebellion by Liberal 
Democrat backbenchers at third reading. The Localism Act 2011 and the Protection 
of Freedoms Act 2012, saw no division at second reading but did at third. 
Partisanship therefore surely plays a role here and is to be expected to some degree 
as parliament is a partisan institution.  
While there is always the case to argue for more post-legislative scrutiny, especially 
if it has been deemed to be contentious, committees have to decide for themselves 
which Acts warrant scrutiny. Furthermore, just because an Act is politically 
contentious, does not necessarily mean it is a bad piece of legislation. Indeed, a 
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greater consideration on a committee’s mind in terms of deciding whether to 
undertake post-legislative scrutiny on a particular Act will be the level of 
contentiousness since the Act was signed into law and came into effect. This might 
include whether the Act is causing unintended consequences or (depending on the 
Act) whether the courts are able to utilise the Act in the manner to which it was 
intended. 
 
 Depth of Scrutiny  
This section will assess the depth of scrutiny that the legislation, reviewed by post-
legislative scrutiny received during the formal legislative process. This is important 
so that we can assess whether the depth of scrutiny which legislation received 
during the formal legislative process is linked to legislation which has gone on to 
receive post-legislative scrutiny. It might be expected that legislation which has 
not received as detailed scrutiny to be potentially in greater need of review. This 
section will look at the success rate of amendments in the House of Lords, along 
with the number of government defeats on each Act as well as how many Acts were 
caught up and passed during the wash-up period between elections being called 
and the dissolution of parliament. The section ends with an assessment of the 
length of legislation and the time each Act spent in committee. 
 
4.3.1 Amendment success rate and government defeats in the 
House of Lords 
Table 4.9 shows the success rate of amendments in the House of Lords and the 
number of government defeats that the legislation received during its passage 
through the House of Lords. Amendments in the House of Lords were selected for 
this section on the basis that the House of Commons does not keep records of 
amendments made to each bill. The table shows that there is a variance in the 
success rate of amendments. The Act with the highest success rate was the 
Charities Act 2006 with 61% of amendments being tabled, going on to be made and 
the legislation with the lowest success rate being the Terrorism Prevention and 
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Investigation Measures Act 2011 with only 7% of the amendments tabled going on 
to be accepted. The average success rate for amendments from these Acts is 28%. 
The success rate for the Charities Act 2006 is, therefore, high. This can be explained 
by the fact that the Act was deemed uncontentious by the measures used to assess 
contentiousness in table 4.8 and the government may be more willing to accept 
amendments. That being said the success rate for amendments to the Gambling 
Act 2005 was 45%, which is quite high for an Act which was divided upon at second 
and third reading. This will be an indication that an effort was made to revise the 
bill to try and accommodate critics in order to pass the Act before the 2005 General 
Election. There may not be a trend therefore between the number of amendments 
accepted in the House of Lords and the contentiousness of the legislation receiving 
post-legislative scrutiny. There may instead be a number of specific reasons per 
Act as to why some receive more amendments than others. 
The government does not have a majority in the House of Lords, mainly due to the 
number of Crossbench Peers who do not take a party whip. The House of Lords is, 
therefore, willing to defeat the government on the finer details of bills (Norton, 
2005). Government defeats in the House of Lords are far more common than in the 
House of Commons (Brazier, Kalitowski, & Rosenblatt, 2007). Indeed, in the 2010 
Parliament, the government was defeated 100 times on legislation in the 
2015Parliament the government was defeated 98 times (Constitution Unit, 2018). 
While the Gambling Act 2005 is seen as contentious, the success rate of 
amendments in the House of Lords on this particular Act is likely down to the 
government offering concessionary amendments to try and avoid defeat and 
ensure the legislation was passed before the end of the parliament. The fact the Act 
was being scrutinised in the ‘wash up’ will mean the government would be more 
willing to accept amendments to ensure the bill did not fall before dissolution, 
prior to the 2005 General Election. 
The large number of amendments made to the Charities Act 2006 in the House of 
Lords could be explained by drafting issues or the government taking the chance 
to amend the legislation in the House of Lords in order to save face and avoid 
defeat in the Commons. As well as covering drafting issues, a lot of amendments 
tabled in the Lords come from the government in response to pressure from the 
134 
Commons or in order to avoid defeat (Norton, 2013; Russell, Gover, & Wollter, 2015; 
Thompson, 2015). It is not uncommon for the government to table amendments in 
the Lords which have developed from points made in the House of Commons. It is 
less embarrassing for the government to accept these amendments in the Lords 
than the Commons as it is less likely to be seen to climb down. 
Table 4.9. Success rate of amendments and government defeats in the House of 
Lords 
Committee 
No of  
Acts 
scrutinised Act(s) involved 
Success rate of 
amendments 
in the Lords 
(%) 
Government 
Defeats in 
the Lords 
Public 
Administration 
and 
Constitutional 
Affairs 
Committee 1 Charities Act 2006 61 1 
Digital, 
Culture, Media 
and Sport 1 Gambling Act 2005 45 1 
Justice 1 
Legal Aid, Sentencing 
and Punishment Act 
2012 41 11 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Extradition Act 2003 38 4 
Home Affairs 1 
Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers 
Act 2000 36 2 
 N/A 
Children and Adoption 
Act 2006 34 0 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Equality Act 2010 31 3 
Health 1 
Mental Health Act 
2007 31 6 
Environment, 
Food and 
Rural Affairs 
Committee 1 
Animal Welfare Act 
2006 31 0 
Justice 1 
Freedom of 
Information Act 2000 28 0 
Ad hoc (Lords) 2 
Adoption and Children 
Act 2002 27 1 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 
Mental Capacity Act 
2005 27 0 
Justice 1 Serious Crime Act 2007 24 2 
Public 
Administration 
and 
Constitutional 
Affairs 
Committee 
1 
Statistics and 
Registration Service 
Act 2007 
24 2 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Inquiries Act 2005 23 2 
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Committee 
No of  
Acts 
scrutinised Act(s) involved 
Success rate of 
amendments 
in the Lords 
(%) 
Government 
Defeats in 
the Lords 
Environment, 
Food and 
Rural Affairs 
Committee 1 
Flood and Water 
Management Act 2010 20 0 
Ministry of 
Housing, 
Communities 
and Local 
Government 1 
Greater London 
Authority Act 2007 13 2 
Digital, 
Culture, Media 
and Sport 1 Licensing Act 2003 7 9 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Licensing Act 200314 7 9 
Joint 
Committee on 
Human Rights 1 
Terrorism Prevention 
and Investigation 
Measures Act 2011 6 0 
Environment, 
Food and 
Rural Affairs 
Committee 1 
Veterinary Surgeons 
Act 1966 N/A N/A 
Source: (House of Lords Public and Private Bill Office, 2000; 2002; 2003; 2005; 2006; 2007; 
2010; 2012) 
 
To put these success rates into context, this can be compared with the number of 
government defeats on these Acts as they passed through the House of Lords. The 
Act with the most government defeats was the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment Act 2012 which saw eleven defeats, followed by the Licensing Act 2003 
with nine defeats. The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment Act 2012 was deemed 
contentious with a division being forced at both second and third readings in the 
House of Commons. Those Acts which were not deemed contentious tend to see 
fewer government defeats. The Freedom of Information Act 2000 and Charities Act 
2006, saw no defeats for the former and the latter only saw one. There is a trend 
here between the contentiousness of the legislation and the number of times that 
legislation is defeated in the House of Lords. However, the data is limited to a small 
number of cases and as such it will not be possible to generalise. It does follow that 
a lack of a government majority in the House of Lords might lead to more defeats 
                                                     
14 The legislation is included twice in the table but for the purposes of analysis it will be counted 
as one Act. 
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on contentious legislation. If the legislation is not contentious then there is likely 
to be more agreement than disagreement.  
4.3.2 Length of legislation and number of sittings 
Before reaching the end of this chapter it is important to assess both the length of 
legislation and the number of sittings that took place at the committee stage. This 
is important because it may reveal the depth of scrutiny which the Act received in 
the House of Commons. 
Table 4.10 and figure 4.1 show that there is, in fact, a positive correlation between 
the length of legislation and the number of sittings that piece of legislation receives 
during the committee stage of the legislative process.  
Table 4.10. Length of legislation and number of sittings in public bill committee 
 
Committee 
No of Acts 
scrutinised Act(s) involved 
Bill 
Word 
Count 
No of 
sittings in 
Committee 
Justice 1 
Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment Act 2012 121,074 18 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Equality Act 2010 93,493 20 
Digital, Culture, 
Media and Sport 1 Gambling Act 2005 92,278 20 
Public 
Administration 
and 
Constitutional 
Affairs 1 Charities Act 2006 72,045 8 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Licensing Act 2003 71,332 17 
Digital, Culture, 
Media and Sport 1 Licensing Act 2003 71,332 17 
Health 1 Mental Health Act 2007 63,428 12 
Justice 1 Serious Crime Act 2007 59,849 9 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Extradition Act 2003 58,116 9 
Home Affairs 1 
Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 
2000 50,262 11 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Mental Capacity Act 2005 36,457 12 
Justice 1 
Freedom of Information 
Act 2000 31,713 14 
Environment, 
Food and Rural 
Affairs 1 
Flood and Water 
Management Act 2010 29792 10 
Joint Committee 
on Human Rights 1 
Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures 
Act 2011 22,989 10 
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Committee 
No of Acts 
scrutinised Act(s) involved 
Bill 
Word 
Count 
No of 
sittings in 
Committee 
Housing, 
Communities and 
Local Government 1 
Greater London Authority 
Act 2007 22,383 9 
Environment, 
Food and Rural 
Affairs 1 Animal Welfare Act 2006 20,794 8 
Public 
Administration 
and 
Constitutional 
Affairs 
1 
Statistics and Registration 
Service Act 2007 
16,877 8 
Ad hoc (Lords) 1 Inquiries Act 2005 13,494 3 
 N/A 
Children and Adoption 
Act 2006 11,166 6 
Environment, 
Food and Rural 
Affairs 1 
Veterinary Surgeons Act 
1966 10,462 N/A 
Ad hoc (Lords) 2 
Adoption and Children 
Act 2002 N/A 24 
Source: (HM Government, 1966, 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 
2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012; House of Commons, 
2001, 2003, 2013, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010b, 2012)  
 
The Committee Stage of the legislative process is where line by line scrutiny takes 
place. The longer an Act is, logically, the more time you would expect such an Act 
to spend in committee, if it is to undertake line by line scrutiny. However, 
Greenberg (2015) has argued that public bill committees in the UK barely 
undertake a clause by clause scrutiny of bills, never mind a line by line scrutiny 
due to a lack of appetite from committee members. If there is a disparity between 
the length of legislation and the time spent in committee, it might reveal a lack of 
scrutiny. This could develop into a reason for why post-legislative scrutiny was 
necessary on the Act because it did not receive extensive scrutiny during the formal 
legislative process 
The overall trend is not completely linear, however. There are a number of factors 
which come into play when determining how long a bill will stay in committee for. 
These include the speed with which the government wishes to have the legislation 
passed (determined by the programme motion) and whether the bill originated in 
the House of Lords (if so it would have had extensive line by line scrutiny there). 
There are exceptions to the trend such as the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment Act 2012 which was just over 121,000 words long and only received 
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eighteen days in committee while the Gambling Act 2005 which was just over 
92,000 words received twenty days in committee.  
Figure 4.1. Number of committee sittings by length of legislation 
Source: (HM Government, 1966, 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 
2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012; House of Commons, 
2001, 2003, 2013, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010b, 2012) 
 
Brazier (2004) argues that public bill committees deliver weak and incomplete 
scrutiny, as substantial changes are not usually made to bills at this stage, and bills 
often leave committee without full line by line scrutiny. This is, therefore, another 
factor that can impact the effectiveness of scrutiny and it could potentially 
reinforce why post-legislative scrutiny is a necessary and important task for 
committees to undertake. However, research by Russell et al. (2015) and Thompson 
(2015) argue that public bill committees have more influence than initially thought.  
 
 
4.3.3 The wash-up 
Another factor that will impact upon the depth of scrutiny given is whether 
legislation gets caught in the wash-up at the end of a parliament. The wash-up is 
the interval between an election being called and parliament being 
prorogued/dissolved (whichever comes first) (Newson & Kelly, 2011). Once 
parliament dissolves ahead of a general election, all parliamentary business that is 
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not complete falls (e.g. is a bill has not passed through all the parliamentary stages 
and received royal assent by dissolution, then it falls). The challenge with 
completing scrutiny comes from the fact that the wash-up interval is usually short. 
In both 2005 and 2010, there were only two sitting days to complete scrutiny and 
fourteen and seventeen bills respectively received royal assent in this time period 
thus leaving little time for final scrutiny (Newson & Kelly, 2011). Out of the Acts to 
receive formal post-legislative scrutiny, five completed their scrutiny during the 
wash-up.  
 
The Acts are detailed in table 4.11. However, out of the five, two had passed their 
formal stages and were awaiting consideration of amendments. There are therefore 
differing degrees of impact here. An Act which has passed all its main stages, except 
consideration of amendments is, less disadvantaged in terms of scrutiny than an 
Act which was only part way through its committee stage. This means that in the 
example of the 2005 and 2010 elections, it meant completing the remaining stages 
in two sitting days. Therefore, having completed their final stages in a hurry could 
mean they are in greater need of receiving post-legislative scrutiny as the focus is 
upon what the frontbenches can agree to in order to get the legislation passed. 
However, only 20% of the Acts passed during the 2005 election wash-up and 12% 
from the 2010 election wash-up went on to receive post-legislative scrutiny. 
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Table 4.11. Acts which received post-legislative scrutiny and were caught in the wash-up period 
 
Source: Newson & Kelly (2011)
Act 
(originating 
House) 
Parliament Date 
election 
announced 
Date of 
prorogation 
Stage reached prior to election 
announcement 
Progress during the wash-up 
Gambling 
(Commons) 
2001-2005 5th April 
2005 
11th April 2005 Lords: Committee stage (10th 
March) 
Lords: Committee stage and remaining stages completed (6th 
April. 
 
Commons: Lords amendments (7th April) 
 
Royal Assent: 7th April 
Inquiries 
(Lords) 
2001-2005 5th April 
2005 
11th April 2005 Commons: Committee stage 
(22nd and 24th March) 
Commons: Remaining stages (6th April) 
 
Lords: Commons amendments (7th April) 
 
Royal Assent: 7th April 
Mental 
Capacity Act 
(Commons) 
2001-2005 5th April 
2005 
11th April 2005 Lords: Third reading (1st March) Commons: Lords amendments (5th April) 
 
Royal Assent: 7th April 
Equality 
(Commons) 
2005-2010 6th April 
2010 
8th April 2010 Lords: Third reading (23rd March 
2010) 
Commons: Lords amendments (6th April) 
 
Royal Assent: 8th April 
Flood and 
Water 
Management 
(Commons) 
2005-2010 6th April 
2010 
8th April 2010 Lords: Committee stage, second 
sitting (24th March) 
Lords: Committee stage (6th April), remaining stages (8th April) 
 
Commons: Lords amendments (8th April) 
 
Royal Assent: 8th April 
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 The post-legislative scrutiny gap 
The focus of this thesis is on the post-legislative scrutiny that has taken place. 
However, this raises an interesting question about what legislation is not receiving 
post-legislative scrutiny. Earlier in this chapter, the selection of legislation was 
addressed and in particular the party which introduced it. It showed that there is 
something of a party bias when it comes to the selection of legislation, with 
legislation introduced by the 2010-2015 Coalition Government not yet receiving 
much attention when it comes to post-legislative scrutiny with only two Acts 
having been reviewed so far. Indeed, the final three post-legislative scrutiny 
inquiries included in this research were on Labour introduced legislation (Animal 
Welfare Act 2006; Licensing Act 2003; Flood and Water Management Act 2010). 
There is clearly a gap here in the coverage of post-legislative scrutiny, especially if 
you consider that government departments are now required to complete their 
own post-legislative review 3-5 years after an Act has entered the statue books. This 
could be more accurately referred to as a post-legislative gap (i.e. what legislation 
is not receiving post-legislative scrutiny). While the government process appears 
to be systematic, the parliament side of it is less so.  
At the time of writing, taking into account the 3-5 year post-legislative 
departmental review process, committees, as long as departments are producing 
their reviews on time, should now have received the reviews for the first two 
sessions of the 2010 Parliament. This is assuming that government departments 
take the full five years to produce the review. Indeed David Lloyd, Head of the 
House of Commons Scrutiny Unit noted that they tend to come towards the end 
of the given time period because of other departmental priorities (Lloyd, 2017). 
That totals 75 pieces of legislation15 that should have received their departmental 
reviews and only 2 pieces of that legislation have received post-legislative scrutiny 
(2.6%). 
                                                     
15 Not including financial legislation. 
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In terms of the lack of post-legislative scrutiny on the coalition government’s 
legislation in the House of Lords, this might be explained by the longer time frame 
the Lords likes to take when undertaking post-legislative scrutiny. Interviews with 
clerks in the House of Lords pointed to a period of time greater than five years 
needing to pass before legislation is deemed suitable to undertake post-legislative 
scrutiny on an Act. Michael Collon, who was the clerk for the inquiries into the 
Licensing Act and the Equality Act suggested that seven to eight years would need 
to pass before it was possible to see the full effects of the Act (Collon, 2017b). This 
was on the basis that not all of the Act necessarily comes into force at the same 
time. Indeed, this view was shared by the clerk of the House of Lords Liaison 
Committee who stated that the optimal time for post-legislative scrutiny is 
somewhere between 5 and 10 years (Tudor, 2017). This would potentially explain 
why the House of Lords is not as yet addressing the legislation passed by the 2010-
2015 Coalition Government if it is taking that long term view.  
In justifying this longer term view Michael Collon noted that ‘3 years is too short a 
time as you can’t really see what an Act is doing, what has been achieved and what 
hasn’t’ (Collon, 2017a). Again this ties in with the earlier point about Acts not 
necessarily coming into force at the same time. So while the government focuses 
upon the date of Royal Assent, it might, in fact, be better to focus upon the date of 
commencement, as the House of Lords Constitution Committee does. In relation 
to this point he raised the case of the Licensing Act 2003 which the House of 
Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee scrutinised just three years after 
it the Act had come into force. The report ended up being short, on the basis that 
there wasn’t much to say other than noting that it was too soon after the Act had 
been passed to make any concrete suggestions (Collon, 2017a). The House of Lords 
assessed the legislation again in the 2016/2017 session, 11 years after its enactment 
on the statute books.  
One additional issue that might be influencing the House of Lords in this area is 
the general desire to avoid anything too politically controversial (Collon, 2017b). 
Such an aim might deter the House of Lords from addressing the legislation of 
governments that are still in office. This links back to points made in chapter three 
regarding the timidity of the House of Lords due to its unelected status and the 
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primacy of the House of Commons (Russell, 2013). This could explain why so few 
Acts from the Coalition Government have been assessed as well, indeed the House 
of Lords has not undertaken any post-legislative scrutiny at the time of writing into 
legislation passed by the Coalition Government. The challenge here is that 
potentially the legislation that is the most controversial or contentious is, in fact, 
the legislation in most need of review and the House of Lords with its more 
independent and consensual approach to legislation and scrutiny might be the 
better place to undertake such scrutiny. 
From the perspective of the House of Commons, Elizabeth Flood, the former clerk 
of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee noted that there is a tendency to put 
at least a parliament (around five years) between the legislation being passed and 
the undertaking of post-legislative scrutiny. She also noted that it is possible that 
a time frame of seven to eight years would be necessary depending upon the policy 
area in question (Flood, 2017). So there is also the potential for a slightly elongated 
time frame in the Commons as well. If five years is the minimum from their 
perspective then this does fit with the government’s framework of 3-5 years for 
post-legislative review by a department. However, only two Acts of the Coalition 
Government have been reviewed. With a time frame closer to the government’s 
and with 75 pieces of legislation being eligible for review, the Commons does not 
have the same reasoning to avoid such legislation, especially as the government is 
accountable to the House of Commons and therefore for any problems with the 
Acts and their implementation.  
For the time being, in relation to the legislation not receiving scrutiny, there is a 
post-legislative scrutiny gap. One other issue worth addressing here is a post-
legislative gap in terms of the committees that have not undertaken formal post-
legislative scrutiny since 2010. Table 4.12 shows the House of Commons 
departmental select committees that have not undertaken a formal post-legislative 
scrutiny inquiry since 2010.  
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Table 4.12. Departmental select committees which have not undertaken a formal 
post-legislative scrutiny inquiry. 
 
Committees 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee 
Education Committee 
Defence Committee 
Foreign Affairs Committee 
International Development Committee 
Northern Ireland Affairs Committee 
Scottish Affairs Committee 
Transport Committee 
Treasury Committee 
Welsh Affairs Committee 
Work and Pensions Committee 
 
The Foreign Affairs, International Development, Defence and the Northern 
Ireland, Scottish and Welsh Affairs committees can be excused to some degree as 
these departments are not as legislatively intensive in comparison to the others. 
Additionally, the Treasury Committee could also be excused to a limited degree 
because financial legislation is currently not eligible for post-legislative scrutiny 
under the government’s agreement with parliament, nor was it deemed eligible by 
the House of Lords Constitution Committee (House of Lords Select Committee on 
the Constitution, 2004; Office of the Leader of the House of Commons, 2008). 
However, questions have since been raised as to whether such exemptions should 
be made. Nevertheless, the core tasks of departmental select committees are 
relevant to all departmental select committees, of which post-legislative scrutiny 
is one of those tasks. That leaves an additional four committees which have not 
undertaken a formal post-legislative scrutiny inquiry. In relation to Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy it has undertaken a number of inquiries classified 
under informal post-legislative scrutiny whereas the other two committees have 
not.  
However, when assessing the post-legislative memoranda published by 
government departments. Figure 4.2 raises a number of issues. Firstly, the Home 
Office has published far more memoranda than the Home Affairs Committee has 
taken up for post-legislative scrutiny. While not all legislation will require scrutiny, 
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with the Home Affairs Committee having only undertaken one inquiry in 
comparison to eighteen memoranda having been published, this again shows that 
post-legislative scrutiny is not systematic. Additionally, for each of the committees 
listed in the previous paragraph for not having undertaken any post-legislative 
scrutiny, all of their respective departments (except International Development 
and Defence)16 have been publishing memoranda, albeit, some more than others. 
This suggests that the problem of a lack of post-legislative scrutiny is not down to 
a lack of memoranda coming from government. That is not to say that the 
government has produced all of the memoranda that they are required to. The data 
here has been sourced from gov.uk and has been collected assuming that all 
memoranda have been published as required on that website. At the time of 
completion 90 memoranda had been published by government departments. 
Figure 4.2. Post-legislative memoranda published by government departments 
 
(Source: gov.uk) 
                                                     
16 The Department for Exiting the European Union and the Department for International Trade 
have been excluded from this study on the basis that at the time of writing they are two years old 
and their legislation is not eligible for post-legislative scrutiny, at least currently.  
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In order to understand why this post-legislative gap is occurring interviews were 
undertaken, with the clerks of two committees which have not engaged with post-
legislative scrutiny. These committees were the Education Committee and the 
Work and Pension Committee. In terms of the Education Committee, the clerk 
noted that they came very close to launching a post-legislative scrutiny inquiry into 
the Children and Families Act 2014 but due to the surprise calling of the 2017 
General Election this inquiry did not proceed (Ward, 2017). It remains to be seen 
whether this inquiry goes ahead in the 2017 Parliament. So there was a problem 
here of events taking over. This can be both political events like elections halting 
committee work or even new policy announcements which divert the attention of 
the committee away potentially from tasks such as post-legislative scrutiny. 
However, it appears that post-legislative scrutiny was on their agenda even if only 
lower down it. In terms of the Work and Pension Committee, attention is paid to 
what is likely to be published by the department in terms of post-legislative 
memoranda and discussions are held about what if anything the committee would 
like to move forward with but the committee does not usually make much further 
progress than that (Mellows-Facer, 2017). So it is clear that post-legislative scrutiny 
is on the minds of at least the secretariat but the committee does not make the 
leap into undertaking a full inquiry for a variety of reasons.  
There is also the potential for committee work programmes to be overtaken by 
parliamentary and legislative cycles, in the sense that once one bill has been passed 
work starts on the next (Ward, 2017). There is then a conveyer belt of legislation, 
which a) undertakes some of its own post-legislative review in terms of looking 
back at the previous Act and amending it through a new one and b) means post-
legislative scrutiny doesn’t take place as the legislation is not on the statute books 
long enough before the next piece of legislation comes along and supersedes it. 
Ward (2017) notes that the Department for Education has been in a state of 
permanent revolution since 2010 with a near constant cycle of legislation coming 
out of the department. This means there is plenty of material to potentially look at 
but also makes the job of undertaking post-legislative scrutiny more challenging if 
it is superseding earlier laws. It also potentially eliminates some legislation from 
the running for post-legislative scrutiny. This problem was also raised in relation 
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to the Work and Pensions Committee, in that nearly every year a new Pensions Bill 
appears, potentially superseding or dealing with the challenges presented in the 
previous Act. As a result, the government department does not produce a 
memorandum or a review as it claims it reviewed the legislation when crafting the 
new bill (Mellows-Facer, 2017).  
This does come down to power, to some extent, as the power to pull together and 
produce these memoranda rests with the government, and not parliament. 
Although parliament can call for papers they rely upon government for their 
production and for the information contained within them. While it was noted 
earlier that parliament has no coercive powers, it is also left weaker at being at an 
informational and resource disadvantage to government. In linking this back to 
the conceptual framework, access to information is a vital foundation for all 
scrutiny and the government led focus in terms of post-legislative scrutiny 
memoranda, could be a limitation to wanting to undertake it in the first place. In 
terms of power in this situation, parliament often relies upon convention and the 
creation of an obligation, and commitment from government what Lukes (1974) 
would term persuasion or manipulation. Boulding (1989) in Three Faces of Power 
refers to this as the kiss. Although, as the parliamentary reform literature notes, 
the government will be in no hurry to change this face and alter the balance of 
power (Kelso, 2009). This might to some extent explain the behaviour of 
committees over the lack of formal post-legislative scrutiny, although it should be 
noted that committees do not need a memorandum to launch a post-legislative 
scrutiny inquiry. 
That being said both clerks, Ward (2017) and Mellors-Facer (2017), argued that 
their committees had undertaken post-legislative scrutiny in other ways. For the 
Education Committee, this included a number of sessions they had on the work of 
the Children’s Commissioner for England which the clerk claimed had a clear and 
demonstrable link to the Children and Families Act 2014. In relation to the Work 
and Pensions Committee, Mellows-Facer (2017) argued that they did a lot of work 
that was driven by politics and driven by constituency mailbag issues. One of those 
issues related to the state pension age and the Women Against State Pension 
Inequality (WASPI) campaign. It was a very high profile politically driven inquiry 
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and in practice, a lot of what they focused upon was tantamount to looking at the 
legislation and whether it was achieving its objectives or whether policy was 
enacted in a way it ought to have been (Mellows-Facer, 2017). He argued that a lot 
of it was about communication and it bore quite a lot of the hallmarks of a post-
legislative scrutiny inquiry. He also noted that he didn’t think anyone involved was 
consciously thinking that at the time. However, in hindsight, you could see it in 
those terms (Mellows-Facer, 2017). This again highlights the issue that sometimes 
post-legislative scrutiny, especially if it is informal, is not located until after the 
inquiry has taken place and when committees are reporting back to the Liaison 
Committee at the end of a session. Both of these pieces of work were not picked 
up using the methods for identifying informal post-legislative scrutiny, although 
as was acknowledged in the methodology this was not a perfect method of 
detection, as informal post-legislative scrutiny is not easy to locate. This 
emphasises the need for additional research. They both specifically noted the 
challenges in identifying where post-legislative scrutiny has taken place. 
Ward (2017) also noted a problem of Members’ interest in relation to post-
legislative scrutiny and the potential lack of interest as Members often want to 
address and look at the symptoms of a problem rather than looking at the root 
causes. Indeed Mellows-Facer (2017) argues that post-legislative scrutiny is often 
way down on the list of priorities of members and because they only maybe spend 
a couple of hours a week on committee work, it never rises much higher on the list 
of priorities. Indeed, a survey undertaken by the Hansard Society in 2011 found that 
MPs spent only 14% of their time on committee work (Korris, 2011). This is in 
comparison to 21% of time being spent in the Chamber and 59% spent on 
constituency related issues (campaigning, casework, and meetings) (Korris, 2011). 
Ward (2017) argued that interest in the study or review of legislation and the 
legislative process is probably restricted to the Members who are lawyers or who 
are more technically minded (Ward, 2017). He suggested that they would never 
refer to an inquiry as post-legislative scrutiny as it was a sure way to turn off 
Members and potentially miss an opportunity for public engagement (Ward, 2017). 
Instead, he noted that mentions of post-legislative scrutiny would be placed in the 
terms of reference so that witnesses would understand how to approach the 
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inquiry. As committees are Member driven, Member interest is important in terms 
of determining committee behaviour. Additionally, in not actively labelling post-
legislative scrutiny just that, it becomes harder to locate where it is taking place.  
There is also an additional problem raised by Mellows-Facer (2017) which has 
impacted upon the Work and Pensions Committee at least, and that is in relation 
to the turnover of committee membership. Data from the Institute for Government 
shows that turnover on the Work and Pensions Committee in the 2010-2015 
Parliament was over 150%, which will have had a big impact upon the dynamic and 
interests of the Committee (Freeguard, 2015). That being said, the Justice 
Committee was active in terms of undertaking post-legislative scrutiny during the 
2010 Parliament but had a turnover of just over 140% (Freeguard, 2015). The chair 
of the Justice Committee at the time, however, was committed to undertaking 
post-legislative scrutiny which will have had an impact upon its prevalence here 
despite the turnover in Members (Beith, 2017). Turnover might not be the most 
important factor when determining whether to undertake post-legislative scrutiny, 
but if a chair is ambivalent to it, turnover is unlikely to help push it up the agenda. 
He argued that you may at the start of a parliament plan to address a particular Act 
a few years down the line but if a number of Members’ change (including those 
with the desire to do it) then that can cause a change to the work programme via 
Members’ priorities (Mellows-Facer, 2017). This potentially ties in with events 
discussed earlier and a high membership turnover makes planning and sticking to 
a long term work programme more challenging. Members’ interest is important 
here in determining committee behaviour but also in terms of new Members’ 
interests as they join committees and dilute the earlier interests.  
This, therefore, sheds some light on why post-legislative scrutiny in the case of the 
Education Committee has been limited. Ultimately it came down to events and 
Members’ interest but also potentially the hidden nature of such work, especially 
if it is informal. There may also be a perception gap in terms of recognising 
informal post-legislative scrutiny when it is taking place, as well as a broader post-
legislative scrutiny gap. In relation to the Work and Pensions Committee, in 
addition to the points raised above, the turnover of committee members has 
caused issues with long term planning. It is clear that both committee secretariats 
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have post-legislative scrutiny and their other core tasks in mind when trying to put 
together a work programme but the challenges outlined above have meant at least 
in terms of these committees, a post-legislative gap has been created.  
 
 Conclusion 
The chapter found that formal post-legislative scrutiny is the closest type to 
meeting the House of Lords’ recommended time frame for the undertaking of post-
legislative scrutiny. This is important because this timeframe, to an extent, 
underpins the current system of departmental review, and as a result post-
legislative scrutiny. In particular, it was found that those post-legislative scrutiny 
inquires which had received a memorandum in advance were much closer on 
average to meeting the recommended time frame. This could be explained by them 
having a greater access to information which as noted in the conceptual framework 
is a foundation of scrutiny, such additional information helps to trigger scrutiny. 
However, this will be because this is the type of post-legislative scrutiny that the 
recommendation is aimed at, as well as the nature of the inquiry and the new 
systematic memoranda process. 
It was also discovered that previous Labour Governments have been most likely to 
have their legislation reviewed under the new systematic approach to post-
legislative scrutiny. This can be explained by the fact that the system started under 
the 2005-2010 Labour Government. By 2010 there was an entire parliament’s worth 
of legislation to review. It was also noted that there was a lack of review taking 
place on the legislation from the 2010-2015 Coalition Government which is now 
within the recommended time frame for departmental review and thus post-
legislative scrutiny by committee.  This section also found that the two 
departments most likely to see their legislation receive post-legislative were the 
Ministry of Justice and the Home Office, which can in part be explained by the fact 
that they are also the two most legislatively intensive departments. 
Finally, this chapter addressed contentiousness and found that the majority of 
legislation that has received formal post-legislative scrutiny so far, has at least 
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some degree of contentiousness, whether that is a division being called at second 
and third reading or a rebellion. This is encouraging as contentious legislation is 
more likely to be protected by governments from over amendment and perhaps 
too detailed scrutiny. Such legislation is, therefore, more likely to warrant post-
legislative scrutiny. In addition to this, the chapter also discovered that there was 
a trend between the length of legislation and the number of sittings the bill has in 
committee. However, it was further noted that a larger number of sittings in 
committee does not necessarily mean more effective line by line scrutiny. 
This chapter addressed research questions one (c) and one (d), in so doing 
completing the assessment of the first research question relating to the 
extensiveness of post-legislative scrutiny in the UK Parliament. In particular, this 
chapter has made a contribution to the understanding of committee behaviour 
through the findings relating to the potentially biased selection of legislation. It 
has also made a practical contribution to the creation of an audit of post-legislative 
scrutiny undertaken by the UK Parliament. The next chapter moves on to address 
research question two in relation to the recommendations produced by post-
legislative scrutiny inquiries. Much of the data collected in this chapter feeds into 
the next, with some of the characteristics forming independent variables utilised 
in the regression analysis.  
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Chapter 5 The making and acceptance of post-
legislative scrutiny recommendations 
Post-legislative scrutiny has been, in various forms, a core function of select 
committees in the House of Commons since 2002. However, it is as yet unknown 
what kind of recommendations committees are making and what proportion of 
such recommendations are being accepted and rejected. The aim of this chapter is 
to fill this gap in knowledge. In particular this chapter aims to address the following 
research question: what recommendations have arisen from post-legislative 
scrutiny and how frequently have these recommendations been accepted by the 
government?  
Firstly, this chapter will assess the types and strength of recommendations made 
by committees before looking at the acceptance of these recommendations by the 
government. This will involve assessing descriptive statistics for both types of post-
legislative scrutiny; formal and informal. This is important on the basis that while 
this data has been available to collect for some time (mainly in post-legislative 
scrutiny inquiry reports published by committees), it has never been analysed 
before. If the UK Parliament is to continue to undertake post-legislative scrutiny 
and even expand its use, then there is a need to understand what exactly 
committees are recommending through their inquiries. This analysis will also 
include a comparison between departmental select committees in the House of 
Commons and ad hoc committees in the House of Lords for formal post-legislative 
scrutiny inquiries. This is important as currently it is not known what difference 
(if any) there is between the recommendations that the two Houses produce. 
Following this analysis, the chapter goes on to address the factors that impact upon 
the strength of recommendations made and whether or not the government 
accepts them, with the use of two regression models. These regression models will 
only include data for the formal post-legislative scrutiny inquiries. This is on the 
basis that informal post-legislative scrutiny only forms a small part of a broader 
committee inquiry and as such it is different from formal post-legislative scrutiny. 
From a practical position while there are a number of instances of informal post-
legislative scrutiny, the number of recommendations produced is limited and the 
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data is not yet suitable for a regression model. Additionally this area of post-
legislative scrutiny requires further research and further conceptualisation.  
This chapter contributes to the literature on the impact of parliamentary 
committees, in terms of the types of recommendations they make and whether 
they are accepted in relation to post-legislative scrutiny. It also contributes to our 
knowledge of committee behaviour in terms of understanding why they make 
recommendations they do, as well as the literature on post-legislative scrutiny as 
it is currently unknown what the outcomes of such scrutiny are. To an extent the 
chapter also contributes to the comparative study of post-legislative scrutiny by 
assessing how the UK’s post-legislative scrutiny system operates in practice. 
 
 Chapter methods 
This chapter features content analysis of committee reports and government 
responses. This involved the coding of 20 committee reports and 20 corresponding 
government responses from all the formal post-legislative scrutiny inquiries in 
both the House of Commons and House of Lords between 2005 and 2017. A further 
37 reports and responses from informal post-legislative scrutiny were also coded. 
However as the latter classifications are from committee inquires which were 
focused upon policy issues but included an element of post-legislative scrutiny, 
only the recommendations and conclusions relevant to post-legislative scrutiny 
were coded. 
The recommendations were selected from those appearing in the 
recommendation/conclusion section of a committee’s report. Before the coding of 
recommendations could begin an initial coding of these reports was necessary in 
order to establish which points were recommendations directed at central 
government and which points were not. However it should be noted that these 
codes were not utilised in the regression analysis that follows. This exercise was to 
finalise the list of recommendations utilised in the regression analysis. These 
points were coded using codes based upon those used by Russell & Benton (2011) 
as they allow for some level of comparison and expectation of what might be found 
with regards to post-legislative scrutiny. However, some of these codes have had 
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to be adapted and modified to fit with this particular study on post-legislative 
scrutiny because this study is more specific in its focus. This has been done by 
ensuring the code descriptions focus upon issues related to post-legislative 
scrutiny (e.g. implementation, repeal of an Act or the amendment of an Act). 
 
Recommendations and Conclusions: 
1. Expression of approval - conclusions which are positively phrased, 
praising a particular action, which do not formally recommend any 
further action. 
 
2. Expression of disapproval - conclusions which are negatively phrased, 
criticising a particular action, but which do not formally recommend any 
further action. 
 
3. Recommendation (Government) – for points which clearly call for the 
government or one of its executive agencies to act. This can include the 
formal phrase ‘we recommend’ however it can also appear in other forms 
such as suggesting an action should take place or a calling for 
clarification. This includes recommending no action be taken. 
 
4. Recommendation (Other) - for points which clearly call for an external 
body from UK central government to act (e.g. local authorities). This can 
include the formal phrase ‘we recommend’ however it can also appear in 
other forms such as suggesting an action should take place or a calling 
for clarification. This includes recommending no action be taken. 
 
5. Explaining or justifying another recommendation – for points which 
support, justify or provide background information for other 
recommendations without recommending anything else. 
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6. Other type of point – for all other points including introductory 
statements or factual statements or general conclusions. 
 
7. Not clear if a recommendation – for points that fall somewhere between 
a recommendation and a conclusion but do not express in strong, 
unambiguous terms for an action to be taken. 
 
Following this set of coding it was determined that some recommendations called 
for more than one action. In order to ensure that government responses could be 
matched correctly with recommendations, they were broken down into their 
various calls for action. Following this there were 504 recommendations in total 
(n=504) from formal post-legislative scrutiny and 131 from informal post-legislative 
scrutiny. In the first instance recommendations were coded on the type of action 
that they called for. The codes here were developed from those used by Russell and 
Benton (2011). Initially the same coding scheme was used but it was noted early on 
that some recommendations were not being covered by the scheme in place. Policy 
and practice was included as an additional category, this is on the basis that policy 
and legislation are not the same thing. Policy refers to the aims and approach that 
a government takes on an issue. While legislation might be necessary to implement 
policy, it is not always required. 
 
Type of Recommendation: 
1. Legislation – This category was used for recommendations explicitly 
calling for legislative action, including amendment or repeal of existing 
legislation, putting things on a ‘statutory footing’, and changes to 
secondary legislation. Where legislation might have been required to 
implement a recommendation, but this was not explicitly stated, this 
category was not used.  
 
2. Guidance - This includes recommendations for guidance, information 
or direction to be provided to any relevant bodies, including the NHS, 
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the Police, schools or local authorities. Again, although the word 
‘guidance’ was not necessarily required to be used in the 
recommendation, the requirement for guidance or direction needed to 
be quite explicit.  
 
3. Research or review - Recommendations which call on the 
government/parliament to investigate, conduct research, evaluations or 
impact assessments, trial, test, or for example set up a task force to 
review a policy area. Recommendations to government to ‘consider’ 
doing something were also placed in this category.  
 
4. Promotional or public information campaigns - This option applied to 
recommendations where the committee suggested raising public 
awareness or undertaking public engagement on a particular issue, such 
as a new initiative or public health crisis.  
 
5. Disclosure - Recommendations which ask government to make 
information more readily accessible, clearer, clarity, communicate 
better, or more complete, or call for new disclosure of information to 
the committee. 
 
6. Resources/Funding - As with legislation, this category was used for 
recommendations explicitly calling for (additional) funding or savings, 
including the continuation of funding for existing programmes or 
reallocation of funding. Recommendations which might have required 
funding to implement, but did not explicitly call for this, were not placed 
in this category.  
 
7. Attitude change - for recommendations couched in general terms and 
asking government to adopt a change in outlook or attitude.  
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8. Policy/Practice - This category was used for recommendations calling 
for a change in government approach to an issue but did not explicitly 
call for legislative change or funding. 
 
9. Recommendations from other bodies – this category was used for 
recommendations calling for the recommendations of other 
organisations to be implemented. 
 
10. Co-operation – This category was used for recommendations which 
called for greater cooperation between government departments (and 
their executive agencies), with other bodies such as local authorities or 
charities. 
 
11. Other - This category was used for any other recommendation where 
the action required was clearly set out, but did not fall into any of the 
other specified categories. There appeared to be no single obvious 
missing category among those placed under this one. 
 
12. More than one of the above17. 
 
The strength of action that the recommendation calls for in relation to the 
legislation being assessed was then coded. This employed a modified version of 
Russell and Benton’s (2011) coding scheme (no/small, medium and large change), 
with the scale increased to five on the basis of the types of changes that post-
legislative scrutiny calls for. The medium action category was expanded into three 
separate categories to account for the differences in action classified under the 
medium category (e.g. calls for more resources versus calls for the amendment of 
primary legislation). Additionally the no/small category has been separated into 
no action and small action, to account for the difference between no change and 
small change. 
                                                     
17 For the regression analysis, this category saw recommendations broken down into their 
constituent parts.  
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Strength of Recommendations:  
0. No Action – for recommendations which support or endorse existing 
policy and/or legislation. 
1. Small Action – for recommendations which call for information to be 
released, for guidance to be issued/amended and for reviews, 
assessments and further consideration to be taken. 
2. Lower Medium Action – for recommendations which call for a pause in 
a policy, for a pilot/trail run to be undertaken, for a change in procedure, 
for additional resources or training to be made available, for the 
implementation of parts of an Act and for existing legislation to be 
utilised. 
3. Mid-range Action – for recommendations which call for policy changes, 
new regulations or for regulations to be amended and for minor 
amendments to be made to an Act (e.g. for drafting purposes). 
4. Upper Medium Action – for recommendations which call for substantial 
amendments (relating to powers) or for the repeal of specific clauses of 
an Act, additionally for recommendations which call on the government 
to legislate but do not specifically call for primary legislation.  
5. Large Action – for recommendations that call for the repeal of all or part 
of an Act or for new legislation to be introduced.  
 
To code the government responses, each response was matched with the 
corresponding recommendation. As with the codes for type of recommendation 
and strength of recommendation, the codes for government acceptance were 
based upon those utilised by Russell & Benton (2011). Here the code descriptions 
have been altered slightly to ensure relevance for post-legislative scrutiny but the 
scale has not been increased as with strength of recommendation. 
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Government Acceptance:  
0. No response – for recommendations that did not receive a direct written 
response within the government’s response, or for recommendations 
which are not acknowledged explicitly or implicitly in the government’s 
response. 
1. Rejected outright – for recommendations where the government states 
that it rejects or disagrees or through its response signals outright 
rejection.  
2. Partially rejected – for recommendations that were part rejected and 
part ignored, or where the government dodged the point the 
recommendation made, including suggestions that the 
recommendation was not necessary. Additionally for recommendations 
where the government rejects but acknowledges frustration or where 
the government states that it has a policy/initiative (which is different 
to what the recommendation calls for) already in place to deal with the 
issue raised by the recommendation.  
3. Neither accepted nor rejected – for recommendations which received 
lukewarm support (e.g. saying the recommendation required further 
consideration) or where it is not clear whether the recommendation is 
accepted or rejected. 
4. Partially accepted – for recommendations where there was agreement 
with the general thrust (in principle) but not the finer detail which the 
committee called for. Also for recommendations which were accepted 
in part and ignored in part. Finally for recommendations where the 
government accepts the objective or principle of a recommendation but 
proposes an alternative policy or initiative to that recommended by the 
report. 
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5. Fully accepted – for recommendations where the government states that 
it accepts or agrees, or through its response signals full acceptance or for 
recommendations where the government claimed the committee’s 
demands were already in progress. 
 
As coding can be subjective it was important to ensure inter-coder reliability. To 
this end each of the recommendations and subsequent government responses 
included in the regression analysis (formal post-legislative scrutiny only) were 
double coded by the researcher to ensure that codes would not be changed upon a 
second reading of them. In addition to this measure a sample of the coding was 
blind checked by members of the supervisory team to further ensure coding 
reliability. For this sample, every third committee report and government response 
was blind checked. This is amounted to seven reports (35% of them overall).   
 
5.1.1 Regression analysis  
The independent variables18 utilised in the regression analysis are split into three 
categories: the committee level, the legislative level (used in both strength and 
acceptance models) and the recommendation level (used in the acceptance model 
only). At the committee level, variables included: opposition chairman; Joint 
Committee; Justice Committee, Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs 
Committee; Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee. These dummy 
variables were selected on the basis that they were included in the research of 
Russell and Benton (2011) and of Caygill (2014), however the types of committee 
selected here are based upon those committees that had undertaken post-
legislative scrutiny. The types of committee were included to assess whether any 
specific committees were significant in the acceptance (or indeed rejection) of 
recommendations. Finally whether committees had an opposition chairman, and 
                                                     
18 The following independent variables were not included due to problems with multicollinearity 
(as measured by the VIF diagnostics in SPSS): party of government (which introduced the 
legislation); departmental select committees (as a combined category, although individual 
committees were included); ad hoc committees; Culture, Media and Sport Committee; length of 
Act (in words); time difference between Royal Assent and post-legislative scrutiny and time spent 
in the House of Commons. 
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whether they had a government majority were included to explore the impact that 
they might have on the acceptance of recommendations. 
At the legislative level, variables included: number of sittings in committee stage 
(in the House of Commons)19; number of government defeats in the House of 
Lords20, contentiousness and whether those bills got caught in the wash-up periods 
before elections. These variables were included on the basis that post-legislative 
scrutiny addresses legislation and as such, what happened to those Acts as they 
passed through the legislative process might have an impact upon the 
recommendations committees make and the government’s acceptance of them. 
The number of sittings in committee could offer an insight into the depth of 
scrutiny an Act received as it passed through the House of Commons, and the 
number of defeats in the House of Lords could give an indication of the level of 
changes the Lords were willing to push for against the government’s wishes in 
order to improve the Act. The contentiousness of the legislation during the 
legislative process was included to determine the impact of this variable on the 
likely acceptance of recommendations. 
Finally, at the recommendation level, variables included the strength of 
recommendations and the different types of recommendations which include; 
action related to legislation; guidance; policy/procedural change; research; 
disclosure and resources. These variables were used by Benton and Russell (2013) 
and were included to explore the significance of the different types of 
recommendations upon their likely acceptance. 
 
 Formal post-legislative scrutiny 
This section will begin by assessing the recommendations arising from formal post-
legislative scrutiny inquiries. So far twenty formal post-legislative inquiries have 
                                                     
19 For this particular variable, the post-legislative scrutiny inquiry into adoption legislation 
reviewed two pieces of legislation. To deal with this an average was taken of the number of 
sittings in committee. It was determined to be the best way to move forward without excluding or 
skewing the data. 
20 Note the footnote above, this time in relation to the number of government defeats in the 
House of Lords. 
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taken place. The recommendations of these twenty reports (and the subsequent 
government responses) will be assessed in this section.  
5.2.1 Direction of recommendations21  
The data shows that 78% of recommendations are directed at central government, 
with a further 11% of recommendations directed at the executive agencies of the 
central government (89% in total). However what is more surprising is the 9% of 
recommendations (local government, other and professional bodies combined) 
which have been directed at bodies which are not directly accountable to the UK 
Parliament. While committees have the power to call for persons and papers, they 
often have to rely on their soft power, such as embarrassment and negative media 
attention in order to entice private witnesses to attend hearings and produce 
evidence (Gordon & Street, 2012). Additionally if the government does not provide 
papers, committees rely on the House of Commons as a whole to order their 
release. This could be problematic with majority governments. As noted earlier, 
they rely upon convention, obligation and commitment from government. The 
power over witnesses at parliament’s disposal are considered out of date and 
inoperable under human rights law (D’Arcy, 2012). Indeed White (2016) notes that 
‘historically, those found guilty of contempt could be fined or imprisoned, but 
those sanctions have not been used by the Commons since 1666 and 1880 
respectively’. It also raises questions about whether these recommendations are 
worthwhile making on the basis that these bodies are not directly accountable to 
the respective committees. However it could be argued that it is a way of placing 
them under pressure. This question cannot be answered by this study but requires 
more research and not just in relation to post-legislative scrutiny.  
 
5.2.2 Types of recommendation 
Table 5.1 shows the total number of recommendations coming from each of the 
twenty formal post-legislative scrutiny inquiries. Only 79 recommendations out of 
504 called for action related to legislation (16%). The table also shows that the most 
                                                     
21 For full table, see appendix 1, page 320 
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frequent type of recommendation called for, is a change in policy or practice, with 
39% of recommendations calling for such action. Policy is labelled differently to 
legislation as policy is a specific approach a government choses to take regarding 
an issue. While legislation can and does enact policy, policy can be implemented 
and changed without legislative measures. The second most frequent type of 
recommendation which committees called for was for research to be conducted or 
a more extensive review to be undertaken. 
In relation to legislative recommendations it might be expected that post-
legislative scrutiny would lead to more of them being made in comparison to other 
types of scrutiny. This is on the basis that post-legislative scrutiny is focused upon 
the implementation and operation of legislation, whether that is implementing an 
unimplemented part of an Act or amending or repealing part of an Act. That being 
said, legislative change is arguably the most costly for governments in terms of 
time and political capital. This figure is in comparison to Benton & Russell (2013), 
who found only 4% of recommendations called for legislative change, across seven 
committees suggesting that post-legislative scrutiny leads to an increase in 
legislative recommendations. 
Table 5.1. Type of recommendation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (CLG (2013); CMS (2009, 2012); EFRA (2008a, 2016b, 2017c); H (2013); HA (2014b); JCHR 
(2014a); J (2012, 2013a, 2015); PACA (2013a, 2013c); SCAL (2013); SCEL (2015); SCEAD (2016); SCIA 
(2014); SCLA (2017); SCMCA (2014)) 
 
Code No. % 
Policy/Practice 199 39 
Research/Review 85 17 
Legislative 79 16 
Disclosure 39 8 
None of the above 19 4 
Guidance 18 4 
More than one of the above 14 3 
Recommendation to other bodies 14 3 
Co-operation with other bodies 13 4 
Resources/Funding 13 3 
Campaigns/Public Information 11 2 
 Total 504 100 
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With regards to policy change recommendations (which did not require legislative 
change) being made most frequently, this can be explained by the fact that getting 
a government to change the law is a costly way to spend political capital. 
Committees therefore focus on what they are more likely to achieve, reinforcing 
the idea that politics is the art of the possible. Weaker recommendations are also 
more likely to be made if a committee struggles to find a consensus for stronger 
action. In relation to recommendations calling for research and review this figure 
of 17% is lower than the 23% figure that Benton & Russell (2013) found in their 
study.  
 
5.2.3 Strength of recommendation22 
When assessing strength of recommendations, the data showed that 41% of 
recommendations stemming from formal post-legislative scrutiny inquiries called 
for little or no action on behalf of the government. In total, those 
recommendations which called for some kind of medium (lower, mid-range and 
upper) action (e.g. change in policy or a change in regulations) totalled 58% and 
there were only seven recommendations out of 504 (1%) that were classified as 
calling for a large action (e.g. new primary legislation).  
In terms of the figure for recommendations calling for little or no action, it is 
similar to what Benton & Russell (2013) found in their study (40% of 
recommendations calling for small or no action). Although the coding schemes 
have been altered slightly for this study, it is still possible to compare generally. 
The data from this study showed that committees tend to focus their 
recommendations on calling for small and medium action; this could be a response 
to knowing they do not have the power to force the government to accept and 
implement their recommendations. This reflects the reality of scrutiny and the 
power relations between the executive and legislature in comparison to what is 
written about scrutiny conceptually (i.e. it is the difference between scrutiny in 
theory and scrutiny in practice). All committees have is the power to persuade and 
                                                     
22 For the full table, see appendix 2, page 320 
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influence opinion (soft power) (Russell, 1986; Gordon & Street, 2012). One way of 
explaining this particular behaviour of committees is that they wish to hedge their 
bets and recommend small and medium actions which are more likely to be 
accepted and implemented and thus have an impact. This is a strategy 
acknowledged by both Aldons (2000) and Benton & Russell (2013). Perhaps one of 
the reasons the government helped to develop the current system of post-
legislative scrutiny was on the basis that it would not cede power to parliament 
and any action following such scrutiny is entirely up to the government to decide. 
Such reforms were evolutionary and did not come following a critical juncture 
(Kelso, 2009; Collier & Collier, 1991), at least in terms of a particularly poor batch 
of legislation or legislative failure.  
 
5.2.4 Government acceptance of recommendations23 
In relation to the government acceptance of recommendations, the data shows that 
39% of recommendations were accepted (either in full or in part). The data also 
showed that 36% of recommendations were rejected at least in part, if not outright. 
Finally the data showed that 10% of recommendations did not receive a direct 
response, in the government responses to the committee reports. 
This is comparable with what Benton & Russell (2013) found in their study into the 
impact of oversight committees that 40% of recommendations went on to be 
accepted. This can be explained by the fact the majority of recommendations called 
for small or medium action. 
With regards to the figure for no response, 10%, this is potentially a significant 
finding, as a substantial proportion of recommendations have not received a 
response from the government. There is also a general problem with the way in 
which some government departments respond to committee reports. Some 
responses are very long winded and it is not clear what the government intends to 
                                                     
23 For full table, see appendix 3, page 320 
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do with the recommendation. This may be a strategy by the government to skirt 
around issues which it does not want to tackle head on.  
However the government should ensure that it directly responds to each 
recommendation and states clearly what it intends to do. This would help with 
accountability further down the line when a committee might follow up on 
recommendations that the government has accepted in order to check to see 
whether they have been implemented. Accountability, as noted in the conceptual 
framework section of chapter two, is operationalised within post-legislative 
scrutiny and forms an important part of that scrutiny. This is especially true in 
relation to the responsibility of government to respond to parliamentary reports. 
The accountability relationship between government and parliament is important 
for the operation of select committees across their core functions. However 
committees also need to ensure that the recommendations they produce clearly 
call for specific action (White, 2015a), in order to allow the government to respond 
effectively. There were some recommendations that were hard to follow and 
determine exactly what the committee wanted. However, it could also be a case of 
committees struggling to come to a decision on a single call for action and the 
compromise to make the recommendation acceptable to the whole committee 
means a loss of directness in terms of the action called for. 
 
5.2.5 Acceptance by strength of recommendations 
Having assessed the strength and acceptance of recommendations separately, it is 
also important to assess if there is a relationship between the strength of 
recommendations and their acceptance by government. This is important to 
identify whether there is a trend in relation to stronger recommendations being 
rejected. Later in this chapter the regression analysis will assess how significant the 
relationship is between the strength of recommendations and their acceptance. 
Table 5.2 shows that recommendations are more likely to be accepted if they call 
for small or medium action, with those calling for greater action more likely to be 
rejected. There is more variation however in terms of recommendations which are 
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partially accepted and partially rejected. When it comes to recommendations 
calling for no and small action 64% and 53% of them respectively are either 
accepted in part or in full. ‘No action’ was included in the table above because 
although committees have called for no action to be taken, they often pass 
commentary in such recommendations and as such the government does 
sometimes respond to that commentary. For recommendations which are 
classified under lower medium, 44% are being accepted in part or in full and 35% 
are being rejected in part or in full.  
Table 5.2. Acceptance by strength of recommendations as a percentage (%) 
  
No 
response 
Rejected 
outright  
Partially 
rejected 
Neither 
accepted 
nor 
rejected 
Partially 
accepted 
Fully 
accepted 
n 
 
 
% 
No action 27 0 9 0 9 55 11 100 
Small 
action 
11 15 8 13 15 38 
194 
100 
Lower 
Medium 
action 
13 22 13 8 14 30 
86 
100 
Mid-
Range 
action 
10 34 9 20 9 18 
158 
100 
Upper 
Medium 
action 
2 52 15 15 13 4 
48 
100 
Large 
action 
0 71 14 14 0 0 
7 
100 
 
Source: (CLG (2013); CMS (2009, 2012); CO, (2013); DCLG, (2013); DCMS, (2009; 2013); DfE, 
(2013); DH, (2013); EFRA (2008a; 2008b; 2017a; 2017b, 2017c); H (2013); HA (2014a; 2015); HO, 
(2014; 2015b; 2017); JCHR (2014a); J (2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2015); MoJ (2012; 2014a; 2015); MoJ & HA, 
(2014);  PA (2013a, 2013b, 2013c); SCAL (2013); SCEL (2015); SCEAD (2016); SCIA (2014); SCLA 
(2017); SCMCA (2014)); WEO, (2016a). 
Additionally, when focusing on the recommendations which call for stronger 
action a greater percentage are rejected either in part or in full. For mid-range 
action 43% are rejected, as opposed to 27% which are accepted. Mid-range also 
sees the largest number of recommendations which are neither accepted nor 
rejected. When it comes to recommendations classified under upper medium, 67% 
were rejected in part or in full in comparison to 17% of which that were accepted 
in part or in full. On recommendations calling for large action, which included the 
repeal of legislation and calls for new legislation, although there are only seven 
168 
such recommendations, none were accepted in part or in full. Another interesting 
finding here is that the government is responding to committee recommendations 
which require no action to be taken. These recommendations are usually in favour 
of the status quo.  
With regards to the figures for mid-range action in relation to neither accepted nor 
rejected, this can potentially be explained by the fact that at this level of strength 
the government may wish to delay the issue and hope that the committee forgets. 
There is thus a stronger tendency to reject recommendations which are calling for 
large action than there is to accept recommendations which are calling for limited 
action. This again is perhaps to be expected as the government would probably 
rather not make changes to policy unless it felt it absolutely necessary, either 
because there is a problem or because they want to accept weaker 
recommendations in order to cover themselves for rejecting stronger 
recommendations later in a report. While this does not prove that such a strategy 
is deployed by committees, the data might provide a reason for why committees 
may wish to deploy such a strategy. Again this goes to show that parliament is a 
relatively weak position as it cannot coerce or force the government to accept 
recommendations (Gordon & Street, 2012). Committees will want to develop a 
strategy to persuade government to accept recommendations and to get a 
commitment from them. 
 
5.2.6 Acceptance by type of recommendations 
Table 5.3 shows the acceptance of recommendations by the type of 
recommendation that committees have called for.  
In terms of recommendations calling for change relating to legislation and its 
implementation, 59% of recommendations were rejected in full or in part while 
20% of these recommendations were accepted in part or in full. In terms of the 
issuance of guidance, 61% of those recommendations were accepted either in part 
or in full while 33% were rejected either in part of in full. For recommendations 
which called for further research to be undertaken or a review to take place 45% of 
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those recommendations were accepted either in part or in full while 25% of them 
were rejected either in part or in full. Recommendations calling for public 
information campaigns saw 54% of them accepted either in part or in full and 
surprisingly for recommendations calling for additional resources and/or funding 
53% of them were accepted in part or in full while 31% of them were rejected in 
part or in full. In terms of changes to government policy or the practice of that 
policy 41% of recommendations were rejected either in part or in full in comparison 
to 34% of which were accepted either in part or in full. 
In relation to legislative recommendations, the rejection of them can be explained 
by the fact that changing legislation is going to take up time and resources from 
the government. There is therefore a resource problem both from the 
government’s perspective but also from a committee perspective too. New 
amendments to an Act require new legislation, whether it is attaching an 
amendment to a bill currently making its way through the legislative process or 
introducing an amending act. If such resources are necessary, it would be expected 
that the government would be more likely to reject them. With regards to 
resources and funding these findings are surprising on the basis that whatever 
resources a committee is recommending be made available is going to cost money. 
It might, therefore, be expected that the government would try to avoid spending 
(although this would ultimately depend upon the scale of resources required). 
Indeed, White (2015a) notes that recommendations need to be financially realistic. 
However, it might be the case that an increase in resources is more preferable to a 
change in policy or legislation. Finally, in terms of recommendations calling for 
policy change, the findings are surprising as you might expect the government to 
be wary about changing policy unless it felt it absolutely necessary on the basis 
that once a government has formally backed a policy it is unlikely to want to appear 
to U-turn on any of it. Such recommendations were more likely to be rejected, 
although only just and it could be a reflection that the policy/practice changes 
suggested were small. 
 
 
170 
Table 5.3. Acceptance by type of recommendation as a percentage (%) 
 No 
response 
Rejected 
outright 
Partially 
rejected 
Neither 
accepted 
nor 
rejected 
Partially 
accepted 
Fully 
accepted 
n 
% 
Change relating to legislation (and its implementation) 1 46 13 20 10 10 79 100 
Issuing of Guidance 0 11 22 5 17 44 18 100 
Research or Review 15 19 6 16 11 34 85 100 
Campaigns or Public Information 9 0 18 18 18 36 11 100 
Disclosure of Information 10 13 8 13 5 51 39 100 
Resources or Funding 15 31 0 0 15 38 13 100 
Changes to policy or practice 11 30 11 15 14 20 199 100 
Recommendations from other bodies 7 21 7 7 14 43 14 100 
Cooperation with other organisations 8 0 15 8 23 46 13 100 
 
Source: (CLG (2013); CMS (2009, 2012); CO, (2013); DCLG, (2013); DCMS, (2009; 2013); DfE, (2013); DH, (2013); EFRA (2008a; 2008b; 2017a; 2017b, 2017c); H (2013); 
HA (2014a; 2015); HO, (2014; 2015b; 2017); JCHR (2014a); J (2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2015); MoJ (2012; 2014a; 2015); MoJ & HA, (2014);  PA (2013a, 2013b, 2013c); SCAL (2013); 
SCEL (2015); SCEAD (2016); SCIA (2014); SCLA (2017); SCMCA (2014); WEO, (2016a)).
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5.2.7 Comparison between the House of Commons and House of 
Lords 
This section assesses whether there are any differences between the 
recommendations produced by departmental select committees and ad hoc 
committees, as well as any differences between the proportion of these 
recommendations being accepted or rejected. In terms of the breakdown of full 
formal post-legislative scrutiny, the House of Commons has undertaken thirteen 
inquires and the House of Lords has undertaken six. There was also one inquiry 
undertaken by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. As this cannot be placed in 
either category, it is not included in this section of analysis.  
Table 5.4. Type of recommendations by House24 
Type of Recommendation 
House of 
Commons House of Lords 
 N % N % 
Policy and Practice 85 37 111 48 
Research/Review 58 25 25 11 
Related to legislation 30 13 49 21 
Disclosure  22 10 14 8 
Co-operation 10 4 3 1 
Recommendations from other bodies 9 4 3 1 
Funding and resources  8 3 5 3 
Campaigns/Public information 5 2 5 2 
Guidance 3 1 15 6 
Total 250 100 231 100 
Source: (CLG (2013); CMS (2009, 2012); EFRA (2008a, 2016b, 2017c); H (2013); HA (2014b); JCHR 
(2014a); J (2012, 2013a, 2015); PACA (2013a, 2013c); SCAL (2013); SCEL (2015); SCEAD (2016); SCIA 
(2014); SCLA (2017); SCMCA (2014)) 
 
Before delving into the recommendations produced, it is worth mentioning the 
average number of post-legislative recommendations (directed at central 
government) that departmental select committees in the Commons and ad hoc 
committees in the Lords make. On average committees in the House of Commons 
produce 19 recommendations per report in comparison to 41 recommendations per 
report made by Lords committees. This difference can be accounted for by the ways 
in which the two different types of committees undertake post-legislative scrutiny. 
                                                     
24 Note that the Joint Committee inquiry is not included here due to the committee not belonging 
to either chamber. 
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Unlike departmental select committees which have a large range of tasks, ad hoc 
committees have (usually) only the one task they were set up to undertake. They 
are, therefore, able to dedicate a full session to the inquiry and produce more 
detailed scrutiny. This in turn would the lead to a larger, more in-depth report with 
a greater proportion of recommendations than departmental select committees 
can make in the comparatively short time they have available among their other 
functions. 
Table 5.4 shows the types of recommendations being made by both Houses of 
Parliament. Firstly the table shows that proportionally the ad hoc committees of 
the House of Lords are making more recommendations calling for action in 
relation to legislation. The table also shows that the ad hoc committees of the 
House of Lords are producing more recommendations relating to policy and 
practice 
In relation to the production of more recommendations calling for action relating 
to legislation, this can be explained by the fact that the ad hoc committees that the 
House of Lords appoint to undertake post-legislative scrutiny are usually 
comprised of some members who have a first-hand experience of working in the 
specific area under review. Additionally the House of Lords often takes a more 
technical approach to scrutiny, as it does with the full line by line scrutiny it 
undertakes during the formal legislative process. Such technical scrutiny and 
professional knowledge of whether the Act is working as intended will lead to more 
legislative recommendations. 
With regards to ad hoc committees producing more policy related 
recommendations, this could be a reflection that the House of Lords is willing to 
pressure the government with stronger recommendations on the basis that they 
can emphasise their expertise and experience. This is especially true if there are 
Members on a committee with particular experience of working in the field under 
examination, which would lead such reports and recommendations to carry more 
weight. For example, the Equality Act 2010 and Disabilities Committee included 
Peers who were disabled as well as disability campaigners and the Select 
Committee on Adoption was chaired by a former high court judge and had former 
 173 
social workers among its Members. Additionally, House of Lords committees are 
not as prominent in the media as departmental select committees are. They may 
feel as if there is no need to develop a strategy of producing weaker 
recommendations as outlined by Benton & Russell (2013) because they do not need 
to project influence. Additionally, these committees disband after they report so 
there is no relationship to maintain and no continued media image to promote. 
However, it can be argued that departmental select committees have expertise as 
they shadow government departments and can call in expert witnesses, although 
those expert witnesses are not likely to be there when the committee is formally 
preparing its recommendations. Russell (2013) also argues that these committees 
benefit from the expertise that MPs bring as elected representatives.  
Finally, there is also a difference in terms of recommendations calling for research 
and review, with the Lords calling for fewer such recommendations. This may be 
explained by the fact that committees in the Lords are able to hold an inquiry over 
an entire session and as such have more time to undertake more detailed review 
and potentially reach firmer conclusions than committees in the Commons. 
Table 5.5. Strength of recommendations by House 
Strength of 
Recommendation 
House of 
Commons House of Lords 
  N % N % 
No 9 4 2 1 
Small 98 39 90 37 
Lower Medium  41 16 43 18 
Mid-range 74 30 82 34 
Upper Medium  35 10 23 9 
Large 3 1 4 2 
 Total 250 100 244 100 
 
Source: (CLG (2013); CMS (2009, 2012); EFRA (2008a, 2016b, 2017c); H (2013); HA (2014b); JCHR 
(2014a); J (2012, 2013a, 2015); PACA (2013a, 2013c); SCAL (2013); SCEL (2015); SCEAD (2016); SCIA 
(2014); SCLA (2017); SCMCA (2014)) 
 
Table 5.5 shows that there is only a limited difference between the House of 
Commons and the House of Lords in relation to the strength of the 
recommendations that committees in both Houses are producing. This suggests 
that there is some consistency in terms of the strength of recommendations that 
are produced in both Houses. Aldons (2000) and Benton & Russell (2013) argue 
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that committees use a strategy of producing weaker recommendations so that the 
government accepts more of them and as a result they appear more influential. 
Interviews with committee clerks revealed that they sometimes take into account 
what the government will likely accept and reject before making recommendations 
(Flood, 2017; Collon, 2017a). Again, this highlights the fact that committees do not 
have the coercive (hard) powers to force governments to accept recommendations; 
they can only persuade (Gordon & Street, 2012). 
Table 5.4 showed a larger proportion of recommendations calling for some kind of 
legislative action coming from the House of Lords, which are classed as stronger 
recommendations. However, with few recommendations calling for large action 
and similar proportions of recommendations calling for mid-range and upper 
medium action, it appears that the legislative recommendations that the House of 
Lords are making are not strong.  
Table 5.6 shows there were fewer recommendations that did not receive a response 
from the government in the House of Lords than there were in the House of 
Commons. The table also shows a greater proportion of House of Lords 
recommendations being rejected outright. Additionally, the data showed a greater 
proportion of recommendations being accepted outright in the House of 
Commons than in the House of Lords. 
Table 5.6. Government acceptance of recommendations by House 
Acceptance of 
Recommendations 
House of 
Commons House of Lords 
  N % N % 
No response 38 15 13 5 
Reject outright 60 24 68 28 
Reject partly 22 9 26 11 
Neither accept nor reject 36 14 35 14 
Accept partly 22 9 41 17 
Accept outright 72 29 61 25 
Total 213 100 194 100 
Source: (CO, (2013); DCLG, (2013); DCMS, (2009; 2013); DfE, (2013); DH, (2013); EFRA, (2008b, 
2017b 2017b); HA, (2015); HO, (2014, 2015b, 2017); J, (2013b); MoJ (2012; 2014a; 2015); MoJ & HA, 
(2014); PA, (2013b); WEO, (2016a). 
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With regards to fewer Lords recommendations receiving no response, this is 
surprising as ad hoc committees dissolve following the publication of their report 
and as such the committee is not constituted to receive the response, scrutinise it 
and follow up with the government like departmental select committees can. 
However, the House of Lords Liaison Committee does follow up on behalf of ad 
hoc committees on priority recommendations. It’s also likely that the Lords are 
producing clearer recommendations as committees are more likely to reach 
evidence based consensus due to the nature of the House and its membership.  
The reasons for a greater proportion of recommendations receiving no response in 
the House of Commons can be explained by the government wanting to delay 
dealing with an issue as departmental select committees can hold government 
departments directly accountable. Departmental select committees do not have a 
follow up procedure like the House of Lords Liaison Committee when it comes to 
government responses. The government may therefore feel like it doesn’t need to 
respond as effectively. That being said they do have an obligation to respond fully 
to committee reports. Again as has been noted already, responsibility and 
accountability do underpin these operations. It should be noted however that there 
is an issue with the ability of departmental select committees to undertake follow 
up work on top of the other inquiries and business they are trying to get through. 
Workload and available resources are important factors here. 
In relation to a greater proportion of Lords’ recommendations being rejected 
outright, part of this difference might be explained by the higher proportion of 
recommendations receiving no response in the House of Commons (i.e. the 
government might ignore recommendations so it doesn’t have to reject them). The 
government may feel it is easier to reject recommendations in the Lords than the 
Commons and as such in the Commons it may ignore recommendations so a 
formal rejection does not have to be made. 
In terms of a greater proportion of Commons recommendations being accepted 
outright, there is no obvious explanation for this as the strength of 
recommendations are quite similar between both Houses. However, it could be an 
indication that departmental select committees have produced recommendations 
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more palatable to the government because they tend to have a working 
relationship with their respective departments. Indeed White (2015c) noted that 
productive relationships are important if committees do not want to see their 
recommendations disregarded. These relationships are vitally important for 
committees that rely on the power of persuasion (soft power) (Heywood, 2012). 
That being said, the House of Lords shows a greater proportion of 
recommendations being accepted in part. Indeed taking into account both 
accepted in part and in full, the House of Commons sees a similar proportion 
accepted as the House of Lords (38% and 42% respectively). There is a difference 
however between the combined percentages for rejected in part and in full which 
shows 33% and 39% respectively. Overall the House of Lords sees more of a balance 
in the percentage accepted and rejected in comparison to the House of Commons 
which sees more recommendations being accepted than rejected.  
Having assessed the recommendations and acceptance for formal post-legislative 
scrutiny, the chapter moves on to address the descriptive statistics for informal 
post-legislative scrutiny as well. While the focus of this research is to undertake a 
systematic review of formal post-legislative scrutiny, it is necessary to address the 
recommendations being made through other types. Even though they did not 
come from a formal inquiry into an Act, as they still form part of the broader post-
legislative scrutiny processes within the UK Parliament.  
 
 Informal post-legislative scrutiny  
This section will address the types, strength and government acceptance of 
recommendations from 37 informal post-legislative scrutiny inquires. These are 
preliminary findings as this type of post-legislative scrutiny requires further 
conceptualisation and further research. 
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5.3.1 Types of recommendation 
Table 5.7 shows the pattern of recommendations produced by informal post-
legislative scrutiny. The table shows that there is a greater proportion of 
recommendations relating to legislation coming from informal post-legislative 
scrutiny in comparison to formal. There are also fewer policy related 
recommendations coming from informal post-legislative scrutiny. One interesting 
finding is the proportion of disclosure recommendations coming from informal 
post-legislative scrutiny, this is a higher proportion than for formal post-legislative 
scrutiny. 
Table 5.7. Type of recommendation (informal) 
  Informal 
Code N % 
Research/Review 39 29 
Policy and Practice 33 25 
Related to legislation 27 20 
Disclosure 17 13 
More than one of the above 8 6 
Campaigns/Public information 3 2 
Guidance 2 1 
Recommendations from other bodies 2 1 
Funding and resources 1 1 
Co-operation 1 1 
None of the above 1 1 
 Total 134 100 
 
Source: (BEIS (2017a); BIS (2008, 2012a, 2013); CLG (2014a, 2017); CMS (2007, 2008, 2010, 2013a, 
2013b, 2014a); D (2016a); D, FA, ID and TI (2007); EFRA (2013a, 2014a, 2016a); EA (2014a); H 
(2010); HA (2008a, 2008b, 2012, 2014a, 2016a, 2016b); ID (2016a); JCHR (2007a, 2008a, 2009, 
2011, 2014b); NIA (2013a); PE & WE (2017a); PACA (2009); WE (2016, 2017a, 2017b)). 
 
In relation to a greater proportion of recommendations relating to legislation 
coming from informal post-legislative scrutiny, this could reflect the nature of 
informal post-legislative scrutiny. This type of scrutiny forms only a very small part 
of an inquiry and does not usually produce many recommendations. Committees 
may wish to get straight to the point regarding any legislative challenges. As 
scrutiny of the Acts will not be deep, there may be an assumption that any 
problems are with the Act. As post-legislative scrutiny does focus upon legislation, 
the focus of a committee might be on whether the Act is working as intended in 
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relation to the inquiry they are undertaking and as such might focus upon 
legislative outcomes. This assumes that committees are viewing such scrutiny as 
post-legislative scrutiny.  
Fewer policy related recommendations coming from informal post-legislative 
scrutiny might be explained by the lack of detailed scrutiny that informal post-
legislative scrutiny provides because it does form a small part of a committee’s 
inquiry. This is in comparison to a larger proportion of such recommendations 
coming from formal post-legislative scrutiny.  
Finally in terms of the proportion of disclosure recommendations coming from 
informal post-legislative scrutiny, the committees undertaking this type of post-
legislative scrutiny may feel as if they needed more information in relation to the 
Act and its surrounding policy.  
 
5.3.2 Strength of recommendations (informal)25 
The data for strength of recommendations showed that 49% of recommendations 
called for little or no action. This is a large difference in comparison to formal post-
legislative scrutiny. In relation to the data for recommendations calling for small 
action, this could again be providing evidence of a strategy deployed by 
committees to produce weaker recommendations in order to have more of them 
accepted. Without judging the rest of the non-post-legislative scrutiny elements of 
the report, the same cannot be said for the reports as a whole. This reflects the lack 
of time spent on post-legislative scrutiny during these reports, and the committee 
wishing to keep stronger amendments for the broader aspects of the inquiry.  
Recommendations calling for medium (lower, mid-range, upper) action (e.g. 
changes to policy or new regulations) totalled 49%. This figure is 9% less than for 
formal post-legislative scrutiny and can be accounted for through the larger 
proportion of recommendations calling for no or small action. There is similarity 
between both types of post-legislative scrutiny with only 1% of recommendations 
                                                     
25 For the full table, see appendix 4, page 321.  
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calling for large action. This is further evidence of committees avoiding 
recommendations calling for large change and could be a sign of a deliberate 
strategy being at play.  
 
5.3.3 Government acceptance of recommendations (informal)26 
The data for government acceptance showed that 3% of recommendations from 
informal post-legislative scrutiny are not receiving a direct response from the 
government, this is in comparison to the number of non-responses for formal post-
legislative scrutiny (10%). However the data shows that there is a greater 
proportion of recommendations that are neither accepted nor rejected (25%) 
especially in comparison to the proportions for formal post-legislative scrutiny 
(15%). In terms of the acceptance (in part and in full) and the rejection (in part and 
in full) of recommendations the data shows a greater proportion of those 
recommendations being accepted than rejected (44% accepted, 28% rejected). 
The findings in relation to the lower proportion of no responses will be related to 
the style of post-legislative scrutiny. Here it forms a small part of a broader inquiry 
and as such the recommendations are couched around other non-post-legislative 
scrutiny related recommendations and the government might not feel under so 
much pressure regarding the Act. Additionally, it may be a result of the 
relationship between some of the committees and the government on the basis 
that, as was noted in previous chapters, this type of post-legislative scrutiny also 
include committees which have not undertaken formal post-legislative scrutiny.  
With regards to the greater proportion of recommendations that are neither 
accepted nor rejected, this is an indication that while the government is 
responding to more recommendations they are at the same time being more non-
committal to the ones they are responding to and as such hoping to delay taking 
action on those issues. In terms of the greater proportion of recommendations 
being accepted, this is due to the types of recommendations that informal inquiries 
were making with a greater percentage of recommendations calling for little or no 
                                                     
26 For the full table, see appendix 5, page 321. 
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action (49%). It is much easier to accept recommendations which do not require 
the government to do much. 
This section has been important in assessing the type, strength and acceptance of 
recommendations published by committees that have undertaken informal post-
legislative scrutiny. However, informal post-legislative scrutiny will not form part 
of further analysis into post-legislative scrutiny, but this type of post-legislative 
scrutiny does require further research. Throughout the thesis thus far, it has been 
important to address this type of post-legislative scrutiny as it is one of two routes 
that committees take when undertaking post-legislative scrutiny, even if it is not 
necessarily as visible as formal post-legislative scrutiny. The next section moves on 
to analyse some of the factors that impact upon the strength and acceptance of 
recommendations coming from formal post-legislative scrutiny inquiries. 
 
 Factors that impact upon the strength and acceptance of 
recommendations 
Before going on to outline the findings from the two regression models it is first 
important to hypothesise what we might expect to see from previous studies 
regarding the relationship between some of the independent variables and the 
dependent variables of strength of recommendation and government acceptance.  
Benton & Russell’s (2013) study and the methods deployed by the studies discussed 
earlier in the thesis have been used as a foundation for this research. Benton & 
Russell’s (2013) study did not address what factors might impact upon the strength 
of recommendations however they did address the factors that impact upon 
government acceptance. Some of the variables for this study have therefore been 
identified based on the findings of Benton and Russell (2013). As noted in the 
methods section of this chapter, the independent variables used in this study have 
been drawn from the committee level, the recommendation level and the 
legislative level, with the committee and legislative level variables being utilised as 
variables for strength of recommendations as well.  
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5.4.1 Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses have been made in relation to the independent and 
dependent variables assessed in the subsequent regression analysis. 
Committees chaired by opposition MPs have previously been found to be a 
statistically significant predictor in terms of opposition chairs being more 
successful than government chairs in getting their recommendations 
implemented. Benton & Russell (2013) found this in their study on the impact of 
parliamentary oversight committees and it was also found by the present 
researcher during a study into post-legislative scrutiny in the Scottish Parliament 
(Caygill, 2014). However, the latter found it statistically significant on the 
acceptance of recommendations. Benton & Russell (2013) included the variable on 
the basis that they expected government chairs would have a higher level of success 
(in getting their recommendations implemented). In fact they found the opposite 
and suggested that it might be a result of opposition chairs perhaps working harder 
to build consensus and make reasoned amendments based on evidence in order to 
avoid appearing too obstructive. It might be expected in cases where committee 
chairs are wanting to have influence, that they might take a more conciliatory tone 
with the recommendations that they propose. This could also be a result of an 
opposition chair working with a government majority. It is argued that the 
strength committees have comes from their unanimity, if it can be achieved 
(Rogers & Walters, 2015; White, 2015a). It is also argued that in the hunt for 
unanimity, recommendations can get watered down and become quite bland 
(White, 2015c). This ensures they are more palatable to the government and makes 
them weaker and therefore more likely to be accepted. As such the following 
hypothesis has been made: 
H1 - Committees chaired by opposition MPs will be more likely to see 
recommendations accepted than government chairs.  
 
Committees with a government majority might produce recommendations more 
favourable to the government. This is not a variable that Benton & Russell (2013) 
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included in their study but was used by the present author in his study on post-
legislative scrutiny in the Scottish Parliament (Caygill, 2014). Although committees 
are supposed to work consensually, party politics will still be present and will play 
a role from time to time (White, 2015a), especially if junior members are seeking a 
future ministerial career. Government backbenchers may therefore be more likely 
to propose recommendations that are more acceptable to the government or ask 
others to be reworded in order to be less critical and or demanding. Indeed, the 
hunt for consensus can lead to a watering down of amendments and an airbrushing 
of dissent (White, 2015c). As committees vote on a paragraph by paragraph basis 
on reports (Rogers & Walters, 2015), if government backbenchers are in the 
majority they would have the ability to vote down parts of reports that they do not 
like or amend a report via votes. However, it should be noted that a good chair will 
avoid division, which could mean (depending upon the strength of feeling) that 
government backbenchers can have parts of reports removed in order to achieve 
consensus. With more effectiveness coming from consensus being struck (Rogers 
& Walters, 2015), such changes are likely to be made. It is also likely that a 
committee with a governing majority will be seen more favourably than a 
committee without one.  
H2 - Committees with a government majority will be more likely to make 
recommendations that the government accepts. 
 
Benton & Russell (2013) noted in their research that committees deploy a strategy 
of producing weaker recommendations so that the government is willing to accept 
more of them and as a result make committees appear more influential. This is also 
a strategy that is acknowledged by Aldons (2000). This strategy is expected to have 
developed due to an unwillingness from the government to accept 
recommendations that are calling for substantial changes in legislation. This 
relates to the power balance between parliament and the executive, in which 
parliament (and its committees) do not have hard (coercive) powers to force the 
government to take action (Gordon & Street, 2012). Committees rely on the power 
of persuasion (Chafetz, 2017). If such a strategy exists then it might be expected 
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that stronger recommendations would be more likely to be rejected. Norton (2013) 
recognises that the impact of committees does not usually extend to the 
introduction of significant new polices or large-scale changes. Indeed, Rogers & 
Walters (2015) note that recommendations which are highly critical of the 
government are likely to receive a defensive response and the government is likely 
to take its time over recommendations it considers challenging.  
H3a - The stronger action that a recommendation calls for, the more likely 
it is to be rejected. 
 
Benton & Russell (2013) used disclosure and guidance as variables and found that 
they were statistically significant predictors and were more likely to be accepted. 
Disclosing information is part of the main relationship between government 
departments and committees as access to information, as noted in the conceptual 
framework, is a foundation of scrutiny. These recommendations should, therefore, 
be seen as a routine request. Additionally, it might be expected that 
recommendations calling for disclosure and guidance would be ranked as weaker 
recommendations. This is because they will generally require less political capital 
than recommendations calling for legislative change and as a result be more likely 
to be accepted because they are weaker, and as such are more palatable to the 
government. Indeed, Rogers & Walters (2015) note that critical and challenging 
amendments are likely to be viewed with suspicion by the government or 
dismissed outright if overly critical. Therefore weaker amendments which are less 
challenging such as calling for disclosure would be more likely to be accepted. 
H3b - Recommendations calling for disclosure and guidance will be more 
likely to be accepted by the government. 
 
Due to the nature of post-legislative scrutiny and the focus on legislation, calls for 
action relating to legislation will be more likely to be rejected on the basis of the 
resources (including time and political capital) that such changes would require. 
This is linked to the strength of recommendation categories that 
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recommendations calling for action relating to legislation are likely to fall under. 
They are likely to fall under the stronger recommendation categories and as a 
result of H3a, and the strength of such recommendations, be more likely to be 
rejected by the government. This is on the basis that any legislative change is going 
to require some political cost in terms of capital and resources. A new bill would 
require space in the government’s legislative programme and amendments to an 
Act would either need a new amendment act or a suitable piece of legislation to 
attach it to. As such political costs would be higher than calls for the disclosure of 
information. Indeed as noted in H3a, Rogers & Walters (2015) argue that 
recommendations which are highly critical of the government are likely to receive 
a defensive response or be rejected outright and the government is likely to take 
its time over recommendations it considers challenging. Any recommendation 
calling for action that is high in political cost is likely to be rejected. Benton & 
Russell (2013) also tested this variable although it was not found to be statistically 
significant. However, with post-legislative scrutiny focusing on legislation, and as 
legislative style recommendations are more prevalent this could lead to a more 
significant relationship.  
H3c - Recommendations calling for action relating to legislation will be 
more likely to be rejected by the government.  
 
If legislation is deemed to be contentious, then the government would be more 
likely to protect its legislation from amendment during the formal legislative 
process which could result in stronger action being necessary during post-
legislative scrutiny to improve the Act. Indeed Peter Riddell (former director of the 
Institute for Government) noted that ‘the more important and controversial the 
Bill, the less likely is parliament to play a creative part in its scrutiny’ (Brazier, 2004: 
18).  As the legislative process is dominated by partisan loyalty (Brazier, 2004) any 
vote against the bill at second reading will be seen by the government as the 
opposition being completely against the bill. As a result, the government is less 
likely to want to accept opposition amendments on the basis that they do not want 
the bill to pass in the first place. In a study using twelve case study bills, Russell, 
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Gover, & Wollter (2016) found that only 0.7% of opposition tabled amendments to 
legislation are accepted. They may view any attempt to amend, even if sincere, as 
a vehicle to try and derail the bill. As such stronger recommendations through 
post-legislative scrutiny may be necessary to counteract any problems that were 
not dealt with during the formal legislative process. In terms of government 
acceptance, in line with what is hypothesised in H3a, it is expected that bills 
considered to be contentious will be more likely to see their recommendations 
rejected on the basis that they are likely to be stronger. It is probable that the 
government will not want to reopen issues that are considered closed following the 
completion of the formal legislative process. This will also likely be true if there 
has been a change in government, as a new government will unlikely want to have 
to give up some of its precious legislative time, unless it agreed strongly that the 
legislation needed changing.  There is also the potential for the partisanship of the 
formal legislative process to spill over into post-legislative scrutiny, especially if the 
government is being asked to consider recommendations on its own legislation. 
Indeed White (2015c) argues that committees and departments can sometimes 
view each other as the enemy, and as such that partisan divide does spill over into 
the relationship between parliament and government which is vital for 
recommendations being accepted. Although it is argued that partisan loyalty is not 
as strong as it used to be, we should at the same time not exaggerate its decline, as 
cohesion is still a marked part of parliamentary behaviour (Norton, 2013). 
H4 - If a bill is labelled as contentious it will be more likely to receive 
stronger recommendations, and,  
H5 – If a bill is labelled as contentious it will be more likely to have 
recommendations rejected by the government.  
 
5.4.2 Regression analysis: Strength of recommendation 
The ordinal logistic regression analysis shows two variables that are significant 
(Justice Committee and government defeats in the House of Lords) both at the 
P<0.01 level. This tells us that there are statistically significant relationships 
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between these independent variables and the strength of recommendations 
produced. The Cox & Snell R-squared for this model is .035 however this model is 
not designed to be predictive. The categories used to measure strength of 
recommendation are; (0) no action, (1) small action, (2) lower medium action, (3) 
mid-range action, (4) upper medium action and (5) large action.  
Table 5.8. Ordinal logistic regression: DV = strength of recommendation27 28 
  Estimate S.E.29 
Committee-level variables   
Chairman (Opposition) -.104 .245 
Committee Type (Joint) -.257 .272 
Committee (Justice) -1.041** .390 
Committee (Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs) -.720 .544 
Committee (Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) -.144 .506 
Legislation-level variables   
Sittings in Committee (House of Commons) .49 .487 
Government defeats in the House of Lords .075** .075 
Contentiousness -1.016 .705 
        Wash-Up -.097 .260 
   
Cox & Snell R-squared  .035  
n 504  
*P<0.05  ** P<0.01 
 
The analysis shows that the Justice Committee, is significant at the P<0.01 level. 
The directionality indicates that the committee is producing weaker 
recommendations. In attempting to explain committee behaviour here, this 
suggests that there might be a strategy here from committees, acknowledged by 
both Aldons, (2000) and Benton & Russell (2013), in terms of committees 
producing weaker recommendations on the basis that they are more likely to be 
                                                     
27 As it was originally envisaged that an OLS Linear regression would be used, one was run. The 
following differences were noted between that model and the logit model. There were no changes 
in directionality, however there was two changes in significance, sittings in committee was no 
longer significant and Justice Committee was significant at the P<0.05 level. 
28 The following independent variables were not included due to problems with multicollinearity 
(as measured by the VIF diagnostics in SPSS): party of Government (which introduced the 
legislation); departmental select committees (as a combined category, although individual 
committees were included); ad hoc committees; Culture, Media and Sport Committee; length of 
Act (in words); time difference between Royal Assent and post-legislative scrutiny and time spent 
in the House of Commons. 
29 Clustered standard errors. 
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accepted by the government and as a result make committees look like they are 
having more of an impact than actually might be the case. Again this comes down 
to the power committees have; without coercive force they rely on persuasion and 
attraction in order to get the government to act. It also explains why committees 
would want to develop such a strategy.   
It can also be explained by the fact that the legislation, that has received post-
legislative scrutiny by those committees so far, has not been in need of large change 
and is perhaps operating as intended at the time of enactment. Indeed, it was noted 
during an interview with the clerk of one of the ad hoc committees in the House 
of Lords that no committees so far have argued that the underlying legislation has 
been flawed (Collon, 2017a).  However, the academic literature on the legislative 
process suggests it produces deficient legislation (Brazier, Kalitowski, & 
Rosenblatt, 2007; Fox & Korris, 2010; Rippon, 1993; Slapper & Kelly, 2015). This 
points instead to deficient legislation not being selected for review, as noted in 
chapter four. Additionally, with the analysis suggesting that recommendations 
calling for smaller action are being made by these committees, it suggests that the 
legislation under review only needs small changes to enhance its operation. The 
directionality for Joint Committee and Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Committee is also negative, supporting the arguments made above, that 
committees are producing weaker recommendations. Although no formal 
hypotheses were directed at these particular variables, from the arguments 
presented by Aldons (2000) and Benton & Russell (2013) this would be in line with 
expectations. 
Finally, the number of government defeats in the House of Lords was significant 
at the P<0.01 level and its directionality is positive, showing that as government 
defeats in the House of Lords increase, the stronger recommendations get. The 
more government defeats there are in the House of Lords suggests that those Acts 
were in need of improvement; as such this is an indication of the challenges with 
Acts that still require improvement following their implementation. 
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Having assessed some of the factors what impact upon the strength of 
recommendations that committees make, the next section moves on to address the 
factors that impact upon the government’s acceptance of recommendations. 
5.4.3 Regression analysis: Government acceptance 
The ordinal logistic regression analysis shows that five variables are statistically 
significant, four at the P<0.01 level and one at the P<0.05 level. The Cox & Snell R-
Squared for this model is 0.194. Again this model is not designed to be predictive. 
The categories used to measure government acceptance are; (1) rejected outright, 
(2) rejected in part, (3) neither accepted nor rejected, (4) accepted in part and (5) 
accepted outright.  
Table 5.9. Ordinal logistic regression: DV = government acceptance 
 
  Estimate S.E. 
Committee-level variables   
Chairman (Opposition) -.558* .234 
Committee Type (Joint) -1.019** .367 
Committee (Justice) -.338 .232 
Committee (Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs) .863** .292 
Committee (Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) -.437** .161 
Legislation-level variables   
Sittings in Committee (House of Commons) .040 .032 
Government defeats in the House of Lords -.012 .025 
Contentiousness -.024 .452 
Wash-up .376 .223 
Recommendation-level variables   
Strength of recommendation -.564** .104 
Recommendation calling for action relating to legislation  -.506 .447 
Recommendation calling for guidance  -.228 .331 
Recommendation calling for research and review -.471 .354 
Recommendation calling for disclosure  .129 .538 
Recommendation calling for resources and funding -.035 .836 
Recommendations calling for policy and procedure -.457 .361 
   
Cox & Snell R-squared .194  
n 45230  
* P<0.05   ** P<0.01 
                                                     
30 As the model is measuring the level of acceptance, recommendations which received no 
response were listed as missing for the purpose of this model. There were fifty-two 
recommendations which received no response.  
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Strength of recommendations is statistically significant at the P<0.01 level in this 
model. The directionality of this variable is negative meaning that stronger 
recommendations are more likely to be rejected than accepted. This is in line with 
H3a. As stated in earlier sections this is intuitive to some degree as you would 
expect the government to find weaker recommendations more palatable, especially 
as committees do not have the power to force the government to accept stronger 
recommendations. These findings are also in line with the findings of Benton & 
Russell (2013) in their study on the impact of parliamentary oversight committees. 
This could also suggest that if committees do deploy a strategy as suggested by 
Aldons (2000) and Benton & Russell (2013), then they are perhaps not completely 
wrong to do so. The time committees have to undertake their variety of functions 
is limited and if they were producing recommendations calling for stronger action 
which were subsequently being rejected then a feeling could develop that there 
was no point in doing such scrutiny if the main recommendations are just going to 
be rejected anyway. Subsequently they make weaker ones that are more likely to 
gain traction with the government. This will have implications for accountability 
as such findings, suggest that accountability is not such an important part of post-
legislative scrutiny, if committees are willing to brush past recommendations 
which would require greater action. As a result, if such a strategy is being utilised 
then it shouldn’t necessarily completely be seen as a bad thing. The down side, if 
this strategy is being used, is that committees are to an extent overstating their 
influence. So committee behaviour in this area will be being influenced by 
government actions (i.e. they may know the chances of getting stronger 
recommendations accepted are limited), but also by institutional constraints such 
as the finite amount of time that departmental select committees have especially.  
However, rather than a deliberate strategy at play of couching recommendations 
in terms that the government can more readily accept, interviews suggested that 
committees are producing weaker recommendations due to internal political 
compromise on the committee, as a unanimous report is more influential (White, 
2015a) (all of the reports in this study were agreed unanimously). That sometimes 
means that they prefer a weaker recommendation on which they can all agree, 
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rather than a stronger one which would cause a division. Although this is still a 
strategy, it is a different one. Additionally, the desire to seek compromise with the 
government will have an impact here too, as committees recognise that they won’t 
get everything they want and judge that it would be better to get something than 
nothing. Finally a lack of evidence on which to develop a recommendation would 
also lead to a committee producing weaker recommendations.  
The regression analysis also showed that joint committees were significant at the 
P<0.01 level. The directionality of the variable is negative, suggesting that 
recommendations coming from joint committees are being rejected by the 
government. This correlation can be explained by the nature of the inquiry 
undertaken by the committee in question. The inquiry was on terror legislation 
and as a result of it being a sensitive area, the government will, as a result, be more 
likely to reject changes to the Act and its operation.  
 
The Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (PACAC) and 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee was statistically significant at the 
P<0.01 level. The directionality of the PACAC variable is positive, suggesting that 
recommendations coming from this committee are being accepted by the 
government. The previous model for strength of recommendations showed the 
Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee were more likely to 
produce weaker recommendations which would make their acceptance more 
appealing to government. Whereas the EFRAC variable is negative suggesting that 
recommendations coming from this committee were being rejected despite the 
committee offering weaker recommendations. 
Committee chairman was significant at the P<0.05 level and the directionality was 
negative meaning opposition chairs were more likely to see their 
recommendations rejected than accepted. This was not in line with H1 or Benton 
& Russell's (2013) findings. This can be explained by the nature of post-legislative 
scrutiny in reviewing legislation. For example, the legislative process is partisan 
and that partisanship on the part of the government may creep into this particular 
task.  
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While the following recommendations were not significant at any level their 
directionality does warrant reporting on the basis that hypotheses were made. For 
recommendations calling for some sort of action relating to legislation, there was 
a negative effect suggesting they were more likely to be rejected by the 
government. This is in line with H3c. This was on the basis of the time and political 
capital that might be needed to amend a piece of legislation or repeal part of an 
Act, which unless you have a suitable bill you can attach such amendments too, 
means new legislation is required. Recommendations calling for guidance saw a 
negative effect. The direction is therefore not in line with H3b or with the findings 
of Benton & Russell (2013) who found a positive effect and statistically significance. 
However, recommendations calling for resources and funding, again although not 
statistically significant, had a positive effect and thus more likely to be accepted by 
the government. One final recommendation in this category of variables is 
recommendations calling for the disclosure of information. Again this was not 
statistically significant but its directionality was positive, which is in line with H3b 
and what was found by Benton & Russell (2013). The reason for a positive effect 
could be that the basic scrutiny relationship involves access to information. As a 
result requests for information by committees to government departments are not 
going to be unusual. 
 
 Conclusion 
The findings in this chapter have covered the direction of recommendations as well 
as the type, strength and acceptance of recommendations across the two types and 
between both Houses of Parliament. Finally the chapter assessed the factors that 
impact upon strength and acceptance.  
The data showed that the most frequently called for recommendation is a change 
in policy or practice, with 39% of recommendations calling for such action. The 
research also found that although only 79 recommendations out of 504 called for 
action related to the legislation and its implementation (16%), this is a 12% increase 
in comparison to what Benton and Russell (2013) found in their study, which 
included seven committees across all their functions. This suggests that post-
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legislative scrutiny leads to more legislative recommendations. However, with an 
academic literature suggesting that the legislative process in the UK produces 
deficient legislation, there isn’t much sign of it if only 16% of recommendations 
recommend legislative action. 
41% of recommendations stemming from formal post-legislative scrutiny inquiries 
called for little or no action on behalf of the government. This is a similar 
proportion to what Benton and Russell (2013) found in their study (40%). The 
research therefore showed that committees tend to focus their recommendations 
on calling for small and medium action. This provided evidence to support the 
arguments of both Aldons (2000) and Benton & Russell (2013) that committees 
produce recommendations which are weaker so the government is more likely to 
accept more of them. This is a strategy that appears to be supported somewhat by 
other findings from the research. Indeed, the ordinal logistic regression analysis 
showed that the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee and 
the Justice Committee, were significant and producing weaker recommendations. 
This reflects the reality through which scrutiny takes place in the UK Parliament, 
in which parliament is weaker vis-à-vis the executive. 
In terms of the ordinal logistic regression analysis for government acceptance, the 
analysis showed that strength of recommendation was statistically significant at 
the P<0.01 level, suggesting that there is a very strong relationship between the 
strength of recommendations and their acceptance. The directionality of this 
variable is negative meaning that stronger recommendations are more likely to be 
rejected than accepted. This finding suggests that if committees do deploy a 
strategy as suggested by Aldons (2000) and Benton & Russell (2013), then they are 
perhaps they are not completely wrong to do so on the basis that the analysis shows 
that stronger recommendations are more likely to be rejected.  
The research contained in this chapter has helped to fill an important gap in 
knowledge in terms of the types of recommendations committees undertaking 
post-legislative scrutiny are making, their strength, whether they are being 
accepted and finally what factors impact upon their strength and acceptance. It 
has shown where data is comparable with Benton and Russell’s (2013) study and 
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where it diverges. It has also provided evidence to support the arguments made by 
Benton and Russell (2013) and Aldons (2000) that committees have a strategy to 
produce weaker recommendations in order so the government will accept more of 
them.  
This chapter, in answering the second research question, contributes to the 
literature on the impact of parliamentary committees, in terms of the types of 
recommendations they make and whether they are accepted (in relation to post-
legislative scrutiny) and their likelihood to be weaker. It also contributes to our 
knowledge of committee behaviour in terms of understanding why they make 
recommendations they do, such as there being a deliberate strategy at play. In 
addition it also contributed to the literature on post-legislative scrutiny as it was 
unknown what the outcomes of such scrutiny are, we now know there is a strong 
relationship between the strength of a recommendation and its acceptance. To an 
extent the chapter also contributes to the comparative study of post-legislative 
scrutiny by assessing how the UK’s post-legislative scrutiny system operates in 
practice. This is important as more legislatures deploy procedures to undertake 
post-legislative scrutiny it is important to assess such processes to determine if 
they should be replicated.  
The next chapter goes on to address the third research question relating to the 
experience of committees undertaking post-legislative scrutiny. 
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Chapter 6 Undertaking post-legislative scrutiny in 
the House of Commons 
This chapter will focus upon the qualitative experience of three committees in the 
House of Commons which have undertaken post-legislative scrutiny. This 
addresses the final research question of what has the experience been of 
committees undertaking post-legislative scrutiny in the UK Parliament? It also 
supports and confirms the findings of the proceeding chapters as well as providing 
answers to some of the questions raised in previous chapters such as why 
committees are making the recommendations they are and how legislation gets 
selected by committees. The subsequent chapter on the House of Lords will answer 
the final part. This chapter, in providing the first part of this answer will follow the 
process of a typical committee inquiry as set out by Rogers & Walters (2015). It 
addresses the start of an inquiry, evidence, the report, as well as the response and 
any related follow up. The findings for each of these stages in relation to post-
legislative scrutiny will be presented and analysed in order to assess the actual 
operation of the inquiries in comparison to how Rogers & Walters (2015) suggest 
they should operate in theory as well as locating any areas of success and failure in 
this process.  
The chapter focuses on three case studies; the Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee’s inquiry into the Gambling Act 2005; the Justice Committee’s inquiry 
into the Freedom of Information Act and the Health Committee’s inquiry into the 
Mental Health Act 2007. The subsequent chapter will address committees involved 
in post-legislative scrutiny in the House of Lords in order to provide separate and 
in-depth analysis. This comparison will be useful as the processes and committees 
which undertake post-legislative scrutiny in both Houses are slightly different (e.g. 
the time committees have to undertake post-legislative scrutiny inquiries).  
As post-legislative scrutiny has not been subject to systematic academic scrutiny 
before now, the aim of the case study analysis is to gain a greater knowledge about 
the process of post-legislative scrutiny. The individual inquiries examined in this 
chapter were selected on the basis of the most similar systems design. Most similar 
systems design was selected on the basis that it is considered the best fit for 
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exploratory studies as there were no outcomes to assess until the research had been 
completed. The following criteria were deployed in order to aid selection; the 
committees have undertaken a formal post-legislative scrutiny inquiry (systematic 
post-legislative scrutiny); which took place either in the 2010-2015 or the 2015-2017 
Parliaments (so that Clerks would still be around and the inquiry wouldn’t be a too 
distant memory). For each committee, a representative of the committee 
secretariat, membership and pressure groups who took part in the inquiries were 
interviewed. Such criteria for this chapter left six committees to choose from.  
 
During scoping interviews it was suggested that the Public Administration and 
Constitutional Affairs Committee was not appropriate to assess as the staff had left 
the House of Commons. Additionally, the then clerk of an additional committee 
noted they would only give an interview if it were anonymous, which would be 
challenging with a case study approach focusing upon specific inquiries.  That left 
four committees, however and the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Committee didn’t undertake its inquiries until after the selection had been made 
for the research. 
 
The final choices came down to the availability of interviewees and access to 
committee staff and members. In total 8 semi-structured interviews were 
undertaken31 and the transcripts of these interviews were analysed to determine 
key themes through NVivo. These case studies account for 27% of inquiries 
undertaken in the House of Commons in the time period 2010-2017.   
 
In practical terms, this chapter contributes to our knowledge of post-legislative 
scrutiny as a function of parliamentary committees and how committees deal with 
such scrutiny. Additionally, it provides an assessment of the procedures utilised in 
the House of Commons with the voices of those who have taken part in the process. 
It also contributes to our knowledge of the behaviour of committees and on the 
impact of parliamentary committees, this time it is through the clerks and 
                                                     
31 Only two interviews were undertaken for the Health Committee case study as no Members were willing 
to be interviewed.  
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committee members regarding specific inquiries and the issues they took into 
account when undertaking such scrutiny.  
 
 Introduction to case studies 
First, the chapter will give an outline and some context to the three case studies. 
This is to develop a better understanding of the inquiries themselves and the 
context of the legislation that was under review at the time. 
 
6.1.1 Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Gambling Act 2005 
The Culture, Media and Sport Committee announced its inquiry into the Gambling 
Act 2005 on the 17th May 2011. This was not the first post-legislative scrutiny 
inquiry that the Culture, Media and Sport Committee had undertaken. In the 2008-
2009 session, the committee looked into the 2003 Licensing Act but concluded that 
it was too early to see the full ramifications of the Act. A House of Lords ad hoc 
committee completed post-legislative scrutiny on the Act in the 2016-2017 session 
and concluded that the legislative framework was not ideal (Collon, 2017b).  
The announcement of the inquiry into the Gambling Act came before the 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport had published its own memorandum. 
With the recommended time frame being between three to five years following the 
Act receiving Royal Assent (Kelly and Everett, 2013), the government’s final 
deadline for producing its memorandum was September 2012 (Kelly and Everett, 
2013), so the committee began the inquiry within but before the end of the formal 
period of government post-legislative review and the inquiry focused upon 
reviewing the Act as a whole. The government did, however, provide a post-
legislative memorandum at the request of the committee which was received in 
time for the start of the inquiry in October 2011 (Department for Culture, Media 
and Sport, 2011).  
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The Gambling Act 2005 came into force on 1 September 2007 and was broadly 
designed to consolidate existing gambling legislation. However, it also aimed to 
update the regulatory framework for casinos, online gambling, and Fixed Odds 
Betting Terminals (FOBTs) (House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee, 2012). In addition, the Act created a new industry regulator called the 
Gambling Commission (House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 
2012).  
 
6.1.2 Justice Committee: Freedom of Information Act 2000 
The Ministry of Justice published its memorandum containing its post-legislative 
assessment of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in December 2011 and 
presented it to the Justice Committee (Kelly and Everett, 2013). During the course 
of the inquiry into the Freedom of Information Act, the committee received over 
140 pieces of written evidence and took oral evidence from thirty-seven witnesses 
over the course of seven oral evidence sessions. The call for evidence sent out by 
the committee focused upon three questions; ‘does the Freedom of Information 
Act work effectively?; what are the strengths and weaknesses of the Freedom of 
Information Act; and is the Freedom of Information Act operating in the way that 
it was intended to?’ (House of Commons Justice Committee, 2012). In this case, the 
committee knew what issues they needed to focus upon because the government 
was keen on changing the Act and had made its wishes somewhat clear before the 
inquiry. A focused call for evidence was therefore useful. This isn’t always the case 
with inquiries. The memorandum from the Ministry of Justice highlighted the four 
key objectives of the Act: accountability; better decision making; openness and 
transparency; and public involvement in decision making, including increased 
public trust in government (House of Commons Justice Committee, 2012) and the 
committee published its post-legislative scrutiny report on 26th July 2012 (Kelly 
and Everett, 2013). The Act had also come under some criticism from ministers in 
government and from the civil service. Sir Jeremy Haywood, the Cabinet Secretary 
suggested that the Act had a chilling effect in terms of officials being less likely to 
provide frank opinions and discussion (Rosenbaum, 2016). Former Prime Minister 
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Tony Blair called himself a ‘nincompoop’ for his role in the legislation (House of 
Commons Justice Committee, 2012) and David Cameron had suggested that the 
Act impeded the process of governing (Rosenbaum, 2016). With all of this criticism, 
this was something the committee wanted to investigate. 
 
6.1.3 Health Committee: Mental Health Act 2007 
In July 2012 the Department of Health published its post-legislative memorandum 
of the Mental Health Act 2007 (Kelly and Everett, 2013). Following the publication 
of this memorandum the Health Committee announced it would conduct its own 
post-legislative scrutiny inquiry into the Act (Kelly and Everett, 2013). In its inquiry, 
the committee noted that the purpose of the scrutiny was not to repeat the policy 
debates that occurred during the original passage of the Act but rather to assess 
the implementation and operation of the Act (House of Commons Health 
Committee, 2013). The Mental Health Bill was introduced to parliament during the 
2006-07 session to amend and update the Mental Health Act 1983 which was the 
cornerstone of mental health legislation in both England and Wales (House of 
Commons Health Committee, 2013). The Act established a single definition of 
mental disorder, which included some conditions not covered in the 1983 Act, as 
well as reforming existing law covering compulsory detention and treatment 
(House of Commons Health Committee, 2013). It completed its passage through 
parliament and received Royal Assent in July 2007 with the majority of its 
provisions coming into force during November 2006. (House of Commons Health 
Committee, 2013). 
 
 Start of an inquiry 
At the start of an inquiry, committees decide what subject they want to scrutinise 
and set out the terms of reference for the inquiry (Rogers & Walters, 2015).  
However, Rogers & Walters (2015) note that these terms of reference do not bind 
committees and that a committees’ focus will often change during the course of an 
inquiry on the basis that evidence points to areas of particular importance. At the 
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start of an inquiry, there is also the opportunity to publish press notices as well as 
issues and questions papers to stimulate debate (Rogers & Walters, 2015).  
 
6.2.1 Case studies 
The former clerk of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee noted that the start 
of post-legislative scrutiny inquiries are different to other committee inquiries in 
the sense that with post-legislative scrutiny clerks can never be sure where the 
problems with an Act might be before committees start undertaking scrutiny 
(Flood, 2017). This is in contrast to other inquiries where committee staff usually 
have an idea of what the problem is and can begin to probe this from the beginning. 
She noted that although the terms of reference published at the start of an inquiry 
can change, committees tend to be addressing the same issues at the end as at the 
beginning (Flood, 2017). The implication here is that this is not the case with post-
legislative scrutiny and committees need to start with broad terms of reference 
before they can begin to assess the Act more deeply for its flaws. This has 
implications for the undertaking of post-legislative scrutiny and it would make 
sense for committees undertaking it to issue preliminary terms of reference so that 
an initial assessment can be made prior to formal terms being agreed based upon 
where issues have been highlighted in the written evidence. This would help to 
narrow down the parameters of an inquiry and avoid a case, as with the Gambling 
Act inquiry, of a committee undertaking a complex and lengthy inquiry into a large 
Act. 
 
In terms of selecting the topic or legislation to receive post-legislative scrutiny, 
Members’ interest was raised as an important point in interviews. The former clerk 
of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee noted that the committee was not very 
enthusiastic about scrutinising the Gambling Act. Although a number of Members 
were interested in the gambling industry, they were less interested in looking at 
the Gambling Act as a whole because it was seen as a little dry (Flood, 2017). As 
noted in chapter four, Member interest is vital for successful inquiries. There was, 
therefore, a difference of opinion about whether it would be appropriate and useful 
to look back at the Act in its entirety (Flood, 2017). This raises the issue of how best 
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to approach post-legislative scrutiny, as Members may be interested in the topic 
area of the Act but their interest may not extend to its finer details. However, this 
does raise questions about why MPs choose to serve on select committees and how 
this might impact their level of interest. Searing (1994) would argue that MPs who 
see themselves as policy advocates (aiming to influence government policy) and 
who are most likely to seek committee membership to achieve their aims, tend to 
dislike the behind the scenes, attention to detail work that post-legislative scrutiny 
often requires. Philip Davies MP, when interviewed for this research stated that 
despite scrutinising the Gambling Act, he had never had a constituent raise the 
issue of gambling for the whole time he has served as an MP and there was little 
political interest at the time (Davies, 2017). That being said, because of his well-
known views on the subject, constituents may have felt it was pointless to approach 
him about it.   
 
Another example of where Members’ interest is of importance was noted by, the 
former chair of the Justice Committee, Lord Beith. He stated that in the case of the 
inquiry into the Freedom of Information Act 2000 there was a reasonably high level 
of interest among the Members (Beith, 2017), particularly as the committee had 
previously assessed whether departments were ready for freedom of information. 
Interest is, therefore, key to engaging Members in the process and it impacts not 
just upon what legislation you select but also upon whether committees undertake 
post-legislative scrutiny at all.  
 
However, it could be argued that committees surrender to Member preferences 
too easily. Although post-legislative scrutiny might not be the most newsworthy in 
their constituencies, one of their roles is to act as legislators and post-legislative 
scrutiny is a core task of departmental select committees. Focusing on Member 
interest too much is also likely to mean that committees focus upon Members’ pet 
projects when it comes to undertaking inquiries more generally but also when it 
comes to selecting legislation for post-legislative scrutiny. Such an approach could 
potentially mean overlooking legislation which is in need of review for a piece of 
legislation whose topic interests a particular Member.  
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Representation from interest groups was also another issue, noted in the 
interviews, that impacts upon the selection of Acts, and whether committees 
undertake post-legislative scrutiny. The Culture, Media and Sport Committee 
noted in its report on the Gambling Act 2005 that it announced its inquiry into the 
Act following ‘a large number of representations from the gambling industry’ 
(House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2012). The industry was 
concerned that legitimate commercial interests were being interfered with and 
that the Act was difficult to interpret due to its complexity (House of Commons 
Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2012). It is fair to say therefore that part of 
the reason for the triggering of the inquiry was the representations from the 
gambling industry. Indeed Kingdon (1995) notes the role that interest groups can 
play in agenda setting, suggesting that the louder they ‘squawk’ the higher issues 
that interest them climb on the policy agenda. Indeed, Philip Davies noted that it 
is common for organisations to approach committees with their concerns and 
problems (Davies, 2017). Alternatively, it could be argued that interest groups 
become more interested in issues that are on the policy agenda. This does raise 
issues around committees being led or unduly influenced by an outside interest.  
The Health Committee’s inquiry into the Mental Health Act 2006 is another 
example where representations (of a sort) from interest groups impacted upon the 
decision to undertake an inquiry. The committee had received a memorandum 
from various charities and bodies interested in mental health which also 
commented on the operation of the Act (Lloyd, 2017). From the perspective of the 
secretariat, this meant that the cost of setting up an inquiry was reduced. This 
could potentially fall into the problem centred model of agenda setting as with the 
Justice Committee’s inquiry, on the basis that both the government and 
stakeholder memoranda will have conveyed where there were problems with the 
Act and its operation (Kingdon, 1995; Robinson, 2000). In this model, these 
problems usually become apparent to government and parliament through 
feedback from programmes or other organisations (Béland & Howlett, 
2016). Additionally, with the publication of a stakeholder memorandum, again this 
points towards the role interest groups can play in agenda setting (Kingdon, 1995). 
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Allison Cobb, from Mind32 (but who worked on the inquiry for the Mental Health 
Alliance) noted that it was their initiative to send their memo to the committee 
and that they had also provided evidence for the government’s post-legislative 
assessment with the aim of achieving more impact. She also noted that they felt 
the inquiry was going to go ahead anyway, so they were not seeking an agenda-
setting role from the submission of their memo (Cobb, 2017). Again this reiterates 
the role that interest groups can play in pushing issues on to a committees’ agenda 
as well as how important access to information is as noted in the conceptual 
framework. 
Asking stakeholders to produce their own memoranda on Acts that have received 
government ones is potentially a useful model for committees to follow. This is 
important as one of the key benefits for committees from interest/pressure groups 
is that they provide information meaning committees are not reliant upon the 
government (Norton, 1999). In this case, it improved the committee’s access to 
information, which as discussed in chapter two is an important foundation for 
scrutiny. This helped the committee to better understand the challenges and to 
make a preliminary assessment as to whether the government was right in its own 
assessment of the Act. This could come as a request from a committee, or through 
making the publication of memoranda more explicit so organisations can locate 
them and then respond to them. Having that additional memorandum was an 
additional incentive to undertake the inquiry, so it could be another way of 
increasing the uptake of post-legislative scrutiny. That being said this could raise 
issues around the types of groups that have had access to the committee during 
the course of the inquiry. It raises questions about whether these groups were 
insider groups and the extent to which the presentation of such a memorandum 
limited access for other groups. However Norton (2013) notes that 70% of external 
groups find access through committees to be fairer than through departments, so 
there is perhaps a little less reason for concern here. This is supported by Grant 
(2000) who argues that outsider groups make a substantial input to the evidence 
received by committees. The points made by both Grant, (2000) and Norton (2013) 
would support the pluralist approach to some extent in that there is some sort of 
                                                     
32 Mind is a mental health charity that supports those with mental health problems. 
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equal access for groups, at least in terms of parliamentary committees (Watts, 
2007). Additionally, the Clerk did note that he felt the stakeholder group 
encompassed everyone they needed for the inquiry (Lloyd, 2017). Overall 
representations from industry have implications not just for post-legislative 
scrutiny but also for other committee inquiries more generally. Such 
representations, while important in some instances, could have an impact upon 
inquiries in terms of committees being led by the concerns of a particular interest 
group.  
Other issues these committees took into account when deciding what legislation 
to select for post-legislative scrutiny include the output from the respective 
departments that they shadow. This output includes both legislative output in 
terms of the amount of legislation the department sponsors and which the 
corresponding select committee has a right to scrutinise after its passage through 
the legislative process, as well as post-legislative review memorandum produced 
three to five years after an Act has received Royal Assent. The former clerk of the 
Culture, Media and Sport Committee noted this as a factor in their selection of the 
Gambling Act 2005 on the basis that the Department of Culture, Media and Sport 
has a low legislative output. Indeed in chapter four, table 4.5 showed that only 
eleven Acts had been introduced by the department between 2005 and 2017. It is 
not a department that sponsors many bills and legislative changes often are tacked 
on to other bills from other departments e.g. school sports being added to bills 
from the Department for Education (Flood, 2017). The Gambling Act was, 
therefore, an obvious candidate if the committee wanted to perform post-
legislative scrutiny (Flood, 2017). Since departments are different in terms of their 
legislative output, some committees are going to have less opportunity to 
undertake post-legislative scrutiny. Therefore, there should be different 
expectations of committees based upon the legislative intensity of the departments 
that they shadow. However, it should also be noted that legislatively intensive 
departments can also obstruct post-legislative scrutiny by introducing new 
legislation in the same area frequently which supersedes previous Acts. This was 
noted in chapter 4 when addressing the post-legislative gap. This is because if the 
Act is always changing it wouldn’t necessarily meet the systematic timeframes but 
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also governments could claim that in the drafting of the new Act they undertook 
some sort of post-legislative scrutiny into the previous Act.  
So while legislative output is important, so are the memoranda produced by 
government departments which sometimes Act as triggers for an inquiry. For the 
Freedom of Information inquiry, the committee lead noted that they looked quite 
closely at the memorandum and that it was moderately helpful. In this case, the 
memorandum contained a lot of self-interest based upon what the government 
would like to see happen with that legislation (Stewart, 2017). The government set 
out the problems it felt there were with the Act and then set out potential solutions 
to those perceived problems. The chair noted that like most of the documents the 
government produces it did not provide a foundation for, or back up the changes 
that the government wanted to do (Beith, 2017), and therefore was not convincing 
in its arguments. The committee lead noted that they did end up doing a lot of 
research beyond the evidence provided by witnesses (Stewart, 2017). Whether that 
is simply having a starting point for an inquiry by stating what the government’s 
position is on the effectiveness of the legislation or by putting an issue on to the 
political or parliamentary agenda. Despite the issues with the memoranda, in this 
case, the chair noted that normally memoranda are very helpful because the 
process is fairly systematic and it brings together quite a lot of information 
including from within government and usually provides some structure to organise 
the committee’s inquiry (Beith, 2017). Access to information is a foundation of 
scrutiny and evidently has a role to play in terms of post-legislative scrutiny and 
encouraging committees to undertake it. 
From the perspective of the Health Committee, the clerk noted that the committee 
received a memorandum from the government, as well as from the Mental Health 
Alliance. They took oral evidence which was not particularly extensive from some 
of those people representing the Mental Health Alliance who put forward the other 
memorandum (Lloyd, 2017). In total, they heard from eight witnesses and received 
three pieces of written evidence, including the memo from those representing 
mental health groups. This is not many considering the number of witnesses the 
other inquiries heard from.  
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This is an interesting way of dealing with the memorandum and of course, will 
have been helpful to hear the views of others and be able to question them. Perhaps 
this is something committees should be encouraged to do, as making an 
assessment on whether to undertake post-legislative scrutiny or not based purely 
on what the government has said could mean overlooking specific problems. This 
would at least ensure memoranda are properly scrutinised and make it clear for 
other committees and other Houses when they are scoping for what to do. 
However, this also does raise a point about the capacity of some groups to influence 
and access committees in comparison to others. So memoranda have their 
purpose: they force the government to be reflective, they give committees a launch 
pad to begin an inquiry, and give committees something to work with in terms of 
developing ideas for where the problem areas in an Act may lie. The implication of 
this is that memoranda can influence committee behaviour and potentially allow 
the government to shape the scope of the inquiry, which is problematic 
considering the committee is scrutinising the government department that is 
trying to influence its agenda. 
The saliency of an issue was also raised in terms of determining the selection of 
Acts. The issues around the Freedom of Information Act 2000 were salient at the 
time as the government was proposing to make changes to the Act in terms of 
narrowing the scope of and restricting the use of it (Beith, 2017). Kingdon (1995) 
and Robinson (2000) would argue that this would be part of a problem centred 
model of agenda setting in which the agenda is set by the evolution of a problem, 
in this case, the government’s perceived problems with the freedom of information 
regime. This was not the first time a government had wanted to make changes to 
the Act. In 2006 the government tried to introduce application fees and in the 
2007-2008 session, a private members bill attempted to exclude cabinet papers 
from the remit of the Act (Worthy & Hazell, 2016). 
 
When deciding whether to undertake post-legislative scrutiny on the Mental 
Health Act 2006, the Health Committee considered whether there were gaps in 
their work programme as well as whether it was a policy area that had been 
scrutinised previously. The clerk noted that at the point at which the Department 
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of Health’s memorandum came through, the committee had not done any 
inquiries into mental health issues in the 2010 Parliament (Lloyd, 2017), as they 
were keen to cover areas of policy that had not received scrutiny. This was also the 
first time in the time period studied that the Health Committee had undertaken 
post-legislative scrutiny. The clerk noted that the committee were also very 
conscious of that fact that it was a neglected area and there was a concern that 
there had been few, if any, inquiries into mental health in the previous parliament 
(Lloyd, 2017). As a result, this was particularly timely and was something the 
committee was conscious that it had not done. 
So there are a variety of factors that the committees took into account when 
deciding whether or not to undertake post-legislative scrutiny and also what 
legislation they selected. However, there were other issues at the start of an inquiry 
that are worthy of discussion. The first is how to scrutinise the legislation. 
With regards to the Culture, Media and Sport Committee, there was a difference 
of opinion about whether it would be appropriate and useful to look back at the 
Act in its entirety (Flood, 2017). This also raises questions of how best to approach 
post-legislative scrutiny, as Members may be interested in the topic area of the Act 
but their interest may not extend into the finer details of the Act. As the Gambling 
Act was wide-ranging there were suggestions that it might not be appropriate to 
look at the Act as a whole. The post-legislative scrutiny guidance from the House 
of Commons Committee Office leaves some room for committees to decide how 
to undertake post-legislative scrutiny and what they focus upon (House of 
Commons Committee Office, 2015). This guidance includes the options of 
undertaking review of the Act as a whole or parts of the Act if there is a case for it 
(House of Commons Committee Office, 2015). Some inquiries look at Acts as a 
whole while others address only parts, Member’s interest as well as where the 
evidence points to problems, will help to guide such decisions. The length of an 
Act and its complexity should also be used to guide decisions, especially in the 
House of Commons where committees have limited time.  
The Gambling Act 2005 was, to an extent, a consolidation Act bringing together 
gambling legislation into one Act. However, it did contain a number of new 
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initiatives. The former clerk of the committee noted that in retrospect, if she had 
realised how complex the Act was and how difficult it would be to adequately 
cover, she wouldn’t have pushed the committee to scrutinise the entire Act, and 
would have allowed them to pick out topics to look at (Flood, 2017). She also noted 
that the inquiry took far longer and was far more complicated than anybody had 
thought and that the report was ‘an absolute swine to write because everything was 
interconnected’ (Flood, 2017). This suggests that it might make sense in the future, 
when reviewing a consolidation Act, to focus on a number of aspects within the 
Act rather than the Act as a whole, not only to try and keep Members engaged but 
also because such consolidation Acts are often large and would, therefore, be hard 
to scrutinise in the limited amount of time that departmental select committees 
have. Instead, changes should be made to accommodate the scrutiny of such 
consolidation Acts (for example, sending them to an ad hoc committee). However 
complexity will only be one of the issues at play here, additionally, the resources 
available to committees and their willingness to dedicate the limited resources 
they have to the scrutiny of complex Acts will also have an impact upon whether 
they scrutinise such Acts, as well as how they do it. The core tasks of select 
committees are also likely to have implications here in terms of the style of post-
legislative scrutiny that can be undertaken. With ten of them to complete, there is 
a lot of competition on committee time, as such it would make the undertaking of 
an inquiry into a full Act difficult to square with the other tasks that the committee 
needs to address. The core tasks will limit the style of post-legislative scrutiny to 
be undertaken. 
Philip Davies noted that focused inquiries tend to be more successful and with the 
Gambling Act inquiry covering a lot of areas, it probably didn’t focus at all (Davies, 
2017). He also noted that if the inquiry was to be undertaken again at the present 
time, that it would most likely focus upon fixed odds betting terminals (Davies, 
2017). In this case, it appears that the committee should have been able to shape 
the inquiry it wanted. It could have still looked at the interesting and deficient 
areas without looking at the whole Act. 
Finally, in terms of determining how to scrutinise the legislation the former clerk 
of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee noted that her predecessors’, own line 
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manager had said that if they were going to do it they had to do the entire Act. This 
has implications upon who influences committees. As Norton (2013) notes they are 
supposed to be responsible for determining their own agendas. Indeed Rogers & 
Walters (2015) note that a departmental select committee should have a wide 
discretion about what it inquiries into and also flexibility about how it inquires.  
There are other issues that could impact upon the selection of legislation as well 
as the ultimate decision as to whether or not to undertake post-legislative scrutiny. 
One of those issues is the preferences of the chair when it comes to post-legislative 
scrutiny. The former chair of the Justice Committee noted that he was strongly in 
favour of post-legislative scrutiny (Beith, 2017). His view was that it is very 
important that laws passed by parliament be scrutinised to see whether they have 
been implemented correctly and whether they have worked (Beith, 2017). While 
committees themselves decide the subject of investigations, the chair’s views will 
be highly influential (Rogers & Walters, 2015). The views of the chair are, therefore, 
going to be vital to the undertaking of post-legislative scrutiny and the selection of 
legislation. Under the chairmanship of Alan Beith, the Justice Committee 
undertook three post-legislative inquiries in the 2010-2015 Parliament, in relatively 
quick succession, spurred on no doubt by his views on the importance of post-
legislative scrutiny. However, the committee has not undertaken any post-
legislative scrutiny since he stood down from his role. This has implications in 
terms of the selection of chairs. While the election of committee chairs has granted 
them more legitimacy from the perspective of having the support of the whole 
House of Commons, their election will make them sensitive to the House as a 
whole when it comes to undertaking their tasks. As such, there is an argument that 
committee chairs could become less interested in undertaking scrutiny such as 
post-legislative and financial scrutiny which is less likely to grab headlines and 
engage the wider House in its work. There is also no formal training for select 
committee chairs, so unless MPs are already engaged and have a broader 
knowledge of select committees they must rely upon the secretariat to guide them, 
as well as the interests of the broader committee membership to determine what 
they are and are not going to scrutinise. 
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When it comes to agenda setting Kingdon (2001) notes that there are three streams 
that run through governmental organisations. The first stream is ‘problems’, there 
is a focus upon certain problems over others and there is a process by which they 
are decided upon. The second stream is ‘policy’, the proposal and refining of policy 
proposals and the third stream is that of ‘politics’, political events. Kingdon (2001) 
notes that all these streams develop independently from one another, policy 
proposals are developed regardless of whether there is a problem, problems are 
acknowledged regardless of whether there is a solution and political events have 
their own dynamics (Kingdon, 2001). The biggest policy changes take place when 
the three streams are activated at once. Advocates, such as interest groups, are 
important in this process, they spot opportunities to join these three streams 
together usually with pre-prepared ideas, proposals and rationales. This has 
important connotations for committee agenda setting, and for the post-legislative 
case studies. For example, in terms of the Freedom of Information Act inquiry, 
problems with the Act were noted by the government and solutions to those 
problems were highlighted, activating two of the streams. The political stream may 
have been activated due to the recent change in administration and as a result, the 
political climate may have felt right. However while this worked to put the issue 
onto the Justice Committee’s agenda it did not end in the outcome that the 
government wanted. Another example can be provided through the Gambling Act 
inquiry. Interest groups had noted there were problems with the Act, the political 
stream was likely activated due to the committee majority’s pro-gambling stance 
at the time of the inquiry so the political climate was right. The Gambling industry 
also came with ideas for how the problems could be solved meaning that all three 
streams were activated. However, the government rejected the overall thrust of the 
liberalised approach to gambling (Webster, 2018).  
 
 Evidence 
Once a topic of inquiry has been selected and initial terms of reference have been 
agreed, committees will usually issue a general invitation to submit evidence. As 
well as issuing a general invitation, committees will often issue specific requests 
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for written evidence to government departments and key players in the policy area 
concerned (Rogers & Walters, 2015). At the same time the committee will also 
begin to draw up a list of witnesses they would like to hear from, usually starting 
with academics and experts in the field in question. However, the list of witnesses 
is usually expanded upon once written evidence is received to include those who 
have submitted written evidence, so that the committee can question more deeply 
what they have submitted (Rogers & Walters, 2015). The witness list typically ends 
with ministers and civil servants so that the committee can raise issues from the 
broader findings of the inquiry. Prior to the oral evidence sessions taking place, 
Members will receive a detailed brief covering the background to the hearing as 
well as the key points raised in written evidence. They are also likely to receive a 
list of areas that require further explanation and exploration (Rogers & Walters, 
2015).  
 
6.3.1 Case Studies 
Following the general introduction to the process of collecting evidence, both 
written and orally, we move on to address the key points and findings in relation 
to the three post-legislative scrutiny case studies.  
With regards to the inquiry into the Gambling Act 2005, one of the issues raised in 
interviews was the role of specialist advisors. For the inquiry into the Gambling Act 
the Culture, Media and Sport Committee had two specialist advisors, and the 
committee was influenced by their thoughts on whom the committee needed to 
take evidence from during the course of the inquiry (Flood, 2017). Specialist 
advisors in the committee sense, are outside experts who are appointed for the 
duration of an inquiry to help advise the committee. Specialist advisors know more 
about the issue than the committee staff or Members. However, this means placing 
trust in specialist advisors who provide advice on the selection of witnesses, 
although they will not be the only source of witnesses.  
Inquiries are evidence driven, therefore a poor selection of witnesses can limit 
access to evidence and potentially impact upon the committee’s 
recommendations. The problem is that specialist advisors may not always be 
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impartial (Flood, 2017) and as such their recruitment is worthy of study. Unless 
there is a specialist advisor who takes the opposite view or Members who are 
particularly obstinate then evidence can get skewed (Flood, 2017). So specialist 
advisors and, of course, more permanent committee staff are a key influence on 
the behaviour of committees. Although this did not happen for certain during the 
Gambling Act inquiry, the clerk felt that the general gist of the inquiry was 
libertarian (i.e. the public should be free to gamble with limited intervention from 
the state), along with the views of the chair and the majority of committee 
members (Flood, 2017). If these were the views of the chair and the majority of the 
committee, this would mean the committee was approaching the subject from a 
position of bias. This raises the issue of bias in committee inquiries, not only from 
specialist advisors but also from the Members themselves. That being said Philip 
Davies stated that he felt they had a good spread of evidence and heard from both 
sides of the argument, in fact, he noted that the Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee is the best committee he has served on in terms of the balance of 
witnesses (Davies, 2017).  
However, coming from a libertarian stand point on Gambling, he perhaps would 
not question the spread of evidence. The Evangelical Alliance who gave evidence 
noted that ‘the committee had a set view and that was that gambling was an activity 
that should be permitted and promoted through regulation’ (Webster, 2018). Their 
view was that while they are not in favour of the prohibition of gambling, the 
Gambling Commission should take the challenges and problems that result from 
gambling, more seriously (Webster, 2018). This suggests that there was some bias 
in the way they approached the inquiry. Indeed Danny Webster of the Evangelical 
Alliance noted that their presence was tolerated and felt that they were invited 
because the committee felt obliged to invite views from the other side of the 
argument (Webster, 2018). Overall for this inquiry, the committee invited forty-
nine witnesses to six oral evidence sessions and also received 109 pieces of written 
evidence (House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2012). 
There is the potential for committees to be unduly influenced, not only by 
representations from interest groups but also by their selection of specialist 
advisors. This has implications for committee inquiries since if committees are 
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being steered in a particular direction by an advisor, it could impact upon their 
ability to produce an evidence-driven report and this will of course impact upon 
the recommendations that they make. Bias from committee membership also has 
implications, especially for post-legislative scrutiny. If you don’t recognise a 
particular flaw because of your world-view then it will not be raised as a problem 
and is unlikely to receive a recommendation for action. Take the example of the 
Gambling Act 2005 and the inquiry’s work or perhaps lack of it on fixed odds 
betting terminals. The concern that they were problematic in terms of addiction 
was dismissed as requiring more research but six years after that report the 
government announced it is going to severely reduce the fixed odds betting 
terminal stakes. (Davies, 2018). The Evangelical Alliance noted that the 
government rejected a lot of what was proposed by the committee on the basis that 
it was too libertarian and the government was becoming concerned about the 
broader impact of gambling (Webster, 2018). 
In terms of the inquiry into the Mental Health Act 2007, the clerk noted that 
witness selection, in this case, was a little different than for other inquiries. 
Normally a committee would put out a call for evidence, receive a memorandum 
from the government and use that to inform witness selection (Lloyd, 2017). 
However, because a stakeholder group had already prepared a memorandum for 
them, the stakeholder group were approached. With stakeholder groups providing 
their own memorandum to the committee alongside the governments’, this meant 
the committee had a self-contained inquiry and the committee felt that everyone 
they needed to speak to was covered in the umbrella group (Mental Health 
Alliance). However, the committee during the course of the inquiry heard from 
only eight witnesses, which is lower than the other inquiries that form case studies 
in this chapter. Allison Cobb noted that one of the potential weaknesses of the 
inquiry was the lack of wider engagement with stakeholder groups. She also 
acknowledged the broader point that the umbrella group probably covered the 
main views on mental health in this area (Cobb, 2017). Although no mention of this 
was made in this interview, the fact that committees can be unduly influenced by 
specialist advisors, also means they could be unduly influenced by such 
memoranda as well. Therefore, as with all inquiries, care needs to be taken in terms 
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of the evidence collected. A limited spread of evidence also means a limited inquiry 
and this of course also impacts upon the recommendations that committees make 
as well. 
Although there were specific challenges with the other case studies, for the 
Freedom of Information Act inquiry, it followed the general process as set out in 
the introduction to this section. Witnesses for the inquiry were selected based 
primarily on the basis of the written evidence sent to the committee, but the 
committee did also make sure they drew the existence of the inquiry to the 
attention of people they thought they would want and need to hear from (Stewart, 
2017). The committee lead noted that it was a well-publicised inquiry and that they 
had received a great response from the call for written evidence which meant the 
committee felt that they had picked the people they needed to hear from (Stewart, 
2017). One of the benefits of having the committee’s legal expert run the inquiry 
was her familiarity with the legal ramifications of the legislation and as a result, 
there was less of a need for specialist advisors to be hired for this inquiry. The 
committee lead noted that they received evidence from users, and from people 
who respond to Freedom of Information requests. They also took evidence from 
people who had concerns and they heard from people who felt it was working 
perfectly, as a result, it was regarded as a good selection of witnesses (Stewart, 
2017). Alexandra Runswick felt that the committee listened to the concerns and 
views that Unlock Democracy presented and noted that she felt they were 
genuinely looking at the concerns of the government to see if there was any 
evidence of them but ultimately found none (Runswick, 2018). This appears to be 
an exemplar inquiry from an evidence perspective taking into account what Rogers 
& Walters (2015) noted was typical from the gathering of evidence.  
 
 Reports 
Towards the end of an inquiry, the committee secretariat will prepare a ‘heads of 
report’ paper based upon the evidence they have received and heard. This report 
is designed to outline the main themes of the inquiry as well as tentative 
recommendations (Rogers & Walters, 2015). Following this heads of report, the full 
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report is drafted and presented to the chair of the committee for their comments 
and suggestions before it is shared with the wider committee (Rogers & Walters, 
2015). Most committees go through draft reports informally and then agree to a 
whole report in a single decision.  
 
6.4.1 Case studies 
There is a general process which committees go through when writing their final 
report. As post-legislative scrutiny inquiries, rightly or wrongly, follow the process 
of any other committee inquiry, these processes are also followed. However, there 
are some issues which arose from the interviews for the three post-legislative case 
studies around the preparation of reports that need to be addressed.  
In terms of the development of recommendations, the clerk of the Culture, Media 
and Sport Committee noted that committee staff can often pick up from the line 
of question of Members and from discussions with the chair, which way they think 
the inquiry is going and as a result begin to draw up tentative conclusions and 
develop ideas that the committee might want to recommend. This was noted by 
Rogers & Walters (2015) as the typical process. The clerk also noted that this can 
happen quite early on in the inquiry (Flood, 2017). Once a heads of report is 
developed from the evidence and guidance from the chair, it is up to the committee 
to decide on a final version. This process has implications, not just for post-
legislative scrutiny but for other inquiries too. It raises the question of whether this 
process is a technocratic and bureaucratic run one, with little involvement from 
the Members. It appears that the heads of report forms the foundation of the final 
report, while some changes will be made during agreement process with the wider 
committee, the framework of the report will already have been drafted by the 
secretariat with guidance from the chair. This also raises implications about the 
engagement of Members within inquiries, not just in terms of preparing the heads 
of report but also when it comes to the final agreement. The average attendance at 
oral evidence sessions for the Gambling Act was 73%, the same figure for 
attendance at the meeting in which the draft report was agreed. This figure does 
suggest a high level of engagement but it does not take into account how long 
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Members stayed at meetings nor their contribution to the meeting. Attendance 
alone does not tell us everything about engagement. 
In the case of the Gambling Act, although there were some deep disagreements, 
there was a general consensus on the issues that needed to be highlighted (Flood, 
2017). Indeed in relation to the Freedom of Information Act it was noted that the 
report overall was consensual and unanimous, despite there being some 
disagreements which were dealt with through a number of redrafts (Stewart, 2017), 
although the former chair could not think of any particular issues that were tricky 
(Beith, 2017). However, a large number of discussions would indicate some initial 
disagreement but also a willingness to reach a compromise and consensus which 
is important for select committee reports, if they are to have any weight with the 
government. Just because there were no formal divisions, does not mean there 
were no disagreements. As noted previously a good chair will seek consensus and 
avoid divisions as committee reports have more force if they are agreed 
unanimously (White, 2015b). The fact that there were no formal divisions in 
committee for the Gambling Act inquiry, would suggest that there was nothing 
particularly contentious included in the report. This would support the findings 
outlined in chapter five which showed that the majority of recommendations made 
by committees called for no, small or lower medium action. This also suggests that 
due to the lack of contentiousness, committees are not creating recommendations 
that are likely to make a great deal of difference. Another broader implication here 
is that the need for consensus dampens the potential impact of post-legislative 
scrutiny as the focus is in achieving a unanimous report rather than changes to 
legislation or policy that might be necessary to improve outcomes.  
The need to reach a consensus is also likely to lead committees to ‘fudge’ 
recommendations when they become too politically challenging to receive 
unanimous agreement. Indeed, an example from the Gambling Act inquiry 
suggests that in places of disagreement committees are hedging their bets based 
on the information and evidence they have at the time. 
 The former clerk of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee noted this particular 
example: 
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‘The committee was very torn over the evidence in relation to Fixed 
Odds Betting Terminals and how harmful those were. Though there 
was some evidence, there wasn’t a huge amount and a number of the 
committee members had a gut feeling that these things were bad, 
that people did get addicted to them and spend a huge amount of 
money on them. And others said unless you’ve got a clear picture 
that there is addiction then you are infringing on the personal liberty 
of adults, to restrict it. So we did recommend that more work was 
done in that area’ (Flood, 2017). 
 
Here debate among Members led to a softer recommendation, partly due to a lack 
of data. There is some evidence here of how Member discussions, in order to 
achieve a unanimous report, can lead to weaker recommendations being produced. 
This supports comments made by Clerk A (2017), in chapter 5, who stated that in 
the process of agreeing on a unanimous report the language in recommendations 
can be toned down in order to achieve consensus and the process can lead to 
weaker and less clear recommendations. Again this suggests that a ‘fudge’ was 
made here to try and ensure that there was no division in committee. A further 
implication of this approach is that the wish to produce a unanimous report and 
to avoid divisions can be used by government MPs on committees to force weaker 
recommendations and ones which are more acceptable to the government, leading 
to weaker scrutiny overall. 
One important issue which was raised during the interviews for this case study was 
the extent to which committees take into account the government’s likely response 
to recommendations before they make them. The clerk of the Culture, Media and 
Sport Committee admitted that they ‘have discussions about this…quite frequently’ 
(Flood, 2017) although Philip Davies stated that they didn’t consider this at all and 
that it was all determined by the weight of evidence (Davies, 2017). However, this 
difference in viewpoint might reflect the discussions that went on behind the 
scenes between the chair and the clerk before the report was presented to all 
committee members. If this is the case, then the government’s behaviour is 
impacting upon the committee’s and as such impacts upon the scrutiny 
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relationship between the committee and department. However, the government’s 
behaviour is underpinned by the fact that committees rely on the power of 
persuasion and cannot coerce the government into action (Gordon & Street, 2012). 
While accountability might not be the main aim of post-legislative scrutiny, 
especially in practice as the government under which the Act likely passed is no 
longer in office, it is part of post-legislative scrutiny. Even so, there is limited 
evidence of it being about power and control if committees are actively taking into 
account what the government will and will not accept. This is not surprising to 
some extent on the basis that the quantitative data shows that there is a strong 
relationship between the strength of a recommendation and its acceptance. There 
is, of course, a difference between conclusions and recommendations, and 
generally speaking, the clerk couldn’t think of many occasions where a committee 
has toned down its conclusions to save face with the government (Flood, 2017). 
This might suggest that the criticism is left for the conclusion and a potential 
solution is the focus of the recommendation. Potentially a solution that is 
agreeable to both government and committee.  
With regards to the Freedom of Information Act inquiry, the Justice Committee 
were aware that because governments aren’t very keen on freedom of information, 
if they suggested changes (for example a fee charging system such as they have in 
Ireland) that they would probably be readily accepted by the government (Stewart, 
2017). The committee lead noted that there was quite a strong feeling that it was 
probably a report that would have a certain amount of influence (Stewart, 2017). If 
the committee recommended a weakening of the present system, the government 
would most likely use the committee as cover for it. The government's anticipated 
response was taken into account but not because the government would likely 
reject stronger recommendations, this time it was because the government would 
readily accept certain ones. This meant that from the committee’s perspective that 
the government was on test and had to set out a convincing case to alter the 
legislation (Beith, 2017). This supports the point raised from the example of the 
Gambling Act inquiry, yet, the context is different. While it is taking into account 
the government’s likely reaction, it is from a position of readily accepting 
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recommendations rather than rejecting recommendations that call for stronger 
action out of hand. 
In relation to developing recommendations for the Freedom of Information Act 
inquiry, the Justice Committee focused upon the provisions within the Freedom of 
Information Act that had received the most criticism from witnesses and the 
government, as well as practical solutions to deal with the challenges posed by 
technical changes (House of Commons Justice Committee, 2012). The committee 
was in the unusual position of having a government actively want change and it 
had suggested through its memorandum exactly what changes it wanted to make. 
The committee had heard a lot of evidence about commercial organisations using 
freedom of information, particularly journalists as a short-cut to research, and 
organisations wanting data put in a very specific way so the recipient doesn’t 
effectively have to do the work (Stewart, 2017). While they looked at these issues, 
because of the value to civil society, the committee decided that it’s actually worth 
keeping the regime as it was even though there is inconvenience and it takes up 
resources of public sector organisations. (Stewart, 2017). In most cases, while the 
committee received evidence of problems with the Act, they were also getting 
evidence that suggested the problems were manageable and proportionate to the 
value of the right in itself (Stewart, 2017). The former chair noted that from the 
evidence the committee concluded that some of the changes the government 
proposed wouldn’t achieve the desired improvements, for example discouraging 
requests from media organisations or commercial organisations (Beith, 2017). 
Secondly, the committee concluded that the Act already contained adequate 
means of dealing with frivolous and vexatious requests. Although the government 
was concerned about this, it couldn’t produce any data of widespread unexpected 
costs or paralysing processes resulting from the implementation of the Act (Beith, 
2017). As such the evidence didn’t appear to back up the government’s claims. 
While some tweaks to the freedom of information regime were suggested around 
ministerial exceptions (Stewart, 2017), on the whole, the committee asked the 
government not to take specific action. This is an example of where accountability 
is actively present in post-legislative scrutiny, in comparison to the Culture, Media 
and Sport Committee case study, at least in terms of accountability being about 
 219 
power and control. The Justice Committee did, through soft power means, exercise 
control over the executive in helping to stop them amending the Act. 
 
In terms of the inquiry into the Mental Health Act, one particular issue that caught 
the attention of Members was place of safety, in particular people with mental 
health issues being held in police cells as a place of safety. That was something that 
came up in the evidence but also one of the members of the committee was very 
strongly opposed to that (Lloyd, 2017). So place of safety was an important area for 
the committee and an example of Members’ interest and evidence working 
together to produce recommendations. One of the main ways of developing 
recommendations is through the evidence presented to the committee, the other 
way being Members who have a pre-existing interest in a particular issue (Lloyd, 
2017). It is not surprising that issues raised in evidence presented to committees or 
that came out of the memorandum from interest groups in oral evidence are 
important in terms of developing recommendations. Additionally, this case has 
shown that the pre-existing interest of Members is another reason why Member 
interest is vital. Without it, developing recommendations would be more 
challenging. Nevertheless, there is an implication of focusing recommendations 
upon areas of Members’ interest and that is they will focus upon their pet projects 
at the expense of the other areas that potentially require solutions.  
 
 Response and follow up 
Having addressed the development of recommendations and the publication of the 
report, the next stage in the inquiry process is receiving of the government’s 
response to the inquiry. Responses to committee reports are usually received 
within two months (60 days) of publication (Rogers & Walters, 2015). This is a 
convention rather than a formal rule but it is noted in Erskine May (May, 2004). 
When it comes to the content of a response, if a committee has been highly critical, 
the government is more likely to be defensive in its response. In addition to this, if 
a committee has produced challenging recommendations then the government is 
going to be cautious (Rogers & Walters, 2015). This would explain why committees 
tend to produce weaker amendments. However, Rogers & Walters (2015) note that 
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there is a delayed drop effect when it comes to recommendations. What they mean 
is ambitious recommendations may change public debate and may contribute to a 
shift in policy two to three years after the report has been published. They also 
noted that committees are more influential if they follow up on the 
recommendations they have made, with the government. While most 
departmental select committees run a continuous agenda, if they return to the 
detailed recommendations and apply some pressure to vague promises then they 
can achieve results (Rogers & Walters, 2015). 
 
6.5.1 Case studies 
It is against this backdrop that we assess the response and follow up stage of the 
three post-legislative scrutiny case studies. 
One of the key findings from this research is the admission that select committees 
are not good at following up. In relation to the inquiry into the Gambling Act, both 
the former clerk and former member of the committee, Philip Davies MP noted 
that committees are not good at looking closely at government responses because 
by the time they have produced their report they are tired of the issue (Flood, 2017; 
Davies, 2017). Although the clerk did not make a direct link between this point and 
the inquiry into the Gambling Act 2005, having admitted looking into the whole 
Act was a mistake, it is perhaps not too much of a push to suggest that this may 
have happened with the Culture, Media and Sport Committee in this case. This is 
going to have implications for the impact that post-legislative scrutiny can have, 
as Rogers & Walters (2015) note, follow up is important to ensure pressure is 
applied to the government. It also raises questions about what the point of 
committees undertaking scrutiny is if they are not going to follow up on 
recommendations to ensure they are implemented. However, a lack of hard power 
will likely deter committees from following up, unless they think the government 
is open to persuasion because they cannot force the government to take action 
(Gordon & Street, 2012). They may feel that their time and resources are better 
spent elsewhere if they do not believe they can persuade the government.   
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Another implication of the point above is that Members are tired of an issue and 
want to move on after a report has been published. This once again raises the issue 
of Member interest and perhaps, due to a lack of it, a technocratic and bureaucratic 
approach is being taken by committee staff. The former clerk of the committee 
noted that even if the committee members themselves don’t focus upon the 
government response, the staff do (Flood, 2017). Although it is true that Members 
have a number of responsibilities and would need support when scrutinising the 
response it does not seem constructive for the staff to focus on the response 
without Member involvement. That being said, the former clerk noted that 
Members are more likely to pay attention to it, if they have a specific interest in 
what the government has said, especially to something controversial (Flood, 2017). 
Members’ interest is vital, not just in the preparation of the report but also in the 
scrutiny of the response. This lack of Member engagement, especially at this stage 
has implications for post-legislative scrutiny and scrutiny more broadly. If 
government departments know that only committee staff are going to be reviewing 
the response in detail and that generally speaking committee members are not 
particularly engaged in the process, there is little incentive for them to take 
recommendations seriously, especially ones they do not like. 
Only one of the case study committees had not undertaken any follow-up but their 
case was different from the other committees. The Justice Committee did not do 
any official follow up to the freedom of information inquiry but the option was 
always available if the committee wanted to (Stewart, 2017). This is on the basis 
that there was not a great deal to respond to, as the Freedom of Information 
Commission was undertaking further scrutiny of the freedom of information 
regime (Beith 2017; Stewart, 2017). The chair added that it simply wasn’t necessary 
at that stage to follow up because the government did back off and left things as 
they were (Beith, 2017). The committee lead noted that if they had recommended 
some significant amendments they would have followed up on how those 
amendments had played out and how the government had used the cover of the 
recommendations to make amendments to the Act (Stewart, 2017). 
There is, however, evidence of committees deciding not to chase the government 
up on particular recommendations. The former clerk of the Culture, Media and 
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Sport Committee noted that the committee were aware the government was 
unhappy with their recommendations relating to casinos but they weren't ‘willing 
to die in a ditch’ (Flood, 2017) over this issue. When it comes to scrutiny of the 
response it is clearly about picking the right battles, suggesting there was a strategy 
at play here as well. As a rule, committees do not like getting into an argument 
with the government as the government will usually win (Flood, 2017). This goes 
to highlight the relative weakness of parliamentary committees, in forcing action, 
relying solely on soft power. There was the potential to issue a special report 
addressing the response, but the committee didn't take that option this time. 
Instead, they opted for a ‘magisterial silence’ (Flood, 2017) suggesting they were 
standing by their report, which the former clerk claimed is more dignified than 
getting into a war of words with the government. She argued that while this may 
look like backing down to outsiders, it might more accurately be named ‘picking 
your battles’ (Flood, 2017). Ultimately the committee was more interested in what 
the government had agreed to and what action they were going to take (Flood, 
2017). This again underlines the points made in earlier paragraphs regarding 
committees not being very good at following up. This has implications for post-
legislative scrutiny, and scrutiny more generally on the basis that if the government 
knows a committee is not going to want to get into a fight with them over their 
response to recommendations, there is less incentive to take them seriously.  
Despite the admission that committees are not good at following up and the 
subsequent evidence suggesting that committees avoid following up in certain 
scenarios, there is evidence of a limited amount of follow up taking place but this 
usually happens through means that are convenient to the committee. Despite 
suggesting committees are not good at following up, the former clerk of the 
Culture, Media and Sport Committee noted that the committee was interested in 
following up on the bits of legislation that were brought forward in relation to 
online gambling (Flood, 2017). Although no legislative recommendations were 
formally made, the committee did shine a spotlight on the online gambling 
industry and the government did go on to take action to deal with the legislative 
framework in relation on online gambling. The committee also followed it up with 
evidence from the Gambling Commission and trawled through previous reports to 
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find any recommendations they wanted to follow-up on with the Gambling 
Commission (Flood, 2017). Rather than there being a direct follow up inquiry, it 
was follow up through other convenient means, as the committee often hears from 
the Gambling Commission and the legislation conveniently came along. In 
addition to this, the committee also did some pre-legislative scrutiny into 
advertising (Flood, 2017), although this wasn’t formally recommended in the 
inquiry report, it allowed them to follow up on advertising for gambling and they 
noticed the draft bill was in line with what they had recommended. If during these 
actions they feel that there are still problems, they can pencil future inquiries into 
their diaries. Committees tend to take a holistic view with regards to the fact that 
a lot of the work they do will overlap with other inquiries. They do not want to lose 
sight of what they have recommended but they do not necessarily think it is helpful 
to get a minister in and go through a list of recommendations (Flood, 2017).  
In addition to this example, the Health Committee in its inquiry into the Mental 
Health Act 2007 followed up through correspondence between the chair of the 
committee and the Secretary of State on key issues (Lloyd, 2017). The former clerk 
of the Health Committee also noted that the inquiry that the committee held on 
children and adolescent mental health followed on from the post-legislative 
scrutiny inquiry because one of the things that the committee were particularly 
concerned about was children and young adults being kept in police cells. It was 
only one part of the original report but as a consequence of the inquiry, it made 
the committee go on and do other things relating to mental health (Lloyd, 2017). 
As a result, this inquiry has acted as a catalyst for other inquiries into mental health 
and allowed additional follow up through the committee’s continuous work 
programme. There are implications for committees undertaking follow up through 
continuous work programmes or using convenient methods rather than a more 
detailed look through the recommendations. As noted at the start of this section 
committees are more influential if they follow up on the recommendations in 
detail and apply some pressure to vague promises. The use of the methods outlined 
above potentially blunts their impact here, as written correspondence is not going 
to be effective if you cannot put a minister on the spot. If you are undertaking an 
oral evidence session, following up on recommendations is likely to be pushed 
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down the agenda by more topical issues  and the recommendations of a previous 
inquiry are unlikely to be a committee’s headline ones in a new report. The lack of 
follow up in relation to post-legislative scrutiny does a disservice to the time and 
effort that committees put into the inquiry in the first place.  
 
 Overall impact 
Having assessed the typical process through which committees undertake 
inquiries, and having applied the findings from the three post-legislative scrutiny 
case studies to these processes, the chapter now moves on to address the impact 
of these inquiries. This is important. If committees are going to continue to 
undertake such scrutiny, then there needs to be some sort of return for them. 
Additionally, with the findings of this research suggesting that committees are 
producing weaker recommendations in order to get more of them accepted and 
the government is likely to reject stronger recommendations, it raises questions 
about where committee impact, is coming from. However, it is important to place 
impact with some context. Impact can take a long time to become apparent and 
different policy areas will have different time frames through which impact might 
be visible. Take education policy as an example, it will not be possible to see the 
full effects of an educational policy change until the first cohort of students to fully 
see those changes have completed further education and have entered the world 
of work. It could take over a decade from such policies being passed to seeing any 
benefits from it. As such it is long term. 
One area of impact noted from the case studies was that of stopping or persuading 
the government to not take action. In relation to the inquiry into the Freedom of 
Information Act, the committee lead noted that the Freedom of Information 
inquiry was successful because nothing happened, and the committee gave the act 
essentially a clean bill of health (Stewart, 2017). The overall impact was the 
government didn’t amend the Freedom of Information Act, bar some minor things 
(Stewart, 2017). Although the Commission and other voices will have played an 
important role, (indeed the government backed off after the Commission had 
reported), the committee report will have had its impact too, at least in the 
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government trying another avenue to seek changes and ending back up in the same 
place. Although the topic was already on the agenda, the committee did play a role 
in altering the government’s course. This was through the use of soft power as 
opposed to hard power. Indeed the committee was just one of many voices 
lobbying the government on this and the Freedom of Information Commission 
probably heard from similar people as the Justice Committee. Alexandra Runswick 
from Unlock Democracy agreed with such an impact, in terms of helping to stop 
the government alter the legislation (Runswick, 2018). Additionally, she noted it 
had an impact in terms of potentially influencing the Commission as the inquiry 
had undertaken serious, up to date research when dismissing the government’s 
concerns (Runswick, 2018). This has implications for other inquiries and other 
committees. If an inquiry, post-legislative or not, can undertake serious, up to date 
research then there is a potential longer lasting impact. There is the potential that 
these reports could become seminal pieces of work which future committees 
and/or governments utilise to push for or halt changes to legislation. Post-
legislative scrutiny should, therefore, try to avoid the ‘hit and run’ approach 
committees in the Commons have been described as taking (Russell, 2013). There 
is also clearly an avenue for committees to influence government as part of a wider 
group of organisations. This links back to previous discussion regarding parliament 
being at the apex of scrutiny and that parliament needs to better utilise the work 
of other organisations to undertake scrutiny but also work together to apply 
pressure to ensure action is taken. There is also an implication in terms of time, it 
is clear that it took some time between the committee reporting, the commission’s 
review and then the government making a decision. Impact can be long term and 
as such, time, patience and the ability to apply some pressure will be needed. 
Another area of impact that became apparent during the research was putting an 
issue on the political agenda. This was noted for both the Gambling Act and Mental 
Health Act inquiries. In relation to the Gambling Act, the agenda setting impact 
was on online gambling. The focus of the inquiry on online gambling, the clerk 
claimed, led to an increased focus from the government on it. The government 
went on to produce legislation in an attempt to start regulating the area and bring 
the online sector far more into line with the real world (Flood, 2017). While it is 
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not clear how influential the committee was here in the government eventually 
legislating, the report was probably one of many voices highlighting the problems 
of online gambling to the government and to the regulators (Flood, 2017). As such 
adding pressure will have played a role. In addition to putting the issue of online 
gambling onto the political agenda, the inquiry also highlighted issues like the 
proliferation of betting shops on the high-street which was a perverse result of 
limiting the number of FOBTs in betting shops (Flood, 2017). This issue is now 
higher on the political agenda than it was at the time of the post-legislative scrutiny 
inquiry. Although it is still not a problem that has been resolved it did give a boost 
to local authorities who did feel isolated and showed them that a parliamentary 
committee understood their views (Flood, 2017). The former clerk of the Health 
Committee felt that the inquiry into the Mental Health Act 2007 did put the issue 
of mental health onto the parliamentary agenda, and there was a least one further 
inquiry which was related to the original post-legislative scrutiny inquiry in this 
area (Lloyd, 2017). This style of impact is relatively weak and gives the indication 
that the inquiries were of little consequence. If an inquiry has created a further 
agenda for a topic it would suggest it did not solve issues. As committees do 
produce a number of recommendations for research and review, this would explain 
why an agenda setting role appears to be prevalent, at least in these case studies. 
If you are requesting more research and the government is accepting that point, 
then you are inevitably putting an issue on the agenda for further review.  
Linked to there being an agenda setting role, the Mental Health Alliance felt that 
the impact of the inquiry was that the important issues they had raised in evidence 
had been brought to the attention of both parliament and government (Cobb, 
2017). So there is potentially a safety valve function for post-legislative scrutiny as 
well. Although an important parliamentary function, as noted by Packenham 
(Norton, 2005), it does not suggest an impact that will make a difference in the 
lives of those people affected by the legislation. However, there are difficulties in 
assessing impact. It can take many years for policy ideas like ones generated 
through post-legislative scrutiny, to be assessed and make their way through the 
policy making process. It can take years to see an outcome, especially to anything 
that is legislative in nature (as there will be a need for either a new bill or a suitable 
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bill to attach amendments). Additionally, it could also take a change in 
government to drive forward impact from such inquiries, as governments which 
introduced a particular piece of legislation are unlikely to admit they made a 
mistake or that their legislation is somehow faulty. Furthermore, opposition 
parties will not have the same arduous policy making processes that the 
government and civil service have, meaning they can more readily pick up select 
committee recommendations which match their vision or aims. Just because there 
has been limited impact from these inquiries to date, does not mean there will no 
impact at all in the coming years. 
Points were also raised in these case studies regarding a lack of impact all round. 
Philip Davies, a former member of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee noted 
that although the Gambling Act inquiry was a large and expensive one (involving 
overseas visits), the inquiry did not have much impact (Davies, 2017). This view 
was also held by the Evangelical Alliance (Webster, 2018). Although as noted in the 
previous paragraph, impact can be long term and is perhaps yet unseen. The 
difference in opinion in comparison to the former clerk could be down to the 
different roles played by clerks and Members. It is the job of the committee 
secretariat to keep an eye on issues relevant to their committee whereas Members’ 
focus is likely to be elsewhere. But it does suggest that there was no obvious impact 
if a committee member with a keen interest in the gambling industry could not see 
any. Indeed, except putting an issue onto the agenda the former clerk of the Health 
Committee felt that there was no overall impact from the Mental Health Act 
inquiry that he could really think of. This could be a result of the length of time 
that it can take for the impact of inquiries to become apparent, of course depending 
upon what the committee has recommended. These findings suggest that there 
has been limited impact from these committees in relation to post-legislative 
scrutiny. This has implications for post-legislative scrutiny on the basis that if there 
is no discernible impact, then committees could in future decide to focus upon 
areas where they can have an impact. To an extent, it could undermine the 
willingness of committees to undertake post-legislative scrutiny. However the fact 
that committees rarely follow up formally on post-legislative scrutiny will have 
affected the level of impact that a committee can have. This is also tied in with the 
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recommendations that committees are producing, if a committee actively 
produces weaker recommendations that call for limited action, then they are also 
limiting their own impact. 
 
 Conclusion  
To conclude, this chapter has addressed the experience of committees in the House 
of Commons which have undertaken post-legislative scrutiny. It has assessed this 
experience through the typical flow of a committee inquiry, in order to assess how 
these committees have been operating but to also highlight any challenges these 
post-legislative case studies have had along the way. 
At the start of an inquiry, we noted some of the criteria and factors that the 
committees took into account when deciding whether to undertake post-
legislative scrutiny and which legislation should be selected. There is a focus upon 
Members’ interests, representations from interest groups and also government 
departmental outputs. It was noted that the implication of these pressures is that 
committees can get led by MP’s pet projects or by the views of government and 
interest groups. Such leading could be detrimental to scrutiny and especially the 
selection of legislation for post-legislative scrutiny. There is a need for the selection 
of legislation to receive post-legislative scrutiny to be more open and committees 
need to be alert to the fact that such organisations have their own reasons and 
motives for suggesting certain action. That being said the Freedom of Information 
Act inquiry is a good example of where a committee has potentially been led by 
the government into undertaking an inquiry, but at the same time has, through 
thorough scrutiny, rebuffed the government’s position. There were also particular 
challenges to note from deciding how to scrutinise an Act. The experience of the 
Culture, Media and Sport Committee when undertaking scrutiny of the Gambling 
Act 2005 highlighted the challenges of scrutinising an Act as a whole, especially for 
a departmental select committee. Although part of the problem with this particular 
Act was the fact it was a fairly large consolidation one. While the committee was 
told to undertake a full review of the Act it was clear from the experience of the 
clerk and the Members that this was not the correct approach to take. One way to 
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avoid such problems in the future would be for a committee to publish preliminary 
terms of reference when launching an inquiry so they can scope the legislation for 
problem areas, before publishing final terms of reference once problems have been 
identified and the scope of the inquiry narrowed down. This would be an important 
and useful addition to post-legislative scrutiny inquiries on the basis that it was 
noted that going into such inquiries you do not always know where the problems 
with the legislation lies. 
The collection of evidence also highlighted interesting implications for both post-
legislative scrutiny and broader scrutiny. There were challenges at this stage in 
terms of the appointment of specialist advisors as well as bias among committee 
members. It is important for these scrutiny processes to be objective and 
independent of parties so as not to replicate scrutiny on the floor of the House. 
There is a need to ensure the process of selecting specialist advisors is open and 
transparent and that committees listen to a balanced spread of evidence.  
Challenges were also noted in the subsequent step in the inquiry process, the 
development of recommendations and the publication of a report. The drafting of 
the report being focused on the secretariat and the chair of the committee, suggests 
a bureaucratic and technocratic process and raises questions about wider Member 
engagement in this process. The analysis also found evidence of committees taking 
a government’s likely response into account before making a recommendation. 
This supports the findings in chapter five and provides an explanation for why 
committees produce weaker recommendations. There is also a potential problem 
of recommendations focusing solely on areas of Member interest, as this could 
mean important areas of the Act have not been scrutinised properly. There is thus 
a balance to be struck between a potential bureaucratic approach and a Member 
interest approach to developing recommendations. That balance might be 
achieved by Members who are more willing to undertake required scrutiny as 
legislators rather than focusing solely on their personal and constituency interest. 
There are also problems at the government response and follow up stage of an 
inquiry. This mainly focuses around committees not being very good at following 
up due to a lack of Member interest but also because they utilise convenient 
230 
methods of follow up such as annual oral evidence sessions, where post-legislative 
scrutiny recommendations are likely to be low on the priority list. This has 
implications for scrutiny on the basis that if the government knows a committee is 
not necessarily going to follow up directly there is less of an incentive for them to 
take recommendations seriously. There should be a requirement for committees 
to spend more time following up rather than the typical ‘hit and run’ approach that 
Russell (2013) notes they take. This all has implications for the overall impact that 
committees can have. The analysis showed that impact in these cases has been 
limited, partly because the committees have not been following up effectively. Both 
Rogers & Walters (2015) and the former clerk of the Health Committee noted that 
pressure is needed to ensure change, just because a committee makes a 
recommendation does not mean it will be accepted (Lloyd, 2017). 
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Chapter 7 The experience of undertaking post-
legislative scrutiny in the House of 
Lords 
This chapter moves on to address the process in the House of Lords. In so doing, 
it answers the final part of research question three (i.e. what has the experience 
been of committees undertaking post-legislative scrutiny?). The processes in both 
Houses of Parliament, when it comes to post-legislative scrutiny, are different. So 
it is not possible to generalise from the findings of the House of Commons chapter. 
In the House of Lords, post-legislative scrutiny is undertaken by ad hoc 
committees, created to undertake a specific function, in comparison to sessional 
committees in the Commons. As noted earlier in the thesis, there are important 
differences between these types of committees but it is worth revisiting them here. 
Sessional committees are formed for a full parliament whereas ad hoc committees 
cease to function after they have published their reports. Other differences include 
the time available to committees. Sessional committees (such as departmental 
select committees) have other tasks to complete whereas ad hoc committees are 
given one task. This means they can spend more time on work such as post-
legislative scrutiny. There is also a key difference in that the Lords do not receive 
post-legislative review memoranda from the government, unless they specifically 
ask for one. The process in the Lords leaves space for Peers and clerks to bring 
forward ideas for post-legislative scrutiny, outside of the government’s agreed 
memoranda process in the Commons.  
From these differences, we might expect follow up in the House of Lords to be even 
less effective than in the House of Commons due to the nature of ad hoc 
committees dissolving following the publication of their report. This is due to the 
fact that over a long inquiry, committee staff develop a working relationship and 
foster contacts with government departments which the Liaison Committee (when 
they follow up in writing on the ad hoc committee’s behalf) does not necessarily 
have. The full powers of a dedicated committee are not available to former 
committee members when it comes to following up on the inquiry. Additionally, 
with nine month long inquiries it might be expected that the House of Lords will 
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produce more recommendations on average and that there will be a greater focus 
upon technical aspects of post-legislative scrutiny. However, it is expected that 
committees will avoid making stronger recommendations which are more likely to 
be rejected due to the primacy of the House of Commons. It might also be expected 
that with the greater independence that the House of Lords has, that Acts will be 
selected upon their need for review. 
This chapter will therefore focus upon the experience of the House of Lords Liaison 
Committee, which oversees the process in the House, and the experience of two ad 
hoc committees which have undertaken post-legislative scrutiny. These ad hoc 
committees are the Select Committee on the Equality Act 2010 and Disability and 
the Select Committee on the Licensing Act 2003. The ad hoc committees in this 
chapter were selected using the same criteria as the committees for the previous 
chapter. There were six inquiries to select from in the House of Lords and this 
selection accounts for 33% of inquiries undertaken by the Lords between 2010-2017. 
Beyond the formal criteria used (see pages 194-195), final selection came down to 
the availability of committee staff and members. In total, seven interviews were 
undertaken for this chapter with the clerk of the House of Lords Liaison 
Committee as well as the clerk, chair and an interest group for both case studies. 
The clerk of both of these committees was Michael Collon. Two separate interviews 
were undertaken with Michael for the purposes of this research, one for each 
committee he had clerked for. It is common in the House of Lords for the same 
clerk to be appointed to lead numerous post-legislative scrutiny inquiries. 
In practical terms, this chapter contributes to our knowledge of post-legislative 
scrutiny as a function of parliamentary committees and how committees deal with 
such scrutiny. Additionally, it provides an assessment of the procedures utilised in 
the House of Lords with the voices of those who have taken part in the process. It 
also contributes to our knowledge of the behaviour of committees in terms of the 
development of recommendations and follow up to government responses. It also 
contributes to the impact of parliamentary committees, through the clerks and 
committee members about specific inquiries and the issues that were considered 
when undertaking such scrutiny. Finally, it contributes to the existing literature on 
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the modernisation of the UK Parliament. Specifically how the House of Lords ad 
hoc committees are undertaking this newly formalised task. 
 
 House of Lords Liaison Committee 
The chapter begins with an assessment of the role that the House of Lords Liaison 
Committee plays initiating post-legislative scrutiny and following up 
recommendations. This analysis of the Liaison Committee is placed in this chapter 
assessing the process of post-legislative scrutiny in the House of Lords on the basis 
that it forms an important part of that process. To understand the experience of 
the ad hoc committees, you also need to assess the role the Liaison Committee 
plays in selection and follow up. Since 2012, the House of Lords Liaison Committee 
has been appointing at least one ad hoc committee per session to undertake post-
legislative scrutiny. Ad hoc committees are popular, especially with Members, as 
they allow specific and topical issues to be examined without creating a permanent 
vehicle for doing so (Rogers & Walters, 2015). These committees are appointed for 
one session to undertake that particular task and then dissolve once they have 
reported. One benefit of using such committees for post-legislative scrutiny is that 
they can focus for an entire nine months on one inquiry, unlike sessional 
committees which will have several different tasks/inquiries to be completing in a 
similar timeframe. There is a downside however, in that ad hoc committees are not 
formally constituted to receive the government’s response or to follow up as a 
committee. 
 
7.1.1 Role of the Liaison Committee 
The Liaison Committee in the House of Lords is more proactive when it comes to 
post-legislative scrutiny, than its House of Commons equivalent, in that it formally 
recommends which committees are set up and what topics are examined (Tudor, 
2017). Indeed, the Head of the House of Commons Scrutiny Unit noted that the 
House of Commons Liaison Committee in the 2015 Parliament was rather less 
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active than previously, so there was less reinforcement and, as a result, less 
incentive for committees to follow up on their core tasks (Lloyd, 2017).  
Each autumn, the Liaison Committee, in an open call to Members, invites ideas on 
both post-legislative scrutiny and on other more general ad hoc committees. In the 
case of post-legislative scrutiny, the committee office also does research to see 
what legislation is suitable for post-legislative scrutiny (Tudor, 2017). They do this 
to check what has or has not been done by the Commons, to give greater choice to 
the Liaison Committee when deciding and to avoid overlap between the two 
Houses (Tudor, 2017). With the current lack of post-legislative scrutiny in both 
Houses, overlap by accident would be difficult to achieve. They also do this because 
Members themselves tend mostly to focus on more general policy proposals rather 
than proposals for post-legislative scrutiny (Tudor, 2017). There is opportunity for 
this process to be improved, for example, with the use of public engagement (as 
used by the Scottish Parliament’s Public Audit and Post-Legislative Scrutiny 
Committee) to ensure a wider variety of Acts are shortlisted for review. That is not 
to say that Members do not put forward ideas, but the supplementation of ideas is 
welcome.  
In terms of researching what memoranda have been published, the clerk noted the 
most central single source they have is the House of Commons Library memo on 
the subject. The second is through contacting individual House of Commons 
committee clerks (Tudor, 2017). This is viewed as important as the House of 
Commons has primacy and, as such, there is a reluctance to stray into what might 
be the remit of a Commons committee. The relationship with the House of 
Commons thus impacts the behaviour of the House of Lords. This is not necessarily 
the most productive way of finding out what has or has not been scrutinised. The 
House of Commons Library note on post-legislative scrutiny has not been updated 
since 2013. Indeed, the clerk noted that sometimes they discover these memos by 
doing an internet search on Google. 
The clerk also noted that there is a difference between some committees in how 
they view government memoranda, as some departmental select committees feel 
that because the memos are submitted to them, they belong to them (Tudor, 2017). 
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The remit of House of Commons committees means that they receive the 
memoranda from the governmental department. Commons committees are 
protective of that remit and feel that because the memos are submitted to them, 
they have first pick as to whether to undertake additional scrutiny on the memo. 
The House of Commons should have first refusal as the memoranda are currently 
sent to them, but after that, any committee should be able to take it up if they so 
wish.  
The Liaison Committee also plays a role in the follow up of post-legislative 
recommendations with the government. This follow up usually occurs one year 
after the publication of the report or one year after the government’s response to 
the report has been published, to allow the government some time to implement 
the recommendations. This is important for the impact of Lords’ ad hoc 
committees, as without such work, it would be difficult for them to exert influence 
as even if Members wish to follow up individually, they do not have the power and 
resources of a committee behind them. The fact that ad hoc committees dissolve 
after the publication of their report is one of the weaknesses, if not the main 
weakness of House of Lords ad hoc committees (Tudor, 2017). This severely limits 
the ability to do follow up, which is in sharp contrast to a sessional committee. 
Sessional committees can have a rolling work programme, which if the committee 
is so inclined can involve a series of follow up evidence sessions.  
Consequently, the Liaison Committee has developed various methods to follow up 
on behalf of ad hoc committees. The main method is to follow up on specific 
recommendations in writing with the relevant government department. At the end 
of each inquiry, the Liaison Committee will ask the ad hoc committee to highlight 
the recommendations they want followed up (Tudor, 2017). The reason for 
identifying the most important recommendations is Lords committees, perhaps 
partly due to the length of their inquiries, frequently produce many 
recommendations. Indeed, data in chapter five showed that on average Lords’ 
committees produce 41 recommendations in comparison to 19 in the Commons. A 
downside to that is government responses can then look as if they are accepting 
quite a lot of recommendations, but not necessarily the most important ones 
(Tudor, 2017). Another downside is that it may signal to the government that there 
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are going to be certain recommendations that the committee will not follow up on 
and subsequently create an incentive for inaction in these areas.  
The Liaison Committee has also experimented with debates on reports. However, 
a limitation of this is that the time on the floor of the House is limited. The clerk 
of the Liaison Committee noted that there was nothing she or the committee could 
do that would ever likely be enough for Members in general (Tudor, 2017). The 
Liaison Committee here has shown initiative in terms of identifying a weakness in 
the processes and developing ideas to try and provide mechanisms for some follow 
up. That being said, a written letter to a department is unlikely to be the most 
effective way of following up with the government, as committees cannot put a 
minister on the spot like they can in an oral evidence session. 
When asked whether the follow up processes were perceived to work, the clerk 
said probably not as some chairs would like to reconvene the committee formally 
so meetings could take place and they could access support, including drafting 
support (Tudor, 2017). The clerk also noted that she and her team do not have the 
civil service contacts and relationships that chairs and their secretariat build up 
during a nine-month inquiry (Tudor, 2017). The expertise is held by the secretariat 
who, by this point, have moved on to another committee. This makes the process 
even more challenging.  However, there is still guaranteed follow up on the most 
important recommendations. As was noted in the previous chapter on the House 
of Commons, follow up rarely goes beyond routine questioning of ministers at an 
annual oral evidence session or through written correspondence. Potentially with 
powers to reconvene, the ad hoc committees in the Lords could lead the way in 
terms of conducting follow up. It is, however, unlikely the government would be 
thrilled by the reform on the basis that it benefits from committees not being able 
to effectively follow up. Kelso (2009) argues that institutional context impacts 
upon potential for reform, and if a government benefits from a particular situation, 
it is unlikely to seek or support change. For example, parliament struggles to secure 
effective ministerial accountability, and as the executive benefits from that 
situation, it is unlikely to seek institutional change to correct it (Kelso, 2009: 22). 
One of the key pillars of the Westminster system of government is strong party 
government, and the executive are not going to want to weaken that. There is 
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therefore a reform inertia in parliament and this will impact on the 
recommendations made in this thesis too. For reform to occur, Norton (2000) 
argues that there needs to be a window of opportunity, a coherent reform agenda 
and leadership.  
However, it should also be noted that Members themselves can take up the cause 
and table oral and written questions on the issue, and they can also table relevant 
amendments to legislation. Despite the criticisms, there is some, albeit limited 
follow up with the government, which potentially would not be there without the 
committee. 
 
7.1.2 Factors the committee considered when selecting legislation 
The Liaison Committee plays an important role in the initiation and follow up of 
post-legislative scrutiny inquiries. But this raises the question of how the 
committee decides what legislation to select for post-legislative scrutiny.  
One of the key factors that the committee considers is whether the inquiry would 
make the best use of the expertise of Members of the House of Lords (Tudor, 2017). 
Indeed, one of the claimed benefits of the second chamber is that it contains many 
people with expertise in different sectors. When undertaking post-legislative 
scrutiny, it is important to tap into that expertise.  Another important criterion for 
the committee is whether or not the inquiry can reasonably be completed within 
nine months (Tudor, 2017). An example of this was the Equality Act Committee, 
which focused upon the disability elements of the Act on the basis that a full review 
could not be undertaken in nine months (Tudor, 2017). However, there is the 
potential that this leads to only certain types of inquiries taking place, ones that fit 
a nine-month window. 
One other obvious criterion is whether the Act or topic has been or is likely to be 
considered by a Common’s committee. This is an important consideration; while 
resources are stretched, it is critical to ensure that there is as little overlap as 
possible between the two Houses. While the two Houses may approach inquiries 
from different angles, the House of Commons with its primacy gets first pick of the 
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legislation due for review (usually selected as a consequence of having received a 
post-legislative review memorandum from the government). There is more than 
enough work for both Houses to be doing (Tudor, 2017). However, this does raise 
questions about self-regulation. The House of Lords is limited by asymmetrical 
bicameralism and sees its role as adding value to the political process, as well as 
complementing the work of the Commons rather than conflicting with it (Norton, 
2017). If the House of Commons is not undertaking this work then surely such 
scrutiny would be complementary rather than conflicting with the Commons. 
There is no formal rule that requires the House of Lords to avoid inquiries likely to 
be undertaken by the House of Commons but this practice has developed into a 
norm (Shepsle, 2006). Such norms develop from the timidity of the House of Lords 
in terms of its legitimacy and from the threat of reform (Russell, 2013). This does 
not meet the expectations in the introduction of this chapter on the basis that 
committees appear to actively avoid certain Acts. 
Timing is also another important factor. The clerk noted that there is an optimal 
time for post-legislative scrutiny and that is five to ten years after it has come into 
force (Tudor, 2017). This is different from the time frame that the Cabinet Office 
guideline suggests (three-five years). It was also noted in the previous chapter on 
the House of Commons that clerks felt that this was too short a period. Linking 
this back to the point about overlap between the two Houses, a downside of 
assessing too early is that it might deter committees from reassessing an Act at a 
future point, because it had received review before.  One example of timing that 
the clerk gave was that one of their early ad hoc committees, a committee on small-
medium enterprises and exports, recommended post-legislative scrutiny be 
undertaken on the Bribery Act. The Liaison Committee has considered that 
recommendation two or three times and still felt at the time of the interview that 
the legislation is not yet ready for scrutiny on the basis that the Act is still novel 
and needs time to settle on the statue books (Tudor, 2017). However, this Act was 
reviewed in the 2017/19 session. One other point to note here is the discussions 
that clearly go on regarding what is ready and what is not, appears to be a process 
that the Liaison Committee takes seriously. Having considered the proposal a 
number of times also suggests that there is a keenness among Members to review 
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this Act. The Liaison Committee then appears to be acting as a brake. On the issue 
of timing, the clerk noted that the timeframe is not set in stone and that it operates 
more like guidance (Tudor, 2017). Within an individual Act of Parliament, different 
sections can be brought into force at different times. Three to six years after Royal 
Assent is not necessarily three to six years after bringing it into force. Flexibility is 
needed to ensure that legislation is assessed at the most beneficial time. 
In relation to the selection of legislation by the Liaison Committee, the clerk of the 
Licencing Act 2003 Committee noted the following additional criteria that are 
often considered. He suggested, firstly, that the Act should be a major one that has 
reformed the law in a substantial way, rather than an Act that has made minor 
amendments to the statute books. Secondly, it should have been in force for a 
substantial period of time (Collon, 2017b). The clerk’s view was that it should have 
at least been five years since the Act was enacted but preferably seven to eight years 
minimum (Collon, 2017b). Additionally, since resources are limited, post-
legislative scrutiny should, generally speaking, be focused upon Acts that have 
made a substantial contribution, although this raises the question of what counts 
as a substantial contribution. However, legislation such as amendment Acts which 
are usually limited are unlikely to need a full nine-month review in the Lords. The 
Liaison Committee does produce a list of suggested ad hoc committees and during 
the open call for ideas for the 2016-2017 session, the Legal Services Act 2007 and 
the Animal Welfare Act 2006 were considered for post-legislative scrutiny. Indeed, 
there appears to be a routine in place now where inquiries are determined at a 
certain time in the year. However, this also raises the question of what happens if 
the need for an inquiry arises just after the start of a new session? Do they wait for 
the following year or do they launch an immediate inquiry?  
The third criteria for the House of Lords is to avoid anything too politically 
controversial because the focus of post-legislative scrutiny is more on the Act itself 
rather than looking at the underlying politics of the policy (Collon, 2017b). This 
behaviour will link back to the timidity of the House which stems from its 
unelected status and the primacy of the House of Commons (Russell, 2013). This 
restricts the House of Lords in terms of potential post-legislative scrutiny inquires. 
One other criterion the clerk noted was to avoid legislation that is about to be 
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substantially amended because there would not be much point in conducting a full 
review (Collon, 2017b). However, surely there is an argument that if an Act were to 
be amended (even through another Act), that a post-legislative inquiry might help 
to inform such amendments. This raises questions about the appointment of ad 
hoc committees at the start of a session. If an Act warrants attention during the 
middle of a session, then there should be a procedure to appoint a committee, 
rather than waiting until the start of the next session, by which time the 
government may have already acted. This is also a particular characteristic of the 
Lords, wanting to avoid anything too partisan. However, there is general guidance 
from the Leader of the House of Commons suggesting that post-legislative scrutiny 
should not be a rerun of previous policy debates (Office of the Leader of the House 
of Commons, 2008). This raises questions again about the House of Lords being 
self-regulating on the basis that they are excusing themselves from specific Acts, 
even if they may require review. This would not be such a problem if the Commons 
were willing to tackle more partisan legislation.  
While the data in chapter four suggests that some contentious legislation is 
receiving review, there is also data suggesting that parliament is avoiding the 
legislation of the 2010-2015 Coalition Government. This might be viewed as 
partisan legislation on the basis that the major party in that Coalition is still in 
office. The House of Lords should not rule out scrutiny based upon when the 
legislation was passed as the House could potentially review Acts more objectively 
than the House of Commons because there is less executive and party dominance. 
Such an ethos developed from the presence of the Crossbench Peers, who remain 
free of party to express their opinions, and from the partisan model of 
bicameralism in which there is a purposeful difference in which parties hold 
majorities in both Houses (Russell, 2013). However, structural issues also affect 
behaviour in the House of Lords, for example their appointment for life impacts 
upon their willingness to listen to their whips. Their unelected status, and 
questions about legitimacy, can also lead to some timidity. (Russell, 2013) 
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 Introduction to ad hoc committees and post-legislative scrutiny 
Having addressed the role of the House of Lords Liaison Committee in the 
initiation and follow up of post-legislative scrutiny in the House of Lords, the 
chapter moves on to address these points, plus others in the context of the Select 
Committee on the Equality Act 2010 and Disability and the Select Committee on 
the Licensing Act 2003. From this point, it mirrors the structure of the previous 
chapter and addresses how these case study committees undertook post-legislative 
scrutiny by following the process of a typical inquiry. As the same rules apply to 
Lord’s committees as they do to Common’s committees (Rogers & Walters, 2015) 
and they tend to follow the same process, this section will address the start of the 
inquiries, the evidence gathered, the reports, the response and follow up, as well 
as the overall impact of the inquiries. We start with an introduction to each of the 
case studies, to provide some context. 
 
7.2.1 Select Committee on the Equality Act 2010 and Disability 
The post-legislative inquiry undertaken by the Select Committee on the Equality 
Act 2010 came five years following the enactment of the Equality Act 2010. The Act 
brought together all major equality reforming legislation into one statute, 
including the Sex Discrimination Act and the Disability Discrimination Act (Select 
Committee on the Equality Act and Disability, 2016). However, as the report noted, 
the Equality Act was not just a consolidating Act. The Act: “expanded the anti-
discrimination law applying to race, sex and disability, and applied the same 
principles to age, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, religion or 
belief, sexual orientation, and pregnancy and maternity” (Select Committee on the 
Equality Act 2010 and Disability, 2016: 7). Therefore, this was a landmark piece of 
legislation in terms of promoting and protecting equality. 
The Equality Act received Royal Assent on 8 April, 2010 and most of its main 
provisions were brought into force by 1 October, 2010. In its report, the committee 
noted that post-legislative scrutiny of the Act was not just desirable, but essential 
(Select Committee on the Equality Act 2010 and Disability, 2016). In March 2015, in 
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preparation for the setting up of the committee, the clerk of the committee, 
requested that the government’s Women and Equalities Office prepare a 
Memorandum on the Equality Act (Collon, 2017a; Select Committee on the 
Equality Act 2010 and Disability, 2016).  
The memorandum that the committee received from the government covered the 
Act as a whole. However, the committee was only interested (for the purposes of 
the inquiry), with the provisions relating to disability on the basis of the remit that 
the Liaison Committee had set (Select Committee on the Equality Act 2010 and 
Disability, 2016). This is an example of post-legislative scrutiny which focuses on 
specific parts of an Act, as opposed to the Act as a whole. 
Overall, the committee didn’t face any major problems during the inquiry. The 
main challenges were practical ones linked to the nature of the inquiry. There were 
Members and witnesses who had disabilities. However, the chair noted that she 
thought they managed those challenges well (Deech, 2017). Linking back to the 
point the clerk of the Liaison Committee made about ad hoc committees 
innovating, the Select Committee on the Equality Act 2010 and Disabilities held 
one session in British Sign Language so they were able to take evidence from those 
with speech difficulties (Deech, 2017). The committee hearings were, therefore, 
accessible to the witnesses regardless of disability, and special permission was 
granted to the disabled members of the committee who were able to vote in 
divisions from committee rooms so they didn’t have to move between committee 
rooms and division lobbies (Deech, 2017). However, Terry Riley of the British Deaf 
Association argued that from his perspective, this was just tokenism (Riley, 2018). 
This shows that parliament can be accessible to everyone, at least in terms of 
attending committee hearings, which should be standard for sessions and other 
events.   
 
7.2.2 Select Committee on the Licensing Act 2003 
The Licensing Act 2003 came fully into force in November 2005 (Select Committee 
on the Licensing Act, 2017). The Act transferred the control of the sale of alcohol 
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from justices of the peace to local authorities through licensing committees. The 
previous regime had been in place for over 500 years and was created through the 
Vagabonds and Beggars Act 1494 (Select Committee on the Licensing Act, 2017). 
The Act also made several other changes which included, the introduction of 
criteria against which licenses would be granted, creating the dual system of 
personal and premises licenses, relaxing the hours during which alcohol can be 
bought and it ended the need for temporary licenses for one off events (Select 
Committee on the Licensing Act, 2017). The House of Lords Liaison Committee 
selected the Act for scrutiny on the basis that it had been in force for 10 years and 
that it would be a fruitful topic to undertake post-legislative scrutiny on as more 
time had passed since the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee reviewed the legislation (Collon, 2017b).  
The committee’s report noted that timing was particularly important as in March 
2008 the Department for Culture, Media and Sport produced their post-legislative 
assessment evaluating the Act which was then taken up for scrutiny by the House 
of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee (Select Committee on the 
Licensing Act, 2017). Their report was published in May 2009 when the Act had 
been in force for just over three years and concluded that it was too early to make 
firm conclusions on the operation of the Act. The committee noted that for an Act 
which made such major changes, they thought that the 10 years which had elapsed 
since its entry into force would provide them with a better foundation for a more 
in-depth and fruitful examination (Select Committee on the Licensing Act, 2017). 
The committee did not just confine its assessment to the Act itself but also the 
implementation of it, the secondary legislation stemming from it, and also other 
relevant legislation. Such an approach to post-legislative scrutiny matches one of 
the government’s aims for their system, that it should include necessary secondary 
and supplementary primary legislation (Office of the Leader of the House of 
Commons, 2008). This was particularly important for this inquiry based on the 
number of times the Licensing Act 2003 has been amended by other Acts (Select 
Committee on the Licensing Act, 2017; Collon, 2017b). In particular, the Liaison 
Committee suggested that the committee might want to consider the following 
issues as part of its inquiry: To what extent has the Licensing Act met its objective 
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of balancing rights and responsibilities?; Are the four licensing objectives 
underpinning the Act the right ones?; Has the Act proved sufficiently flexible to 
address changing circumstances?; and What lessons can policy makers draw from 
the changes made to the licensing regime since its implementation in 2005? (Select 
Committee on the Licensing Act, 2017). 
 
 Start of an inquiry 
At the start of an inquiry, committees usually decide what subject they want to 
scrutinise and set out the terms of reference for the inquiry, which set out the main 
areas of interest that they are going to focus upon (Rogers & Walters, 2015). 
However, when it comes to ad hoc committees in the House of Lords, as noted 
earlier, it is the Liaison Committee which makes decisions upon what topics ad hoc 
committees scrutinise and in the case of post-legislative scrutiny, what legislation 
receives review. This is an advantage to some extent as there are broader 
deliberations on what legislation should be selected for post-legislative scrutiny 
and there is essentially a ground-up attempt (through the inclusion of Peers) in 
terms of what Act receives post-legislative scrutiny in any given session. There can 
be potential pitfalls as the Liaison Committee can also determine the broader remit 
of the committee. Indeed, having a strict remit set before anyone has scoped 
evidence, as was the case with the Equality Act 2010 Committee, might not be the 
best approach. After all, as noted in the previous chapter, the House of Commons 
Culture, Media and Sport Committees was told that if they were going to undertake 
post-legislative scrutiny into the Gambling Act 2005, then they had to review the 
whole Act, which was much more challenging than anyone had realised at the time 
(Flood, 2017). The clerk of the Select Committee on the Equality Act and Disability 
noted that the committee would have struggled to assess the Equality Act in its 
entirety (it was a consolidation Act too), so ultimately the Liaison Committee in 
this case made a reasonable decision. 
However, once the inquiry into the Equality Act got underway the clerk 
understood why it was limited to the disability elements of the Act, as the inquiry 
would have been too wide an inquiry to look at all the disadvantages (Collon, 
2017a). Ultimately it was believed that the correct decision had been made in terms 
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of not overburdening the inquiry (Tudor, 2017). The point still stands that there 
needs to be caution in relation to directing committees to look at certain issues 
before the committee understands the foundations of the issue under review. By 
looking solely at disability, it raises a question of whether there are further issues 
with the Equality Act 2010, in relation other provisions which have not been 
assessed yet. The Equality Act 2010 also dealt with, transgender rights33  as well as 
racial and gender discrimination, but these were not included in this particular 
review. 
In the case of the Licensing Act 2003, the committee was able to undertake a full 
review and decide for itself which particular parts of the Licensing Act they wanted 
to address. The clerk noted that it was a detailed piece of legislation and that it was 
a fairly compressed topic, therefore there was no difficulty in dealing with it in one 
inquiry (Collon, 2017b). 
At the start of an inquiry the memoranda committees receive from government 
departments often acts as a foundation for an inquiry. As the Liaison Committee 
determines which Acts receive scrutiny, government memoranda do not act as a 
trigger for inquiries in the House of Lords. Indeed, through the government’s 
agreed three to five-year process for producing memoranda, Lord’s committees do 
not receive these memoranda and instead request their own once an Act has been 
selected for scrutiny.  
Memoranda can play an important role in the undertaking of an inquiry in the 
Lords, despite not being a trigger. The clerk of the Equality Act Committee noted 
that in terms of the usefulness of the memorandum they received, they 
incorporated what the government had said within it, in the planning of questions 
to witnesses and, in particular, the questions to officials of government 
departments and at the end questions to ministers themselves (Collon, 2017a). This 
is something that the chair of the committee, Baroness Deech, also noted during 
the interview (Deech, 2017). The memoranda obviously played an important role 
                                                     
33 It should be noted that the House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee undertook 
an inquiry into transgender issues in the 2015-2016 Session of the UK Parliament, and did 
undertake some limited post-legislative scrutiny into the provisions of the Equality Act relating to 
gender recognition and transgender rights. 
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in the planning of inquiries in both Houses, especially in terms of the questions to 
witnesses including officials and ministers, as noted in the previous chapter. 
The clerk of the Licensing Act Committee agreed with the sentiments that 
memoranda are generally quite helpful but they take some time to arrive. The clerk 
noted that it would have been useful if the committee had received the 
memorandum before the call for evidence (Collon, 2017b). Unfortunately, with the 
way the process works in the House of Lords, the government is not going to be 
aware of what Act is due to receive review before the Liaison Committee decides 
and a committee secretariat is appointed to make the memorandum request. There 
might be an argument for the Liaison Committee to make such post-legislative 
scrutiny decisions earlier in a session so the government could provide 
memorandum before the start of an inquiry. Despite requesting the memorandum 
at the end of April/beginning of May, it was not received until mid-July when the 
call for evidence had already been sent out (Collon, 2017b). In practice the clerk 
and chair noted that in this case it wouldn’t have changed very much because the 
questions in the call for evidence were very much questions that needed answering 
(Collon, 2017b; McIntosh, 2018). There might be a case, however, where a 
government memorandum requires additional questions to be asked. There 
remain plenty of opportunities to ask those questions or to send out additional 
questions as part of the call for evidence. Additionally, the government needs time 
to draft such memoranda, so perhaps any changes need to be made in terms of 
when the Liaison Committee announces its inquiries for the subsequent session. 
The chair of the Licensing Act Committee noted that the memorandum was 
treated with some scepticism and questioned how useful they really are seeing as 
it is a box ticking exercise (McIntosh, 2018). However, at the same time she 
acknowledged, at the very least, that they were useful for background information 
(McIntosh, 2018). Baroness Henig, a member of the committee, noted that it was a 
very long memorandum and was not as focused as some Members would have liked 
(Henig, 2018). 
In terms of Member interest in the memoranda, the clerk of the Equality Act 2010 
Committee noted that all Members received a copy and the chairman scrutinised 
it carefully. But as with any committee, some Members looked at it more carefully 
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than others (Collon, 2017a). The workloads of Members could be significant here 
as peers do not have to fulfil the representative function that MPs do, potentially 
giving them more time to focus upon such tasks, depending upon what outside 
tasks they undertake away from the House. 
There was also evidence in the Lords of committees scrutinising the memoranda, 
which again cements their importance in the post-legislative scrutiny process. The 
Licensing Act 2003 Committee was also keen to get supplementary written 
evidence from the government on the basis that the government’s memoranda did 
not answer/cover all the questions the committee put out in its call for evidence 
(Collon, 2017b). The committee also took oral evidence from officials during its 
first evidence session and they also had ministers give oral evidence as well (Collon, 
2017b). There appears to have been some in-depth scrutiny of the memoranda here 
by the committee in terms of seeking additional evidence from ministers and 
officials. However, a representative from an interest group which gave evidence to 
the inquiry noted that they had not seen the memoranda which suggests that at 
least in the Lords, government memoranda are not widely accessed (Interest Group 
A, 2018). 
So, the start of inquiries in the Lords are different to the Commons in the sense 
that there is a difference in who selects legislation as well as differences in the 
criteria used. There are similarities, however, in the sense that memoranda do 
seem to play an important role in both Houses, but in different ways. 
 
 Evidence 
Evidence, as noted in the previous chapter assessing inquiries in the House of 
Commons, is vital for parliamentary inquiries on the basis that they are evidence 
driven. Once a topic of inquiry has been selected and initial terms of reference have 
been agreed, committees will usually issue a general invitation to submit evidence. 
As well as issuing a general invitation, committees will often issue specific requests 
for written evidence to government departments and key players in the policy area 
concerned (Rogers & Walters, 2015). 
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In the House of Lords, as in the House of Commons there is a need to appoint 
specialist advisors. One of the first things the Equality Act 2010 Committee did was 
to appoint a specialist advisor. The clerk noted that they interviewed a number of 
possible specialist advisors. They appointed a barrister specialising in disability 
(Collon, 2017a). As she was knowledgeable about the topic and had many contacts 
who knew about the topic, she gave the committee a lot of ideas (Collon, 2017a). 
As was noted with the Commons Culture Committee, specialist advisors appointed 
by the committee play an important role in locating witnesses. Although no 
problem was highlighted in this case, caution should be taken when selecting an 
advisor in order so the committee does not approach an inquiry in an overly biased 
manner. However, the experience and expertise of Peers on the committee could 
potentially act as a brake in terms of the committee veering off in one direction. 
Even though the expertise of the Lords is important, the role of specialist advisors 
is also important for an ad hoc committee which is set up for a one off inquiry. This 
is because the committee staff do not have time to develop a broader 
understanding of the policy area that they would on a sessional committee in the 
Lords or a departmental select committee in the House of Commons. 
Additionally, regarding specialist advisors, the clerk of the Licensing Act 2003 
Committee noted that they utilised the following process; draw up a long list of 
those with the relevant expertise, put the long list to the chairman for approval, 
and then create a short list of four to interview (Collon, 2017b). Additionally, the 
clerk noted that because post-legislative scrutiny involves the scrutiny of an Act it 
is very helpful to have a lawyer. In the case of this inquiry they thought it would be 
helpful to have a lawyer who did know something about licensing (Collon, 2017b). 
Three of the four applicants that the committee interviewed were barristers in 
licensing and one of those was appointed. This raises another important point of 
the need for lawyers. As was noted in the previous chapter, most House of 
Commons committees do not have lawyers who form part of their committee 
secretariat, and as such they might be at a disadvantage from a lack of legal 
knowledge around the Acts that they are scrutinising. Legal expertise and/or 
knowledge of the Act in question would be useful on the basis that it would allow 
for the location of legal and drafting difficulties that a technical review would 
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require and is often not in the skills set of Members or clerks. Indeed, it was seen 
as a benefit for the Justice Committee to have their legal expert leading on their 
inquiry into the Freedom of Information Act. 
The number of witnesses was another important issue raised during the interviews 
with clerks in the Lords. In terms of the Equality Act 2010 inquiry, as well as the 
policy analyst searching for and identifying possible witnesses, Members of the 
committee also had suggestions and in the end the committee had more possible 
witnesses than they could cope with (Collon, 2017a). With a nine-month inquiry, 
ad hoc committees in the Lords can speak to more people (forty-seven on average) 
than a departmental select committee in the Commons can (nineteen on average). 
However, the pool of potential witnesses was still large. Over the course of the 
inquiry they heard from fifty-three people through oral evidence and overall, 
counting written and oral evidence, they heard from 166 people and organisations 
(Select Committee on the Equality Act 2010 and Disability, 2017). 
Regarding the evidence that committees heard and whether they felt they had 
heard from the relevant actors to draw fair conclusions, the clerk of the Licensing 
Act 2003 Committee noted that committees never have enough time to hear from 
all the witnesses they would like to (Collon, 2017b). However, he noted that they 
had a lot of evidence to rely on. This is a common theme and even during inquiries 
in the House of Lords which run for longer than in the Commons, there is still a 
challenge with time. The ability for any person or group to submit written evidence 
is an important access point, and ensures that all views can be heard by the 
committee. 
 
 Report 
Following the collection and analysis of evidence, committees, as noted in the 
previous chapter, move on to develop recommendations and prepare their report.  
One of the biggest issues to arise from the interviews in the Lords in terms of their 
reports was that the post-legislative scrutiny inquiry into the Licensing Act 2003 
was different to the others undertaken in the Lords (Collon, 2017a). Additionally, 
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it was also different from those in the Commons too on the basis that this was the 
first inquiry to conclude that there were problems with that statutory framework. 
The report stated as follows: 
‘Previous committees of this House conducting scrutiny of statutes 
have found that the Act in question is basically satisfactory, but that 
its implementation is not. In the case of the Licensing Act our 
conclusion is that, while the implementation leaves a great deal to 
be desired, to a large extent this is caused by an inadequate statutory 
framework whose basic flaws have, if anything, been compounded by 
subsequent piecemeal amendments. A radical comprehensive 
overhaul is needed, and this is what our recommendations seek to 
achieve’ (Select Committee on the Licensing Act 2003, 2017: 5).  
This raises questions around whether the Acts most in need of post-legislative 
scrutiny are being selected, especially as some of the academic literature on the UK 
legislative process suggests that it is producing deficient legislation (Brazier, 
Kalitowski, & Rosenblatt, 2007; Fox & Korris, 2010; Rippon, 1993; Slapper & Kelly, 
2015). 
The committee, during the course of the inquiry, heard a lot of evidence about the 
way licensing committees worked and the clerk noted that some of it was 
scandalous (Collon, 2017b). The committee heard an example of a chairman of a 
licencing committee cross-examining his wife as an independent witness. They 
heard of a licensing committee chairman telling a barrister who had been dealing 
with an applicant for a licence and who had not been granted one, not to worry as 
they would win on appeal, essentially admitting that they had deliberately come to 
the wrong decision (Collon, 2017b). While the clerk noted that these were not 
typical, they were several other examples that the committee were given of where 
the system was not working. There was clearly a problem with the operation of the 
Act. If such actions can be taken, it raises questions about the fairness and 
transparency of the process and as such brings the whole system into question. The 
committee therefore viewed this inquiry as being different from previous post-
legislative inquiries, at least in the House of Lords, as there was something clearly 
wrong with the Act itself. Indeed this provides an example of locating legislative 
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bad practice and offering solutions to the problems, as set out in the aims of post-
legislative scrutiny (Law Commission, 2006).  
Another important issue to arise in interviews for these case studies in the Lords is 
the recommendations they tend to avoid making. The clerk and chair of the 
Equality Act 2010 Committee noted that there is no point in making 
recommendations which you anticipate are not going to be taken on board and, in 
particular, this relates to recommendations which are going to cost a lot of money 
or require legislative change (Collon, 2017a; Deech, 2017) on the basis that it is 
better to achieve something than nothing. This therefore potentially limits the 
scrutiny and effectiveness of post-legislative scrutiny. White (2015a) does note that 
recommendations need to be financially realistic. There is some consideration here 
of what the government might and might not accept, this ties in to an extent with 
the findings in the previous chapter and committees softening their 
recommendations so they are more acceptable to the government. Again, this does 
go on to highlight the weakness of parliament in terms of being able to influence 
and change government policy. As noted earlier in the thesis, these committees 
rely on soft power, the power to persuade (or embarrass), create a sense of 
obligation and commitment from government. There are also structural factors 
that might be impacting upon their behaviour, for instance there is a degree of 
timidity from the Lords based on its unelected basis and the constant threat of 
reform (Russell, 2013). This might explain their reluctance to make stronger 
recommendations as well. As the clerks of the Equality Act and Licensing Act 
Committees were the same, this is an approach that was shared across both 
committees. 
In turn, the clerk of the Equality Act 2010 Committee recommended and the 
committee agreed that it was worth mentioning in the report things which needed 
doing that were going to cost money but there wasn’t much point in making formal 
recommendations to the government (Collon, 2017a). In this case although they 
backed off from making formal recommendations relating to money, they did still 
raise the issue with the government.  
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The clerk and chair of the Equality Act 2010 Committee both noted that they tried 
to focus on recommendations which in their view were going to make a difference 
but were still practical for the government to implement (Collon, 2017a; Deech, 
2017). It could be argued that such an approach is sensible, considering the data in 
chapter five showed that there was a strong relationship between the acceptance 
of recommendations and their strength. Linked to this issue, the committee also 
included in the appendix of the report, recommendations that required legislative 
changes (Collon, 2017a). This included some changes needing primary legislation 
but also ones that could be done with secondary legislation (Collon, 2017a). The 
chair added that recommendations calling for legislative change were just not 
realistic, so they tried to avoid making them and instead focused upon 
recommendations that could be carried out by existing agencies and authorities 
(Deech, 2017).  
Such recommendations are likely to be seen as stronger recommendations by the 
government and are more likely to be rejected because of the time it takes to pass 
primary legislation. There may be a desire to achieve something rather than 
nothing (Clerk A, 2017). It perhaps is not worth getting into a fight with the 
government when you could focus on other less contentious recommendations 
that can make a difference. However, in terms of taking the government’s likely 
response into account before making a recommendation the clerk noted that if the 
committee feels that a recommendation needs to be made, regardless of the 
strength or the government’s likely response to it, then they will make such a 
recommendation. (Collon, 2017a).  
The main recommendation that the Licensing Act 2003 Committee made in 
response various problems was to trial the transfer of licensing powers from 
licensing committees to local authority planning committees which have more 
professional training and have a better framework to support staff (Collon, 2017b; 
McIntosh, 2018). These changes from licensing to planning committees constituted 
substantial recommendations and would ultimately need primary legislation to 
make the necessary changes. 
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In the case of the Licensing Act 2003 Committee the clerk noted that there was no 
way of getting around the fact that the committee’s main recommendation in 
relation to the licensing committees would need primary legislation. So, this is an 
example of where a committee concludes that a recommendation is necessary and 
is going to make it regardless of whether the government is likely to reject it or not. 
Indeed, he also noted that if you played that strategy, you wouldn’t make many 
recommendations at all and you’d never get anywhere even if changes were 
desperately needed (Collon, 2017b). Baroness Henig, noted that in one case the 
committee was so unimpressed by the evidence the minister gave that they were 
determined to put forward recommendations (Henig, 2018). While it can be argued 
the Lords can be timid, this is an example of where that timidity should not be 
taken for granted. 
Despite the main recommendation requiring primary legislation, the clerk of the 
Licensing Act 2003 Committee noted that there are plenty of changes that can be 
made by secondary legislation, including one change which everyone says requires 
primary legislation but actually does not and that is applying the Act airside at 
airports (Collon, 2017b; McIntosh, 2018). Once you have gone through customs at 
an airport, the Licensing Act does not apply and that is why there is nothing to 
stop alcohol being sold at six in the morning or midnight, or to people who are 
already drunk. The committee received evidence of all these things happening 
(Collon, 2017b). The Act states that the legislation is not enforceable in 
international airports but the minister must designate airports. There have been 19 
designations and the minister could un-designate them tomorrow for the purposes 
of licensing (Collon, 2017b). There would be a political cost to this, in terms of the 
potential anger from those who hold licenses and the general public. Therefore, 
there are recommendations that would not take the government as much time and 
resources as the main recommendation relating to licensing committees. There 
were objections from ministers during oral evidence sessions about the cost of 
security clearance for inspectors, which the committee took with a large pinch of 
salt because of the hundreds of staff at airports who will also have had to go 
through security clearance procedures (Collon, 2017b). The committee expected 
push back on this recommendation as well. 
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In terms of the Equality Act 2010 Committee, it also made recommendations that 
in terms of action required, should not have been too strenuous for the 
government. The clerk noted that the inquiry found that there were provisions on 
disability which have not been brought into force (Collon, 2017a). This was not just 
five years on from the passing of the act, as some of those provisions were taken 
into the Equality Act from the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and as such they 
had been sitting on the statue books for twenty years without being brought into 
force (Collon, 2017a). This is an important example, as post-legislative scrutiny is 
not just about making recommendations to change legislation or policy, it is also 
about assessing whether the government has actually implemented the legislation 
properly. This is why post-legislative scrutiny is important and it shows that 
accountability is an important component in our understanding of post-legislative 
scrutiny. If parliament is going to spend finite time legislating on many important 
issues, then surely, they should also take the time to ensure that the government 
has implemented the laws they are passing.  
This particular example was on the issue of the accessibility of taxis for disabled 
people (Collon, 2017a). When committees are preparing to publish their reports, 
they send out an embargoed copy of the report to relevant department the day 
before it is published. At 6 o’clock the same evening that the Department of 
Transport received their report, it issued a press release saying they were going to 
bring that provision into force. This is important to highlight as it raises the 
question of how many other pieces of important legislation on the statue books 
have provisions that have not come into force, for whatever reason. This example 
also highlights the government trying to get out in front of a story before it 
becomes a critical headline. If a story arising out of a post-legislative scrutiny 
inquiry is likely to be negative then it gives leverage to the committee in terms of 
getting the government to act. This emphasises comments made by the House of 
Lords Constitution Committee when stating that parliament’s role in legislation 
should not come to an end with the formal legislative process (House of Lords 
Select Committee on the Constitution, 2004). There is clearly a need for 
accountability post-Royal Assent and post-enactment. 
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One final issue worth touching upon in terms of the development of 
recommendations and the publication of a report is how committees determine 
what recommendations to make. The clerk of the Equality Act 2010 Committee 
noted that most ideas come from the witnesses. The committee asked witnesses if 
they could name their top ideas that could be done to make life easier for people 
with disabilities, it was then up to the committee to consider which were the most 
useful and practical, and ones that they wanted to recommend (Collon, 2017a). 
Indeed, this is something that Baroness Deech, the chair of the committee noted 
during her interview (Deech, 2017). 
 
 Response and follow up 
Having addressed the development of recommendations and the publication of the 
report, the next stage in the inquiry process is receiving the government’s response 
to the inquiry. As noted earlier in the chapter, the same rules apply to Lords 
committees as to Commons committees so responses to committee reports are 
usually received within 60 days of publication (Rogers & Walters, 2015). 
One of the biggest issues with follow up in the Lords is that ad hoc committees 
dissolve after the publication of their report, so they are not formally constituted 
when a report is published by the respective government department. While this 
was covered in detail in the section outlining the Liaison Committee’s role in post-
legislative scrutiny, this section will deal with how the then former committees 
dealt with this challenge. 
One of the ways they deal with the challenges of follow up is to undertake informal 
coordination. The clerk of the Equality Act 2010 Committee noted that although 
the committee ceases to exist, the Members continue to serve in the Lords and 
retain their interest (Collon, 2017a). When the government’s response came in it 
was circulated to Members by the then former clerk. Although he was no longer 
clerk of that particular committee, he did still retain his interest in the issue 
(Collon, 2017a).  A meeting was also organised to discuss the response, although it 
was not a formal committee meeting (Collon, 2017a). There was clearly an informal 
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process going on here. Although they do not have the powers of the committee at 
hand, if Members who retain an interest can organise and apply pressure 
themselves then they might achieve more than if they worked independently. The 
clerk views the lack of being able to reconvene as a committee following the 
government’s response (and potentially later to follow up) as a major failure of 
post-legislative scrutiny in the Lords (Collon, 2017a). There is a desire to undertake 
follow up here. The procedures just do not allow ad hoc committees to do so. 
Instead they are meeting informally to take issues forward, without the powers of 
a committee. This process also occurred following the inquiry into the Licensing 
Act 2003 (Collon, 2017b). 
While committees cease to exist after the publication of their report, Members 
have the ability as individuals to follow up on reports too. One of the 
recommendations that came from the Equality Act 2010 Committee was for an 
amendment to be made to the Licensing Act 2003 so that local authorities, when 
giving licenses for licensed premises, could apply conditions to them in terms of 
ensuring disabled access. As there happened to be a suitable bill going through in 
the 2015-2016 session which was making amendments to the Licensing Act, the 
chair, Baroness Deech, tabled an amendment, which ultimately failed. The chair 
noted that she was very disappointed that the amendment was rejected and she 
was particularly disappointed that the Labour Party in the Lords wouldn’t vote for 
it (Deech, 2016). This is a clear example of where committee Members can use their 
own influence to follow up and try to ensure recommendations are implemented. 
However, it also shows where this individual influence can fail.  One of the benefits 
of procedure in the House of Lords is that any Member can table an amendment, 
and all tabled amendments must be considered (something that does not happen 
in the House of Commons). Although ad hoc committees cease after they report, 
there are ways for Members to achieve results regardless. This might also explain 
why the Licensing Act 2003 was suggested as an option for the following session’s 
post-legislative scrutiny ad hoc committee. 
In relation to the Licensing Act 2003 Committee, the chair noted that Lord Brooke 
and Baroness Henig, both members of the committee, had been successful in 
keeping the pressure on government over the recommendations made (McIntosh, 
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2018). As with the Equality Act inquiry, there is plenty of scope for individual 
members to undertake follow up, before or on top of the Liaison Committee’s 
work.  
Debates on ad hoc committee reports forms an important route for some limited 
follow up and to keep up pressure on the government. There is always a debate on 
ad hoc committee reports and the government’s response to the committee’s 
report is the basis of it. Typically, the day after the report is published, the chair 
will table a motion for the House to take note of the report. However, the debate 
is not held until the response is published. During the debate committee members 
can raise points in the light of the government’s response. A government minister 
also should respond. The clerk of the Equality Act 2010 Committee noted that this 
process doesn’t necessarily take you any further forward in terms of getting the 
government to agree to your recommendations unless you get a commitment from 
them (Collon, 2017a). Floor time in the House can bring publicity both within and 
outside the House, but it is questionable how much. While the chair acknowledged 
that it gave added publicity, she said it didn’t really do anything to further the 
recommendations (Deech, 2017). Additionally, a skilled minister is probably not 
going to give anything away unless they want to. However, this still amounts to 
more floor time than House of Commons committees get.  
In relation to the Licensing Act 2003 Committee, the publication of the 
government’s response to this inquiry was delayed by the 2017 General Election 
and was eventually published on the 9th November 2017, six months after the 
General Election (Collon, 2017b). The clerk also noted that he believed there would 
be quite a few Members interested in this particular debate (Collon, 2017b). The 
debate took place on the 20th December 2017 on the penultimate sitting day before 
the Christmas recess which may have played a role in the lack of enthusiasm 
(Henig, 2018) as only fourteen Members spoke in the debate (HC Deb 20 Dec 2017, 
c.2145). The chair of the committee noted that one downside in this debate was 
that a government whip responded to it rather than a specific departmental 
minister (McIntosh, 2018). This is one of the downsides of senior ministers, for the 
most part, being based in the House of Commons. 
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In defence of debates, the clerk of the Licensing Act 2003 Committee noted that 
the debate following post-legislative scrutiny of the Inquiries Act 2005 saw the 
minister face a lot of criticism from very distinguished former Law Lords (Collon, 
2017b). Following his reiteration that the government was rejecting certain 
recommendations and sustained criticism for this, the minister spent considerable 
time talking to his civil servants trying to find a way out (Collon, 2017b). In the end, 
he said that the government was prepared to look at this again. While there 
appeared to be a change in the government’s position in terms of going from ruling 
out action, to looking again at the recommendation, this did concern the clerk as 
this tends to mean that the issue will be kicked into the long grass (Collon, 2017b). 
In relation to that inquiry, nothing has happened at the time of writing but the 
clerk believes something may yet happen as the issue has been taken up by the 
House of Commons Treasury Committee (Collon, 2017b). The example above of 
the Inquiries Act debate might provide an example of where the House can apply 
pressure but it didn’t necessarily lead to any substantial change in government 
policy, at least immediately from the clerk’s perspective. 
Overall, in terms of the role that the Liaison Committee plays following up priority 
recommendations, the clerk of the Equality Act 2010 Committee noted that while 
some formal follow up is better than none, he doesn’t think it makes a great 
difference (Collon, 2017a).  The chair of the Liaison Committee writes to the 
relevant minister and the minister writes back but that is the end of it (Collon, 
2017a). It is questionable how effective such a mechanism can be as through writing 
a single letter is unlikely to apply much pressure on the government to act. The 
clerk noted that unless the pressure applied to a minister is sufficient then there’s 
nothing much further that can happen, whereas a sessional committee can ask a 
minister to come back and give evidence. There is clearly some annoyance here in 
terms of the lack of capacity for ad hoc committees to follow up, on the basis it is 
not a committee any more, again supporting the expectations made relating to 
follow up. 
There are clearly problems here in relation to following up on committee reports. 
The problem for the most part is procedural in terms of ad hoc committees 
dissolving after the publication of their report. However, there is evidence of 
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former committees taking action into their own hands in terms of informally 
coordinating action. It is clear that follow up in both Houses leaves a lot of be 
desired but the difference between the Commons and the Lords, at least in terms 
of the case studies presented in the thesis, is that in the Lords there is a clear desire 
to see improvements here. There might be an additional argument here for a 
dedicated post-legislative scrutiny committee (previously mentioned in chapter 3) 
which could not only boost the number of Acts receiving post-legislative scrutiny 
but also provide a boost to follow up activity. We next move on to discuss the 
impact that these two case study committees have had.  
 
 Overall impact 
Generally speaking, impact takes time to appear and this is an important issue to 
bear in mind when judging the outcome of post-legislative scrutiny or indeed any 
scrutiny. Post-legislative scrutiny is not like pre-legislative scrutiny where the 
government will want to introduce a bill shortly after a committee has reported. 
For post-legislative scrutiny, especially if it is a major exercise that needs primary 
legislation, it will take years (Collon, 2017a). There are clearly a variety of impacts 
that committees can have in terms of post-legislative scrutiny. 
Baroness Henig, who was a member of the Select Committee on the Licensing Act 
2003 noted that the clearest impact to date on this inquiry was that the acceptance 
of recommendations and more time was needed before the full impact of the 
inquiry was known (Henig, 2018).  The clerk of the committee was interviewed 
before the government responded to the report however in his interview he 
defined success as the government accepting the main recommendation of 
planning committees taking upon the role of licensing but the government rejected 
it in full (Collon, 2017b). Defining success in these terms would see the inquiry 
deemed unsuccessful. However, he also picked out the lack of training of licencing 
committee members, which, as noted above, the government appears willing to 
move on (Collon, 2017b). It is probably best to describe the success as mixed but 
the overall impact of the inquiry is not yet known. This is a crude measure of 
impact but the government accepting recommendations is a low level of impact, 
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as acceptance does not necessarily mean implementation. Even if a government 
rejects a recommendation initially, there is a chance it could be implemented later. 
There was an impact in terms of the Equality Act 2010 inquiry on the basis that 
provisions within the Act, originally in the Disability Discrimination Act, were 
brought into force. It is safe to say that without the inquiry the fact there were 
provisions relating to the accessibility of taxis that had not been brought into force 
might not have been discovered and rectified for some time.  
There was impact in terms of the Licensing Act 2003 Committee with the 
government launching a consultation on applying the Act airside. Baronesses 
McIntosh and Henig noted that this was despite the committee having provided a 
lot of evidence already. Baroness McIntosh reiterated that legislation is not 
required to make such changes as was noted earlier in the chapter (McIntosh, 
2018). Additionally, she noted positive responses from the government in relation 
to stopping the serving of drunk people (McIntosh, 2018) and dealing with air rage 
(Henig, 2018). Progress has also been made on more training for those who sit on 
local authority licensing committees (McIntosh, 2018). She also noted the 
willingness of the government to move forward, at least in terms of considering 
the evidence from Scotland in relation to the minimum pricing of alcohol. While 
the time for impact since the inquiry has not been long, there has been some 
positive movement since the publication of the report and only time will tell if such 
verbal progress equals action on these points. A representative from an interest 
group which gave evidence to the inquiry noted that they saw the inquiry as a 
useless exercise except for informing the committee of where they believed the 
problems with the Act lay (Interest Group A, 2018). So, there appears to be less 
enthusiasm from the interest group than from the Members and secretariat when 
it came to the impact of this inquiry. It is, however, in its early days. 
One of the other impacts that the Equality Act 2010 Committee had was that during 
the course of the inquiry one of the themes they touched upon was that Crossrail 
was being built with a considerable number of stations which were not going to 
have disabled access (Collon, 2017a). This is something the committee thought was 
ridiculous and that if they didn’t point it out while the platforms were being built, 
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some would not be fully accessible to disabled people at all (Collon, 2017a). In the 
end, Transport for London (TfL) said they were working to ensure all the stations 
are accessible for wheelchairs (Collon, 2017a). It is not clear, as with other inquires, 
how influential the committee was on its own in achieving these concessions from 
TfL. It was likely to be one of many voices pressuring TfL. It is probable that most 
of the organisations highlighting these problems to the committee will have also 
highlighted them to TfL previously. However, the clerk did note that he felt that 
this is an example of where the report did make a difference. So, there is impact 
here in terms of the committee being able to help influence an outside body. 
Additionally, another form of impact generated from the Equality Act 2010 inquiry 
was that there was a lot of interest in the report, particularly from people involved 
in disability work and from disabled people (Collon, 2017a). For them it was 
regarded as heartening (Deech, 2017) because it showed that a parliamentary 
committee supported their view and it adds to the punch that they can pack in 
terms of calling for changes on a particular issue (Collon, 2017a). The chair 
described this as ‘pushing their issues to the forefront’ (Deech, 2017).  Terry Riley 
of the British Deaf Association argued that he was disappointed with the inquiry 
on the basis that it ruled the Act was sufficient in terms of the use of British Sign 
Language. There is a way for the committee to make a difference in terms of 
providing evidence based and moral support to a cause and essentially giving 
prominence to an issue which might not be in the thoughts of both the public and 
the government. The clerk noted that such a difference cannot be quantified 
(Collon, 2017a). 
Finally, in terms of the Equality Act 2010 inquiry, the clerk noted that the House of 
Commons Women and Equalities Committee had agreed to take on board some of 
their recommendations (Collon, 2017a). The chair noted that she held a discussion 
with Maria Miller MP, chair of the House of Commons Women and Equalities 
Committee so they were prepared to seize the opportunity to propose amendments 
if any bills came through that were relevant (Deech, 2017). It is encouraging that 
there is co-operation between the two Houses in this case, as the level of co-
operation between them is usually limited. This is also an important boost for the 
report into the Equality Act on the basis that the ad hoc committee ceased to exist, 
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so there was at least one parliamentary committee that could continue their work 
and follow up on specific issues. There is potentially an argument to be made that 
until changes can be made to allow ad hoc committees to re-convene, they should 
seek co-operation from Commons committees in terms of pushing their 
recommendations.  
There is therefore a variety of impacts that a committee can have following the 
undertaking of post-legislative scrutiny, from the acceptance of recommendations 
to liaising with other committees to push your recommendations. There is also 
untapped potential in terms of impact due to procedures in the Lords and if ad hoc 
committees were able to reconvene there would be additional avenues to achieve 
impact. This is not likely to be something that the government would welcome 
based upon parliamentary reform literature. 
 
 Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed post-legislative scrutiny in the House of Lords. First, it 
noted the vital role that the House of Lords Liaison Committee plays in the 
undertaking post-legislative scrutiny. Its role is important not just in selecting the 
legislation that will receive review, and appointing the committee but it also plays 
an important role in the follow up of these inquiries in the House of Lords, due to 
ad hoc committees dissolving once a report has been published. However, the 
chapter noted some of the challenges that committees in the House of Lords face. 
For example, while it does provide the only follow up likely at the moment in the 
Lords, it is limited to written follow up only. Changes could be made to make the 
process run more smoothly, such as allowing ad hoc committees to reconvene after 
a report has been published, and perhaps a year later for follow up.  
In relation to the case studies, the chapter looked at two different Acts, distinct in 
terms of their selection and focus, and different in terms of the recommendations 
they produced. Regarding the selection and focus of the inquiries there was 
similarity in terms of the Liaison Committee selecting the legislation but there 
were differences in terms of the remit of each committee. The Liaison Committee 
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had placed a narrow remit on the Equality Act Committee due to the size and scope 
of the Equality Act. On the other hand, the Licensing Act Committee was able to 
determine its own agenda. There was a general agreement that memoranda are 
beneficial, especially in helping committees to plan their inquiries and to get an 
overview of the government’s position. However, there were differences in how 
they were scrutinised, with the Licensing Committee requesting additional 
supplementary written evidence from the government and going on to question 
ministers and officials on the contents of their memoranda. There also appears to 
be a challenge with the timing of such memoranda, as committees must request 
their own (different to the Commons) and perhaps the Liaison Committee should 
consider announcing the next session’s inquiries, or at least post-legislative 
inquiries, earlier 
In terms of the selection of witnesses and the role of evidence, there was an 
important use in both inquiries of specialist advisors. This is particularly important 
for ad hoc committees as the secretariat teams only come together for one inquiry 
and as such do not have the opportunity to build up the expertise that committee 
secretariats do in sessional committees. Again, the processes through which 
advisors are appointed is important and it appears, at least in the case of the 
Licensing Act Committee, that there was some sort of systematic process for their 
appointment. The importance of written evidence was also raised in both inquiries, 
on the basis that a) it helps to locate potential witnesses for oral evidence and b) it 
provides an important access point for all, especially as time is limited and 
committees cannot hear from everyone in person. Regarding the development of 
recommendations there was agreement that committees should shy away from 
making recommendations with large financial implications or which would require 
primary legislation because the government will likely reject them. The focus 
instead should be on producing practical recommendations that could be 
implemented and make a difference to those affected, unless a good case can be 
made for making such recommendations, for example with the Licensing Act 
inquiry and the abolition of licensing committees. There was also evidence from 
both inquiries showing the worth of post-legislative scrutiny in terms of shining a 
light on areas of legislation that have not been implemented and also on parts of 
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Act which are not working. Without these post-legislative scrutiny inquiries, it is 
possible these problems would not have made their way onto the political agenda. 
The chapter showed there was a variety of impacts that committees can have 
following to post-legislative scrutiny. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion  
This chapter draws the conclusions of this thesis together. It begins by providing a 
summary of the key findings in each chapter. It then identifies recommendations 
that follow from these findings as well as the further research that is necessary. The 
chapter then addresses the contributions the thesis has made in more detail.  
 
 Summary 
This thesis set out with the aim of providing a detailed assessment of the extent 
and the outcomes of the post-legislative scrutiny undertaken by committees in the 
UK Parliament. 
The following research questions were answered to achieve this aim. The summary 
of key findings will address each question in turn. 
1. How extensively has post-legislative scrutiny been undertaken by 
committees in the UK Parliament 
a. How frequently has post-legislative scrutiny been 
undertaken in the 2005-10 and 2015-2017 Parliaments?  
b. Are there patterns regarding which committees undertake 
such scrutiny? 
c. What are the characteristics of the legislation reviewed by 
post-legislative scrutiny?  
2. What recommendations have arisen from post-legislative scrutiny 
inquiries and how frequently have they been accepted by the UK 
Government?  
3. What has the experience been of committees undertaking post-
legislative scrutiny in the UK Parliament? 
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 Key findings and conclusions 
This section provides a summary of the key findings and conclusions contained in 
this thesis. Chapter three answered questions 1a and 1b (how frequently has post-
legislative scrutiny been undertaken in the 2005-10 and 2015-2017 Parliaments; are 
there patterns regarding which committees undertake such scrutiny?). It was 
concluded that post-legislative scrutiny is not particularly extensive. It found that 
in total there were 20 full formal post-legislative scrutiny inquiries. All but one of 
these involved the review of single Acts. This wasn’t unexpected. Inquiries are often 
triggered by a government memoranda (43% of House of Commons inquiries) and 
focus upon the problems and issues in one Act of Parliament. The chapter also 
discovered that only one of the Acts has been formally scrutinised more than once. 
This suggests that, generally, inquiries are not overlapping or repeating scrutiny 
already undertaken by another committee. This is important as post-legislative 
scrutiny is not a priority, therefore it is encouraging that there is limited overlap in 
this area. 
In terms of informal post-legislative scrutiny the chapter discovered that this has 
taken place more frequently than formal post-legislative scrutiny (37 times). This 
chapter also found that a number of committees, which had not undertaken formal 
post-legislative scrutiny, had undertaken the informal type. Informal post-
legislative scrutiny allows committees to undertake scrutiny without committing 
the time or the resources required for a formal inquiry. Post-legislative scrutiny is 
therefore perhaps more extensive than it first appears.  
However, there are problems with informal post-legislative scrutiny. There is a risk 
that informal post-legislative scrutiny becomes a box ticking exercise without 
engaging fully with the aims and focus of post-legislative scrutiny. This is because 
informal post-legislative scrutiny is often not apparent until a committee is 
reporting back to the House of Commons Liaison Committee on which core tasks 
it has met.  
The chapter also found that the most active committees undertaking formal post-
legislative scrutiny were: Justice; Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; and 
Culture, Media, and Sport in the House of Commons. These committees account 
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for eight out of thirteen inquiries in the House of Commons. It can be concluded 
that post-legislative scrutiny is currently limited to specific committees. The most 
active in terms of informal post-legislative scrutiny were Culture, Media and Sport 
and Home Affairs in the House of Commons, in addition to the Joint Committee 
on Human Rights. 
Chapter four, contributed to answering of question 1c (what are the 
characteristics of the legislation reviewed by post-legislative scrutiny?). There is 
currently a bias in the selection of legislation for post-legislative scrutiny. Previous 
Labour Governments have been most likely to have their legislation reviewed 
under the new systematic approach to post-legislative scrutiny. This can be 
explained in part because the current system started under the 2005-2010 Labour 
Government and by 2010 there was an entire parliament’s worth of legislation to 
review. However it was also noted that there is a lack of review taking place on the 
legislation from the 2010-2015 Coalition Government which is now within the 
recommended time frame for departmental review and thus post-legislative 
scrutiny by committee.  
It was also concluded that post-legislative scrutiny is addressing some contentious 
legislation. This chapter found that the majority of legislation that has received 
formal post-legislative scrutiny so far, have had a degree of contentiousness in 
terms of a division either being called at second and third reading or a rebellion at 
these stages. This is encouraging as there is an incentive for governments to protect 
contentious proposals from amendment and detailed scrutiny during the 
legislative process. Such legislation is arguably more likely to warrant post-
legislative scrutiny. 
The chapter also addressed the depth of scrutiny that the legislation received 
during the legislative process. It found varying degrees of success in terms of 
amendment acceptance in the House of Lords and the time legislation spends in 
committee in the House of Commons. Finally, the chapter also addressed a gap in 
post-legislative scrutiny and shed light on some of the reasons why committees are 
not undertaking this work. These included unexpected events and Member 
turnover impacting upon committee work programmes. From this it can be 
268 
concluded that there are legitimate reasons for why some committees may struggle 
to identify suitable legislation and undertake post-legislative scrutiny. 
Chapter five contributed to answering research question two (what 
recommendations have arisen from post-legislative scrutiny inquiries and how 
frequently have they been accepted by the UK Government?). It found that the 
most frequent recommendation from formal post-legislative scrutiny is a change 
in policy or practice, with 39% of recommendations calling for such action. The 
research also found that although only 79 recommendations out of 504 called for 
action related to the legislation and its implementation (16%). However, this is 12% 
more than Benton and Russell (2013) found in their study, which included seven 
committees across all their functions. 
The chapter also considered the strength of action that committees call for in their 
recommendations. It can be concluded that committees produce weaker 
recommendations that require less effort on the government’s behalf. The data 
showed that 41% of recommendations stemming from formal post-legislative 
scrutiny inquiries called for little or no action on behalf of the government. This is 
a similar proportion to what Benton and Russell (2013) found in their study (40%). 
The research therefore showed that committees tend to focus their 
recommendations on calling for small and medium action. This confirmed the 
arguments of both Aldons (2000) and Benton & Russell (2013) that committees 
produce recommendations which are weaker so the government is more likely to 
accept more of them. This is a strategy that appears to be supported by other 
findings from the research. 
The chapter also concluded that post-legislative scrutiny has some impact in 
relation to acceptance of recommendations. The data showed that 39% of 
recommendations were accepted (either in full or in part). This can be explained 
by the fact that the majority of recommendations called for small or medium 
action. Again this was a similar proportion to Benton and Russell’s findings (40%). 
This might suggest that post-legislative scrutiny does not operate completely 
differently to other committee outputs, both in terms of the strength and 
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acceptance of recommendations. However, impact is more complicated than just 
accepting recommendations.  
It was also concluded that governments are more likely to reject recommendations 
calling for stronger action. The ordinal logistic regression analysis for government 
acceptance suggested that there is a high probability of a relationship between the 
strength and acceptance of recommendations. The directionality of this variable 
meant that stronger recommendations are more likely to be rejected than 
accepted. This is in line with what was hypothesised and this finding was also in 
line with the findings of Benton & Russell (2013) in their study on the impact of 
parliamentary oversight committees. This finding could also suggest that if 
committees do deploy a strategy as suggested by Aldons (2000) and Benton & 
Russell (2013), then they are perhaps not completely wrong to do so on the basis 
that the analysis shows that stronger recommendations are more likely to be 
rejected. 
Chapters six and seven answered research question three (what has the 
experience parliamentary committees have had when undertaking post-legislative 
scrutiny?). In Chapter six it was concluded that memoranda play an important 
role in the operation of the new systematic approach to post-legislative scrutiny in 
the House of Commons. For two of the case studies (Freedom of Information and 
Mental Health) the memoranda operated as a catalyst for undertaking the inquiry. 
However, there were other reasons as to why the inquiries were undertaken; these 
included interest from the media and government in terms of Freedom of 
Information, and the lack of scrutiny generally in terms of Mental Health. 
Although the Gambling inquiry was not triggered by a memorandum, it did 
provide a useful launch pad in terms of discovering potentially where some of the 
problems were; this was true for the other two case studies as well.  
It was also concluded that the House of Commons has a problem with following 
up on committee inquiries. Case studies showed that, if committees do follow up, 
then they use convenient methods rather than undertaking a full follow up inquiry, 
with the Mental Health inquiry following up through written correspondence and 
the Gambling inquiry following up through annual oral evidence sessions. This 
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makes sense given the time and resource pressures on House of Commons 
committees. However this does raise the question of how the potential impact of 
inquiries is being affected, as committees cannot force action, they can only 
persuade. There was no follow up to the Freedom of Information inquiry as the 
government took no action, so follow-up was deemed unnecessary. 
Finally, it was concluded that impact is varied and is more complex than just 
accepting recommendations. The impact of these post-legislative scrutiny 
inquiries varied. For the Gambling inquiry, the main impact was to focus 
government upon online gambling in a way it had not before. This helped to put 
the issue onto the government’s agenda and led to some of the problems 
highlighted by the committee being addressed. In terms of the Freedom of 
Information inquiry, the main impact was that the government did not weaken 
freedom of information provisions. The Mental Health inquiry on the other hand 
had impact in terms of putting mental health on to the parliamentary agenda, with 
additional inquiries being undertaken as a result of the post-legislative scrutiny. 
Although subsequent inquiries only related slightly to the original post-legislative 
scrutiny inquiry, it was recognised that they would not have happened without the 
original. 
Chapter seven noted the vital role that the House of Lords Liaison Committee 
plays. The House of Lords Liaison Committee has made a positive contribution to 
the undertaking of post-legislative scrutiny but challenges remain in terms of 
realising the full potential for impact. Its role is important in selecting the 
legislation that will receive review, and appointing the committee. It also plays an 
important role in the follow up of these inquiries in the House of Lords, due to ad 
hoc committees dissolving once a report has been published.  
However, the chapter noted some of the challenges that committees in the House 
of Lords face. For example there is no single source of post-legislative scrutiny 
inquiries or government memoranda that the Liaison Committee can draw upon, 
and as a result it often has to rely upon dated briefing notes and Google. This is 
suboptimal. Indeed the process of follow up is not without challenges either. The 
only follow up likely at the moment in the Lords it is limited to written follow up. 
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Additionally the selection criteria used creates an incentive to undertake a 
particular type of post-legislative scrutiny inquiry, namely one that fits the nine-
month window. This raises questions about what other Acts are not receiving post-
legislative scrutiny because of the selection criteria. This suggests that there is also 
a post-legislative scrutiny gap in the House of Lords.  
The two case studies looked at different Acts. These were distinct in terms of their 
selection and focus, and the recommendations they produced. Regarding the 
selection and focus of the inquiries there was similarity in terms of the Liaison 
Committee selecting the legislation but there were differences in terms of the remit 
of each committee. The Liaison Committee placed a narrow remit on the Equality 
Act Committee due to the size and scope of the Equality Act. This proved an 
appropriate decision according to the clerks of both the Liaison Committee and 
the Equality Act Committee. On the other hand, the Licensing Act Committee was 
able to determine its own agenda as the Act was more contained in comparison to 
the broad focus of the Equality Act. In terms of comparing the committee’s views 
on memoranda, there was a general agreement that such memoranda are 
beneficial, especially in helping committees to plan inquiries and to get an 
overview of the government’s position. This supports the conclusion made in 
chapter six. 
Regarding the development of recommendations there was agreement that 
committees should shy away from making recommendations with large financial 
implications or which would require primary legislation because the government 
will likely reject them. The focus instead should be on producing practical 
recommendations that could be implemented and make a difference to those 
affected. There was also evidence from both inquiries showing the worth of post-
legislative scrutiny in terms of shining a light on areas of legislation that have not 
been implemented and also on parts of Act which are not working. Without these 
post-legislative scrutiny inquiries, it is possible that these problems would not have 
made their way onto the political agenda. Indeed the chapter showed there were a 
variety of impacts that committees can have in relation to post-legislative scrutiny.  
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 Recommendations 
Several implications flow from these findings. There are a number of issues that 
nevertheless need to be borne in mind when making recommendations. The first 
is that additional action usually comes at a cost, either financially or through time. 
The second issue is that of feasibility. The approach taken in the development of 
these recommendations has been for them to be realistic based upon how 
parliament operates and to avoid a drain on already scarce resources. As the 
literature on parliamentary reform notes, evolutionary change is more likely to 
succeed than revolutionary change (Pierson, 1996). As such the recommendations 
presented in this section are designed to be compatible with, for the most part, the 
former. They are arranged based upon their expected cost implications.  
  
8.3.1 Low cost 
The House of Lords Liaison Committee should require that copies of 
government post-legislative review memoranda, which are currently sent 
to departmental select committees in the House of Commons, are also 
copied to the committee. There would be no financial cost incurred from this 
recommendation. 
 
The House of Commons Liaison Committee should play a more active role 
in ensuring committees are meeting their core tasks, including post-
legislative scrutiny. One of the implications of this research is that post-
legislative scrutiny is not systematic. Such a recommendation might improve this. 
Although the independence of committees is important, core tasks have been 
developed for a reason. There should be an expectation that core tasks are 
undertaken at least once during the duration of a parliament (although there may 
be challenges with early general elections). At the very least committees should 
account for the work they undertake in relation to the core tasks. The Liaison 
Committee in the 2010-2015 Parliament is an example of a more proactive 
committee, in which its chairman Alan Beith emphasised the importance of the 
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core tasks. This recommendation does not necessarily incur a financial cost but it 
does require the committee to alter its approach. 
The Committee Office in the House of Commons should review the deal 
struck between it and the Cabinet Office in relation to post-legislative 
scrutiny. It is 10 years since the new memoranda process was formally launched 
and it was done without an understanding of how committees undertake post-
legislative scrutiny. This review should consider a standardised formula for what 
should be included in government-produced memoranda and whether the 
timeframe used (three to five years after Royal Assent) is appropriate. Many of 
those interviewed argued that three years after Royal Assent was too short a time 
given that Royal Assent does not mean enactment. This has implications for post-
legislative scrutiny. If government departments are reviewing legislation too early, 
they may not find problems with the legislation and such problems may develop 
later outside of the current timeframe. This could result in later issues not being 
brought to a committee’s attention and that dysfunctional legislation is not 
addressed.   
There should be a review of committee guidance on post-legislative 
scrutiny. Lord Beith suggested that a proper framework for the undertaking of 
post-legislative scrutiny would be useful. It was suggested that the framework 
should contain details of what to focus on, including examining what the bill was 
for; whether the Act achieved its aims and whether there were other effects, 
especially unintended or unpredicted effects. There should also be guidance on 
who to take evidence from including those; who are affected by the Act, who have 
to administer the Act, who benefited from the Act and who should have benefited 
from it but did not. Assembling such information, he said, would have many 
benefits, including helping to determine whether changes to an Act are needed. It 
would also act as a reminder to legislators of the pitfalls of badly considered and 
over ambitious legislation. One of the implications of this research is that post-
legislative scrutiny is not particularly extensive and improved guidance for 
committees would be useful especially for new clerks and committees at the start 
of a parliament. In addition to this, if guidance is updated, Erskine May should 
also be updated to expand its current section on post-legislative scrutiny 
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and provide more detail about its operation. Again these recommendations do 
not have to come with a financial cost. The next edition of Erskine May could easily 
be updated and a review does not necessarily require additional staff to undertake 
it. 
There should be improved training for MPs who are elected to serve on 
committees which includes education on the core tasks of departmental 
select committees. One of the conclusions of this research was that Members’ 
interest in post-legislative scrutiny is limited and this has implications for the 
uptake of post-legislative scrutiny. Making Members more aware of the impact of 
legislation might help to make it more engaging. Additionally, being able to 
provide examples of where post-legislative scrutiny is tied to current live policy 
questions would help in terms of improving Member engagement. This 
recommendation may incur a financial cost, although it should not be a major one 
as it could be modelled upon the training new MPs receive when they first take 
their seats in the House.  
The House of Lords Liaison Committee should trial making decisions on 
what post-legislative scrutiny committee(s) it is going to establish earlier. 
This is so necessary documents can be requested and received from government 
departments in a timely manner. While it was generally believed that government 
post-legislative memoranda, prepared at the request of an ad hoc committee, are 
useful especially in helping committees to plan their inquiries and to get an 
overview of the government’s position. The main issue appears to be the time it 
takes for such memoranda to arrive after being requested. This has implications 
for the start of inquiries and it was noted that it would be useful if committees 
received such memorandum before the call for evidence is sent out. Therefore 
there may be a need to view post-legislative scrutiny committees in a different light 
to the other ad hoc ones based upon the time it takes to set up the committees on 
top of the time it takes to request and receive an updated memorandum from the 
relevant government department. This recommendation should not come with a 
financial cost, as it requires the committee to go through the process of selecting 
legislation slightly earlier than at present.  
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The House of Lords Liaison Committee should consider the timeframe it 
utilises for the undertaking of post-legislative scrutiny and consider 
scrutinising legislation that is currently deemed to be politically 
contentious. The basis for this recommendation comes from the fact that very 
few Acts passed by the 2010-2015 Coalition Government have been reviewed. The 
implications are that there is a bias in the selection of legislation and it is having 
an impact upon systematic scrutiny. If the Lords’ role is to add value and 
complement the scrutiny of the House of Commons then it should be willing to fill 
a gap in such scrutiny. While such legislation might be seen as politically 
contentious (given the largest party of the coalition is still in office) that should 
not disqualify their legislation from post-legislative scrutiny. While the House of 
Lords does take a longer term view of most scrutiny work it undertakes, greater 
flexibility would allow for a greater coverage of scrutiny in this area. This lack of 
scrutiny in relation to the 2010-2015 Coalition Government’s legislation is a 
problem. This recommendation does not incur a financial cost. 
 
8.3.2 Medium cost 
 
There should be a central repository of post-legislative memoranda hosted 
by the government. This recommendation is developed from the findings in 
chapter seven. This found that the House of Lords Liaison Committee was 
resorting to Google searches to find memos. This is not a suitable way for a 
legislature to find out what has and has not been done and could easily mean 
legislation is missed from potential scrutiny. A central repository should be 
introduced where post-legislative review memoranda can be placed and where all 
committees who undertake post-legislative scrutiny can access them. With the 
primacy of the House of Commons, departmental select committees should have 
‘first refusal’ when it comes to undertaking scrutiny on such memoranda. After 
that the House of Lords should have access to them when deciding what ad hoc 
committees to appoint. Such a repository would allow for greater post-legislative 
coordination between the two Houses, and ensure better coverage of inquiries. 
This recommendation need not incur a financial cost if civil servants or 
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parliamentary staff upload documents to an existing website, such as a dedicated 
space on GOV.UK.  
The central repository for post-legislative review memoranda should be 
made publicly available so outside bodies can also send their own memoranda 
to committees on how Acts are working from their perspective. Improving the 
visibility of government memoranda could help to improve access to information 
for committees and help them to determine whether post-legislative scrutiny is 
necessary.  
 
The House of Lords Liaison Committee should consider reconvening ad hoc 
committees one year after the government responds to inquiries. One of the 
conclusions of this research was the limited ability for ad hoc committees in the 
Lords to follow up. This has implications for the impact of these inquiries and 
ultimately upon accountability. It was also noted that former committee and 
secretariat members are meeting informally after a government response is 
received. One clerk noted that they circulated the government’s response to 
Members and that although they were no longer clerk of that particular committee 
they did still retain an interest in the issue. So there is clearly an informal process, 
without the full powers of a committee. While it is positive that Members can 
organise and apply pressure themselves, the inability to reconvene as a committee 
following the government’s response (and potentially later to follow up) is a major 
failure of post-legislative scrutiny in the Lords. It has been suggested that 
committees should be reconvened around one year after the government responds 
to a report. This recommendation is likely to come with a financial cost as all clerks 
are reassigned to other committees once their former committee has completed its 
work. However as a result of the UK leaving the EU there may be an argument to 
reduce the number of sub-committees to the Lords European Union Committee, 
potentially increasing the pool of available House staff. 
 
The House of Lords should consider appointing both short and long term 
(full session) ad hoc committees. The current appointment process, as was 
noted in chapter seven, might lend itself to a particular type of post-legislative 
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scrutiny, and this has implications for the selection of legislation. The challenge 
here is that not all Acts will require the same length/level of scrutiny; some may 
take less than nine month and some may take more. For example the Equality Act 
inquiry was limited in its remit to only the disability elements because it was 
believed that it was not possible to scrutinise the whole Act in nine months. 
However this excluded other elements of the Act relating to gender and sexuality 
from post-legislative scrutiny. There is also a need for flexibility so that the Lords 
can respond to issues that arise during the course of a session. While the House of 
Commons might be expected to pick up anything urgent, with a lack of Member 
interest, such issues might go unresolved. There would be cost implications of this 
recommendation, as the pool of available House staff is currently limited with 
committee staff from ad hoc committees being reassigned after the former 
committee has reported. However as noted earlier, a reduction of EU sub-
committees following the UK’s departure from the EU could increase the pool of 
available staff. 
 
8.3.3 High cost 
 
The House of Lords and House of Commons should consider the 
introduction of either a Joint Committee on post-legislative scrutiny or the 
creation of a dedicated post-legislative scrutiny committee in the House of 
Lords. This final recommendation is a long-term one and one which represents a 
shift away from evolutionary change. However it is worth raising the prospect of a 
dedicated post-legislative scrutiny committee as scrutiny is currently unlikely to 
become systematic. The government approach to post-legislative scrutiny might 
be systematic with a departmental review three to five years after Royal Assent but 
the approach in parliament is not systematic. The creation of a dedicated 
committee with a well-defined remit could make progress in achieving systematic 
post-legislative scrutiny. Whether that committee is joint or a sessional committee 
in the Lords, it would not absolve the House of Commons in its duty to continue 
undertaking post-legislative scrutiny as a core task. A joint committee or sessional 
Lords committee should take up a sifting role in terms of assessing what Acts have 
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received departmental review and which might be in need of post-legislative 
scrutiny. Whichever committee is appointed should also have the power to create 
two or three sub-committees to undertake post-legislative scrutiny on selected 
Acts. In addition to these roles, a dedicated post-legislative scrutiny committee 
should undertake detailed follow up on the reports that the sub-committees 
undertake, in order to ensure post-legislative scrutiny achieves maximum impact. 
 
 Contribution 
In answering the research questions, this thesis has made a range of contributions. 
It has contributed to the conceptual understanding of scrutiny, accountability and 
responsibility and how these concepts interact with each other and how they 
impact upon post-legislative scrutiny. The thesis has also developed a typology of 
scrutiny based upon this conceptual analysis. This contribution is important as 
parliamentary committees, especially those in the House of Commons, engage 
with these concepts on a daily basis. Any enhancement in our understanding of 
these concepts ultimately will aid the understanding of how committees operate 
and the relationship between them and the government.  
This thesis has also contributed to the literature on the impact of parliamentary 
committees, in particular by extending the research of Hawes, (1992); Hindmoor, 
Larkin, & Kennon, (2009); Monk, (2012); Russell & Benton, (2011); Tolley, (2009) to 
a particular type of scrutiny rather than addressing impact overall or by specific 
committees. The findings of this study were closely aligned with the findings of 
Benton & Russell (2013) both in the strength and acceptance of recommendations. 
It contributed by showing that to some extent post-legislative scrutiny doesn’t 
appear to be too different in comparison to other inquires when it comes to 
recommendations and acceptance. This suggests that government and parliament 
perhaps do not treat the output of such scrutiny differently to other inquiries.  
Additionally, this thesis has contributed to the literature on post-legislative 
scrutiny which is currently limited. This thesis is the first systematic assessment of 
post-legislative scrutiny in the UK Parliament and perhaps of post-legislative 
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scrutiny more broadly. It has made a contribution to the literature not just in terms 
of developing an understanding of post-legislative scrutiny, but also in assessing a 
specific way of undertaking post-legislative scrutiny. There is also a contribution 
to the comparative study of post-legislative scrutiny, as this thesis has assessed one 
particular system and way of undertaking post-legislative scrutiny. It therefore 
provides a benchmark on which to assess other systems.  
There is a contribution also to the literature on the legislative process and the 
quality of that legislation. As the majority of post-legislative scrutiny inquiries have 
concluded that the Acts reviewed have been operating as intended, this suggests 
that the poor quality of the legislative process and the poor quality of legislation 
could be over exaggerated. There could also be a problem of selection here. 
However in nineteen out of 20 acts to be formally scrutinised, the conclusions 
drawn from the inquiries indicated that the legislation is mostly operating as 
intended, it suggests the problem is not as extensive as some would have us believe. 
This could be explained by the increase in resources for legislative drafters 
(Greenberg, 2015; Norton, 2013), the willingness of the House of Lords to press for 
amendments (Norton, 2013; Russell, 2013), and there being more influence in the 
legislative process than first thought (Russell et al., 2015; Thompson, 2015). An 
alternative explanation for this phenomenon is that committees are producing 
weaker recommendations in order to get more of them accepted by the 
government.  
This thesis has also contributed to the knowledge of the behaviour of committees 
in the UK Parliament in terms of how they undertake inquiries and develop 
recommendations. In particular, it contributes to our knowledge of the behaviour 
of committees in relation to the development of recommendations and the 
relationship between the government and committees. Additionally, this thesis has 
contributed to the knowledge of post-legislative scrutiny as a function of 
parliamentary committees and how committees deal with such scrutiny. This is an 
important contribution as it reveals the likelihood of committees continuing to 
undertake such scrutiny. Indeed the research found that all those interviewed 
(both Members and officials) were broadly supportive of the process and thought 
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that post-legislative scrutiny should become more frequent. However the 
challenge is finding ways to do so. 
There is also a contribution to be made to the literature on the differences between 
both Houses of the UK Parliament. Despite there being differences in the way both 
Houses operate, the findings in chapter five showed the two Houses producing 
recommendations that were very similar in terms of their strength.  
There were also practical contributions to this research. It provided a detailed 
assessment of the procedures utilised in the UK Parliament to the benefit of other 
legislatures in the process of formalising post-legislative scrutiny into their 
procedures. This links to the contribution to the comparative study of post-
legislative scrutiny. As legislatures around the world begin to introduce more 
systematic procedures to undertake post-legislative scrutiny, the findings of this 
study will be of use to those deciding whether or not the UK system is something 
worth replicating. This has the potential to impact upon the rollout of post-
legislative scrutiny in other legislatures. Finally, it also provides a detailed 
assessment for the UK Parliament in terms of the procedures it utilises to 
undertake post-legislative scrutiny and offers recommendations to improve such 
scrutiny. This is an important practical contribution. Before this study, the vast 
majority of the data included within it had not been collected before. There was 
no consolidated list of inquiries, making it harder to see what had and had not 
been scrutinised. There was also no aggregate indication of what committees were 
recommending and whether or not they were being accepted. This study has 
contributed to parliament’s understanding of its own procedures and outlines 
what changes could be made to improve the process. 
 
 Implications and further research 
This thesis has reported findings from exploratory research into the operation of 
post-legislative scrutiny in the UK Parliament. It has provided a snapshot of how 
post-legislative scrutiny is undertaken, with what frequency and with what 
consequence, in both Houses of Parliament. However it has also raised a number 
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of questions and implications for the academic study of the UK Parliament and 
also for the future operation of post-legislative scrutiny, not just in the UK but in 
other legislatures too.  
It is clear from the research that our knowledge of post-legislative scrutiny is 
incomplete. This was not unexpected as this research forms one of the first 
academic studies of post-legislative scrutiny. While the research focused upon 
formal post-legislative scrutiny it also began to uncover a more informal style of 
post-legislative scrutiny that select committees in the House of Commons were 
undertaking. This research in relation to informal post-legislative scrutiny provides 
the first steps into trying to locate such scrutiny. Additional research in this area is 
important for a number of reasons, firstly because post-legislative scrutiny is more 
extensive than is perhaps conventionally thought and there is a lack of knowledge 
on how best to locate this scrutiny. Secondly, the lack of understanding of informal 
post-legislative scrutiny has implications for those undertaking it. Additional 
research could lead to parliamentary committees developing processes to better 
identify when they are undertaking post-legislative scrutiny and improve its 
quality. Additional research could also assist in building upon the definition of 
informal post-legislative scrutiny utilised in this thesis and ultimately improve its 
conceptualisation.  
This research has focused solely on the parliamentary side of post-legislative 
scrutiny in the UK. Again, this reinforces the point that our knowledge of post-
legislative scrutiny is not yet complete. The government’s role in the production of 
memoranda is unstudied. As the government plays a role in the initiation of post-
legislative scrutiny, at least in the House of Commons, further research is necessary 
into the full role that the government plays. In particular it is will be important to 
study how departments develop memoranda and how many are presented to select 
committees within the required timeframes (especially as they often trigger 
committee inquiries). It will also be important to assess how government 
departments react to post-legislative scrutiny reports and develop their responses 
to them. This will be vital in developing a broader view of the process and would 
recognise that not all responsibility lies with the legislature with regards to post-
legislative scrutiny. Indeed in a parliamentary system in which the executive 
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initiates the vast majority of legislation, the legislature is not the sole actor in the 
legislative process. 
Furthermore, our knowledge of post-legislative scrutiny remains incomplete as 
this research is solely UK-focused. This research has just focused upon one way of 
undertaking post-legislative scrutiny, the UK approach. In order to fully appreciate 
what is the most appropriate and impactful way to undertake post-legislative 
scrutiny it is necessary to research how it is undertaken in other legislatures around 
the world. It will be of particular importance for the continued development of 
post-legislative scrutiny to assess how such scrutiny is undertaken in other 
parliamentary systems in order to locate best practice for the benefit of all 
legislatures, not just the UK Parliament. Although post-legislative scrutiny is 
becoming more widespread, it is still in its infancy and to ensure its continued 
development as a tool to improve the quality of legislation and also to hold 
governments to account for the implementation of legislation, additional research 
is necessary. 
One of the other implications to flow from this research has been that 19 out of the 
20 Acts to have received post-legislative scrutiny between 2008 and 2017 have 
essentially been given ‘a clean bill of health’ and are operating as intended. This 
does not match the expectations from the literature on the legislative process and 
the quality of the legislation that this process produces. Indeed this literature is 
noted in the introductory chapter and states that the legislative process is a flawed 
one which produces flawed legislation. At least from this research’s perspective this 
does not appear to be the case. The first interpretation of this finding is that 
potentially the academic literature is overstating the challenges with the legislative 
process, which academics such as Thompson (2013; 2015), Russell, Gover, & Wollter 
(2015) and Russell & Cowley (2016) have noted in their own research. However 
these academics did not suggest that the legislative process was perfect, only that 
the executive was not as dominant as is often assumed and that public bill 
committees in the House of Commons have more influence over amendments than 
conventional wisdom suggests. The second interpretation is that there is a problem 
with the selection of Acts which receive post-legislative scrutiny. Considering the 
findings of this research point to how partisan this process can be when it comes 
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to the selection of legislation, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the problem is 
most likely with the selection of legislation. That being said, there is scope for 
further research into both of these implications in order to discover what is 
occurring. 
One of the other implications of this research has is the impact that specialist 
advisors have on committees as well as the inquiries that they undertake, not just 
in relation to post-legislative scrutiny. Chapter six highlighted potential pitfalls in 
the use of specialist advisors, due to them having their own agendas and their own 
biases. This has implications for committee independence and direction. The role 
of committee specialist advisors warrants attention, especially from those 
interested in the behaviour of committees and in the impact that committees have. 
Such research could have an important impact on the way they are appointed and 
the influence that they have on committees. 
There is a further implication that is worth reflecting upon and this touches upon 
the point raised about partisanship. In the introductory chapter the thesis noted 
how the Law Commission (2006) warned against issues that could limit post-
legislative scrutiny and the commission focused upon ensuring this process did not 
become overtly partisan. It was a noble aim but partisanship is impossible to 
remove completely, even in a select committee setting. There are partisan interests 
present in terms of the selection of legislation as well as the development of 
recommendations. It is therefore clear that this process is not free from 
partisanship. It raises the question noted by Rogers & Walters (2015) of whether 
post-legislative scrutiny is best served by being undertaken by parliament. This 
thesis has, however, shed light on this particular dilemma and although the 
assessment of the impact of legislation is a political judgement, which is best made 
by parliament, further thought and work is needed to ensure that post-legislative 
scrutiny is not just a tick box exercise and can bring about the change envisaged 
by the Law Commission (2006). Although the literature on the legislative process 
may overstate how poor the quality of legislation is, the truth is no government or 
legislative draftsman is perfect and no one can see into the future to see what 
impact a particular piece of legislation will have. As such post-legislative scrutiny 
will remain an important mechanism to locate and deal with flaws in Acts of 
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Parliament. It is therefore worth engaging with these challenges to ensure it is as 
impactful as possible. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Direction of Recommendations – formal post-legislative scrutiny  
 
Direction No. % 
Local Government 20 4 
Parliament 3 1 
Other (universities/police) 8 2 
Professional bodies (regulators/representative bodies) 11 2 
Central Government  357 78 
Executive agencies 48 11 
Both Central Government + Executive Agency 8 2 
Central Government + Other 2 0 
 Total 457 100 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Strength of Recommendations – formal post-legislative scrutiny 
  
Strength No % 
No Action 11 3 
Small Action 194 38 
Lower Medium Action 86 17 
Mid-range Action 158 31 
Upper Medium Action 48 10 
Large Action 7 1 
 Total 504 100 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Acceptance of Recommendations – formal post-legislative scrutiny 
  
Acceptance No % 
No Response 52 10 
Rejected outright 131 26 
Rejected in part 51 10 
Neither accepted nor rejected 74 15 
Accepted in part 63 13 
Accepted outright 133 26 
Total 504 100 
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Appendix 4: Strength of Recommendations – informal post-legislative scrutiny  
 
Strength No % 
No Action 3 2 
Small Action 63 47 
Lower Medium Action 20 15 
Mid-range Action 30 22 
Upper Medium Action 16 12 
Large Action 2 1 
Total 134 100 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5: Acceptance of Recommendations – informal post-legislative scrutiny  
 
Acceptance No % 
No Response 4 3 
Rejected outright 26 19 
Rejected in part 12 9 
Neither accepted nor rejected 33 25 
Accepted in part 15 11 
Accepted outright 44 33 
Total 134 100 
 
Appendix 6: Key for Committee abbreviations 
 
Abbreviation  Full Committee Name 
Ad hoc (L) Ad hoc committee 
BEIS Business, Innovation and Industrial Strategy Committee 
BIS34 Business, Innovation and Skills Committee 
CLG Communities and Local Government Committee 
CMS Culture, Media and Sport Committee 
D Defence Committee 
DPRRC (L) Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee 
EA Environmental Audit Committee 
EFRA Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee 
FA Foreign Affairs Committee 
H Health Committee 
HA Home Affairs Committee 
ID International Development Committee 
J Justice Committee 
JCHR Joint Committee on Human Rights 
                                                     
34 Now the BEIS Committee 
322 
SCAL Select Committee on Adoption Legislation 
SCEAD Select Committee on the Equality Act 2010 and Disability 
SCEL Select Committee on Extradition Law 
SCIA Select Committee on the Inquiries Act 
SCLA Select Committee on the Licensing Act 2003 
SCMCA Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 
TI35 Trade and Industry Committee 
NIA Northern Ireland Affairs Committee 
PA36 Public Administration Committee 
PACA Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee 
PE Petitions Committee 
WE Women and Equalities Committee 
 
 
 
Appendix 7: Key for departmental abbreviations 
 
Abbreviation Full Department Names 
BEIS Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
BIS Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (Old) 
CO Cabinet Office 
DCLG Department for Communities and Local Government 
DCMS Department for Culture, Media and Sport 
DCSF Department for Children, Schools and Families (Old) 
DfE Department for Education 
DEFRA Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
DFCA Department for Constitutional Affairs (Old) 
DFES Department for Education and Skills (Old) 
DFT Department for Transport 
DH Department of Health 
DWP Department for Work and Pensions 
HMT Her Majesty’s Treasury 
HO Home Office 
MoJ Ministry of Justice 
WEO Women and Equalities Office 
 
                                                     
35 Now part of the BEIS Committee 
36 Now the PACA Committee 
